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Abstract 
Burrell and Morgan (2000) claimed that knowledge is paradigmatic, 
encompassing a distinct worldview and rationality governing research 
strategies and methods for which they identified four sociological 
paradigms to locate them based on “metatheoretical assumptions 
about the nature of reality, knowledge, and human behavior” (Cun-
liffe, 2010). They regard the competing theories developed from dif-
ferent paradigms as incommensurable—those working in one para-
digm are not understood by those committed to another. Moreover, 
“there can be no measure, outside of the paradigms, which can be 
used as a basis for comparing and adjudicating between the claims to 
knowledge of theories produced from within different paradigms” 
(Jackson, 2000).
This new theory states that because the problem of paradigm incom-
mensurability begins at the level of ontology the solution lies there as 
well. Rather than supporting just one or a few paradigms, a different 
type of ontology is needed to explain ontological variety. It is argued 
that we can only perceive reality as meaningful paradigmatically, just 
as in the metaphor of the blind men and the elephant (Saxe, ca. 
1850) where each comes upon a different part of an elephant and 
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generalises that the whole is like their one piece. Furthermore, they 
cannot understand what they have found by comparing experiences. 
Solving the incommensurability issue is the theoretical key needed to 
properly underpin pluralist approaches to systems theory, design and 
intervention. But to do so, this new ontology is placed so that it oper-
ates within a suitable and otherwise complete theoretical framework 
which does not circumscribe, subsume, or in any way alter existing 
approaches, paradigms and theories—it purpose is only to sanction 
their use in a pluralist systemic approach. Such a framework, called 
P–S Multiparadigm Perspectivity is described in this thesis. 
Ten interviews with systemists were conducted with mixed results. 
The tests mistakenly assumed that systemists were generally aware 
of paradigms and incommensurability—instead, an aversion to theory 
was discovered. Surprisingly, though, two methods to address the is-
sue were also found in the data. One of the interviewees teaches the-
ory through storytelling; another demonstrates methods first, to 
pique the learner’s interest and evoke their questions. It was learned 
that the adoption of this theory depends upon an improved aware-
ness of the concepts of critical systems paradigms within the system-
ist community. 
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Chapter
1. Introduction
I have been inspired and encouraged by a quote from 
Whitehead, that ”the proper test of theory is not that of 
finality, but of progress” (1929). This research project is 
an attempt to make some progress [TB].
1.1. Summary of the dissertation  
This research concerns contemporary issues in critical systems think-
ing. One has to do with the past and our present trajectory in terms 
of theory and the community of systemist researchers, designers and 
practitioners. Another is one which has impeded the advancement of 
systemic practice.
• The radical evolutionary process of progress: developments, 
improvements and advancements of all sorts, some even 
breaking through into whole new worlds of thought. Great 
achievements, yes, but this has also meant a widening of 
the differences between us as systemists. We welcome di-
versity, but have been pushed far apart by divergence. We 
have seen the fracturing of the systems community into spe-
cialties and the decline of the generalist.
• There has been an increasing awareness of the need for 
transdisciplinary approaches to complex systems. In terms 
of critical systems thinking, that requires the employment of 
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a multiparadigm multimethodological, or pluralist, approach. 
There is a need for integrative frameworks for multimethod-
ologies within which systems theories are organised, practi-
tioners co-operate, and where generalists are instead plural-
ists. 
Empirically, the fracturing of the systems community of theorists, re-
searchers and practitioners is concomitant with the evolutionary pro-
gress, diversification and specialisation of systems theories and 
methodologies. The growing ‘family tree’ of systems philosophy is in 
a sense Darwinian—the evolution of species in an environment (here, 
different problem contexts) wherein new methodologies are likely to 
continue to adapt, evolve and mutate to fill every niche; where the 
introduction of a radically new systems theory opens up an entirely 
new environment of opportunity to fill, and the cycle continues.
The systems community was once a small, cohesive group of systems 
thinkers. The Society for General Systems Research (est. 1954) grew 
and evolved into the International Society for the Systems Sciences 
(ISSS). Around the world there are many intellectually-affiliated so-
cieties and spin-offs such as the United Kingdom Systems Society 
(UKSS), the International Federation for Systems Research (IFSR), 
the Cybernetics Society, etc. Some of the Society’s members have 
complained the growth process has not been orderly or well man-
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aged. Members have dispersed, others have broken away to form 
more exclusive and specialised associations, some even disavow their 
obvious intellectual associations with systems thinking. A few of us 
ask what can be done to reverse or at least slow this unhappy trend?
In the modern practice of systemic intervention, multiparadigm mul-
timethodology, or pluralism, is becoming recognised as having an in-
creasingly powerful potential to supply the ‘requisite variety’ (à la 
Ashby, 1956) for applicability and effectiveness as opposed to any 
single methodology in complex situations. In other words, the poten-
tial power of pluralism is positively correlated with systemic complex-
ity. 
However, pluralism suffers the problem of theoretical (i.e. paradigm) 
incommensurability. Paradigms (and therefore approaches that em-
ploy multiple paradigms) are said to be incommensurable because 
their underlying assumptions are believed to be irreconcilable (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). There are other ways of looking at theories as we 
shall see, but if we accept the idea of incommensurable paradigms it 
follows that there is no internally consistent, coherent, legitimate and 
inclusive theory to guide the systemist in the theoretically well-
informed employment of multiple (across paradigm) methodologies. 
That is to say, if we think about theories in such terms and do not 
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deny them or ignore them, then a theory which incorporates incom-
mensurable paradigms by involving methodologies from across those 
paradigms is either logically inconsistent or relativistic. It follows, too, 
that there is no theoretically-legitimate way in which methods can be 
derived from them for use within the same study, design or interven-
tion. 
In the face of the long term intractability of this paradox there is one 
alternative that is growing in popular support—pragmatism1, i.e. act-
ing without recourse to theory. However, this thesis generally es-
chews pragmatism except, as I have learned in this research project, 
as a method for demonstration.2 In general, I believe that responsible 
systemic practice must be based in theory and that a better way for-
ward is with a process of continuous improvement. With respect to 
our multiparadigm multimethodologies, we must address (rather than 
ignore or deny) the issue of paradigm incommensurability.
This research project began with a review of the literature on theory 
and paradigms and their components and a search of the theories of 
4
1  That is, atheoretical pragmatism. See pragmatism, §3.5.
2  Except when used as a method within a theoretically-informed strategy as 
a preliminary aid to learning, e.g. in storytelling. (See Chapter 8 where I 
discovered that taking a pragmatic approach as a first step in teaching a 
systems concept by demonstration or through storytelling was both effec-
tive and enjoyable.
systems thinking to identify scholarly works which are directly related 
to the theoretical issues of multimethodology, multiple paradigms and 
theoretical pluralism. That literature is covered in Chapters 3 and 4, 
with specific system theories evaluated with respect to the problem of 
paradigm incommensurability in Chapter 5. Analysis was done to po-
sition these theories in relation to each other in terms of provenance 
and philosophical alignment. Supporting philosophies were given at-
tribution if they could be identified and four maps were produced to 
indicate these relationships and associated information (see Figures 
10–13), beginning in 1984 with Jackson and Keys’ A System of Sys-
tems Methodologies (Jackson and Keys, 1984) and ending with the 
theory proposed in this dissertation, first published in 2008 (Bowers, 
2008a, b, 2009a, b, 2010a, b, 2011a, b, 2012). 
This dissertation then puts forward a proposal that might rectify both 
of the issues mentioned at the beginning of this section. First, it looks 
at the issue of paradigm incommensurability and why it may be ap-
proached as a problem based at the level of deep ontology.  To over-
come paradigm incommensurability, this dissertation produces a new 
ontology for systems theory that is based on systems principles, the 
duality of process and structure, and isomorphisms between object 
and subject. Then, with the addition of a new epistemology and 
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methodology, the product of this dissertation becomes a purpose-
built theoretical framework for the practicing systemist in a critical 
pluralist approach. 
An experiment involving ten systemists was designed to test basic 
assumptions of the new approach and was conducted to reinforce 
some measure of its validity and utility. The experiment requires that 
the interviewees consider a complex problem scenario. The Interna-
tional Society for the Systems Sciences (ISSS) organisation was cho-
sen as convenient, contemporary issue and one with which they are 
all familiar. The experiment was not concerned with the ISSS, only in 
the ability of the systemist to shift paradigms. Data was collected and 
analysed to locate wherever successful shifts in paradigmatic point of 
view could be noted and to identify whether or not any new aspects 
of the problem scenario were reported. Qualitative and quantitative 
data analysis and triangulation yielded mixed results. A critical look at 
the results was made and a reflective discussion as to what they 
might mean, was also written. I reflected as well on my own per-
formance in conducting the interviews, and incorporated lessons 
learned. 
In the Conclusions chapter I took a step back from the review of how 
well the experiment was constructed and conducted and made a re-
6
flexive (self-reflective) critique of the conceptual structure of experi-
ment itself. That lead to the discovery of my network of assumptions 
and biases that motivated the flawed design of the experiment and 
formed my unrealistic expectations of the interviewees. That is, I be-
came aware that the basics of contemporary critical systems thinking 
is not knowledge that is widespread in the systems community, as I 
had expected. 
The dissertation finishes with a discussion of the research project as a 
learning journey. It was not just about the production of new theory; 
it became a journey of self discovery, as well. Finally, the external 
impact of this research project is considered and its contributions to 
the body of knowledge are reexamined. It goes back to the need to 
educate the systems community in the basics of critical systems 
thinking.
1.2. Aims, objectives, the research question and contribu-
tions to knowledge
This research addresses the question, 
Is it possible to create a theoretical framework for sys-
tems thinking and practice which resolves the long stand-
ing problem of paradigm incommensurability and enables 
a new, coherently-informed multiparadigm multimethodo-
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
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logical approach to systemic research, design and inter-
vention?
The objectives of this research are:
• To conduct research to develop a historical perspective spe-
cifically of those theories which address multiparadigmatic 
and multimethodological approaches to systems thinking and 
practice and then to create a map which indicates their rela-
tionships and supporting philosophies.
• To explain the problem of paradigm incommensurability and 
how it relates to theoretical support of any cross-paradigm 
multimethodological approach.
• To propose a new ontology that reconciles the problem of 
paradigm incommensurability and an epistemology and 
methodology to make it a functional as a theoretical frame-
work for systemic research, design and practice.
• To test the new theory in such a way as to demonstrate 
whether or not its basic assumptions are satisfied—that sys-
temists can take a serially multiparadigmatic look at a highly 
complex system of concern, and find value in doing so.
The aims of this research in order to reach those objectives are:
• To explore the development and divergence of the method-
ologies of systems thinking in terms of their grounding phi-
losophies and to chart a paradigmatic taxonomy.
8
• To focus this research on the multiparadigm, multimethodo-
logical branch of critical systems thinking and the philosophi-
cal attempts within it to resolve the problem of paradigm in-
commensurability. 
• To explore and develop new ideas from the concept of an a-
paradigmatic reality; and, with the specialised needs of the 
systems community in mind, propose a simple, inclusive on-
tology which intrinsically supports it. 
• To produce a new epistemology and methodology and then 
to make a new model for a systemic approach based on the 
new ontology which specifically supports cross-paradigm 
multimethodologies and their engagement in systemic prac-
tice. 
• To design and run an experiment to test the theory’s basic 
assumptions and as a critique and validation exercise, to re-
flect on the findings and adjust and improve the theory from 
what was learned.
Its contributions to the body of knowledge are:
• A map of the development of pluralist systems with support-
ing philosophies and citations.
• A new ontology, P–S ontology and the critical moment of be-
coming, as a resolution to paradigm incommensurability with 
respect to the systemist. 
• A usable understanding of the mind-brain's production of 
paradigmatic observations pulled as emergent properties of 
an a-paradigmatic reality we cannot know.
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
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• A new framework, P–S multiparadigm perspectivity, to sup-
port pluralist approaches to systemic research, design and 
practice.
• An awareness of the need to increase systemists' knowledge 
and understanding of the paradigms of systemic practice and 
of multiparadigm multimethodological approaches.
The preceding components of the research project and their relation-
ships with one another are graphically illustrated in the following fig-
ure:
10
Figure 1.  The research question, objectives, aims and contributions to knowledge.
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learned.
To explore and 
d e v e l o p n e w 
ideas from the 
concept of an a-
paradigmatic re‐
ality; and, with 
the specialised 
needs o f the 
systems com‐
munity in mind, 
propose a sim‐
ple, inclusive 
ontology which 
intrinsically sup‐
ports it. 
To produce a 
new epistemolo‐
gy and method‐
ology and then 
to make a new 
model for a sys‐
temic approach 
based on the 
new ontology 
which specifi‐
cally supports 
cross-paradigm 
multimethodolo‐
gies and their 
engagement in 
systemic prac‐
tice. 
Research 
Question
Aims
Objectives
A map of the de‐
ve lopment o f 
p lura l is t sys‐
tems theories 
with supporting 
p h i l o s o p h i e s 
and citations.
An awareness of 
the need to in‐
c r e a s e s y s‐
temists' knowl‐
edge and under‐
standing of the 
parad igms of 
systemic prac‐
tice and of multi‐
paradigm multi‐
methodological 
approaches.
A new frame‐
work, P–S multi‐
paradigm per‐
spect iv i ty , to 
support pluralist 
approaches to 
s y s t e m i c r e‐
search, design 
and practice.
A new ontology, 
P–S ontology 
and the critical 
moment of be‐
coming, as a 
reso lu t ion to 
p a r a d i g m i n‐
commensurabil‐
ity with respect 
to the systemist. 
A usable under‐
standing of the 
m i n d - b r a i n ' s 
production of 
p a r a d i g m a t i c 
o b s e r v a t i o n s 
pulled as emer‐
gent properties 
of an a-paradig‐
matic reality we 
cannot know.
Contributions to knowledge
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1.3. The researcher’s background and perspective
The aim of this research is to augment the body of knowledge where 
I have seen there is a need, and where I believe I might contribute in 
a way that makes a difference. I hope this work will stimulate some 
fresh conversations around the general topics of multiparadigm mul-
timethodological practices. It was a great personal challenge to tackle 
the wide scope and rich depth of scholarly work necessary to acquire 
the knowledge requisite to an informed attempt at such an important 
task. I have had to become familiar with the works of systems think-
ing: its history, theories and methodologies; of general and theoreti-
cal philosophy and works of early and modern social theory. Stimulat-
ing my desire was my sense I was fortunate to have been afforded 
the opportunity at a time when there is still a need for some funda-
mental critical systems theory. From ideas that began merely as in-
tuition, my thinking has continually formed, reformed and matured 
throughout the learning journey which is this project. I habitually re-
flect upon these ideas and continue to incorporate results from feed-
back and critique which I actively seek from others, including experts, 
academic colleagues and supervisors.
What is written here is a considered and well studied subjective work. 
As such it should be read with a critical eye. No credible researcher 
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today can claim to have a ‘God’s eye view’ of the world nor legiti-
mately assume such a stance. My intent is to honestly and transpar-
ently disclose what is my best understanding of these difficult sub-
jects, to admit to having biases and not to claim infallibility. I have 
tried to avoid taking an imperialist, dogmatic or pedagogic tone, but I 
admit to having strong feelings about this work and at times the tone 
of my writing comes across as forceful. I have not intentionally mis-
represented the words of others. 
I acquired my irresistible curiosity for everything about ‘systems’ as a 
first year undergraduate student of computer science at the California 
State Polytechnic University in Pomona, California; I therefore at-
tached myself to Dr. Len Troncale and his Institute for Advanced Sys-
tems Studies. I proceeded to take full advantage of his love and life’s 
work in systems science. (He once said a teacher waits years for a 
pupil such as me to come along!) Several other students were some-
how recruited and we were off, investigating general system theory 
and its history; researching and writing papers, pooling our discover-
ies in the weekly roundtable discussions. It was a heady, stimulating 
environment. Our domain was the whole of what I later learned was 
called ‘hard’ systems science. I had the opportunity to accompany Dr. 
Troncale and present my work at three annual meetings of the Inter-
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
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national Society for the Systems Sciences. It was there I made con-
tacts with Dr. Wilby and others from the University of Hull that would 
eventually attract me to the Centre for Systems Studies at the Hull 
University Business School.
At the time I was intrigued with what are called complex systems and  
I thought I would go on to do agent-based (or actor-based) computer 
modelling, combining systems thinking with my background and 
studies in systems analysis and computer programming. Before I 
could make that mistake, though, I learned that the most complex 
systems are human systems—individuals, organisations and societi-
es—for which descriptive models are best. Humans, being creative, 
evolving and adaptive, etc. are non-deterministic. In fact their behav-
iour is so complex that they break those computer models; systems 
calls them ‘brittle’.
Doctoral studies at Hull University opened my world to the qualitative 
(the so-called ‘soft’, interpretive, subjective) realm of human-based 
systems and to critical systems thinking, design and intervention. 
Once again, I took full advantage of the resources available to me, 
taking advanced courses in qualitative as well as quantitative re-
search methods and philosophy, modern social theory and organisa-
tional learning and decision making. I have had access to an unbe-
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lievable library; sought engagement and support from the local and 
global systems community, and the world-class faculty. I have devel-
oped my awareness of the milieu of systems thinking including the 
critical–emancipatory and postmodern approaches for which the field 
is highly indebted to scholars from the Hull University Business 
School and its antecedents.
Sadly though, for the field of systems thinking, such radical ad-
vancements have led to divergence and the field continues to frag-
ment (Jackson, 1994) owing to its widening areas of applicability and 
to the increase in specialisation. I have a special desire to see the 
field and the community of researchers and practitioners united and 
thriving as it should be, especially considering the unfathomable po-
tential benefits to mankind and the planet. I feel strongly that we 
systemists must educate ourselves about the other ‘worlds’, or para-
digms of contemporary systems thinking and familiarise ourselves 
with at least one methodology from each paradigm. To remain igno-
rant certainly has many consequences. I like to say that all the easy 
problems have been solved. Right now, though, systemic practice has 
seemingly outgrown its family tree, and systems theory must catch 
up and provide the new branches of support, especially for pluralism.
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
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There are two central subjects of this research project, the theoretical 
paradigms of critical systems thinking and the problem of paradigm 
incommensurability which acts as a conceptual barrier between them. 
The main topics of discussion in the thesis are:
• The development and divergence of systems theory. That is, 
where we are and how we got here.
• The classification of theory by systems paradigm. This is the 
structure that distinguishes the philosophy of critical systems 
thinking from other onto-epistemologies and it is the line of 
thinking which assumes that there are multiple, valid sys-
tems of thought, or ‘worldviews’.
• The problem of paradigm incommensurability. As was 
stressed by the foundational theorists Burrell and Morgan 
(1979), and Morgan and Smircich (1980); paradigms are in-
commensurable owing to differences in their constituent on-
tologies (different concepts for the constituents of ‘the 
world’), epistemologies (different value systems, definitions, 
distinctions and modes of thought), and methodologies (dif-
ferent ways of working with ‘the world’).
• A new ontology and a new model for pluralism. This is new 
thinking about how different ‘worlds’ could come from the 
same potential reality space, and how this can inform our 
approach as systemists to systemic research, design and in-
tervention.
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• Testing the framework with real systemists and interpreting 
the results. This is a test of the feasibility of these new 
ideas. From these tests we learn and adjust to the implica-
tions.
• Incorporating what was learned from the experiment and 
adapting the theory and approach to a new way of thinking 
about systemic theory and practice. The results give context 
to the impact of the experiment and serve to reframe the 
project from the point of view of the participants. 
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
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Chapter
2. The research project
Paradigms simplify the bewildering variety of theories and 
methodologies. They organise theories into paradigmatic 
groups, or worldviews and give onto-epistemological con-
text to methodologies [TB].
2.1. Introduction
I suppose the appeal that paradigms have for me as a critical sys-
tems pluralist is the elegant way in which they simplify the universe 
of theories. They collapse into just a few discrete worldviews. The 
idea of paradigms and the problem of paradigm incommensurability is 
a central concern of this dissertation. 
The matter, as well as some contrary views, are presented in the re-
search materials reviewed in Chapter 3. After defining our terms, evi-
dence that the problem per se has not yet been resolved is cited. It is 
suggested, however, that the product of this research may serve to 
point the way forward—not by abandoning or ignoring the problem or 
by redefining or reframing it as some would do—but by proposing 
new theory that accepts the problem and sees it as providing a diver-
sity of ‘perspectivity’. 
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
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It proposes a new systems ontology and a framework for practice in-
cluding an alternative epistemology and methodology designed spe-
cifically to support the systemist in multiparadigm multimethodologi-
cal engagements with complex systems in terms of research, design 
and intervention. The following diagram illustrates the structure of 
the process in the type of engagements proposed. 
process–structure
ontology
positivist-functionalist 
paradigm 
onto-epistemology
interpretivist paradigm 
onto-epistemology
...
critical moment
methodology
methodology
...
methodology
methodology
...
critical-emancipatory 
paradigm 
onto-epistemology
postmodern paradigm 
onto-epistemology
methodology
methodology
...
methodology
methodology
...
Figure 2.  Structural components of a new critical systemic pluralism.
The diagram shows a new theoretical ontology interfacing with a new 
process called the critical moment.3 In the critical moment, any one 
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3  See the critical moment of becoming, Chapter 6.
of the onto-epistemological theoretical paradigms of critical systems 
thinking4 may be creatively deployed for an engagement with the 
problem situation from within that paradigm. In practice, the system-
ist does this again and again, and uses each paradigm to explore the 
problem situation from multiple perspectives.5 
2.2. The researcher’s approach to this research
2.2.1. Epistemological and ontological stance
Epistemology and ontology are structural components of philosophy, 
both of which are carefully explained in this research project. In a 
way that relates to the ontology of this research, you could say that 
ontology supports epistemology and as such can be thought of as the 
structure or environment within which epistemological processes take 
place6. Bhaskar also demonstrates an understanding of the ‘form and 
function’ dependency, says Craib (1992):
A comparatively recent development most generally 
known as [Critical] Realism, particularly as developed in 
the work of Roy Bhaskar… Bhaskar is concerned to dem-
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
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4  See paradigms of critical systems thinking, Chapter 4.
5  See the methodology, Chapter 7.
6  Note: the terms ‘structure’ and ‘process’ are important later.
onstrate that ontological and epistemological questions 
are interrelated in the sense that the way we gain knowl-
edge about the world, what comprises an adequate ex-
planation, depends on the sort of beings that exist in the 
world. To put in another way, the object we are studying 
determines the knowledge we can have of it.
This research puts forth and develops a philosophy wherein I assert 
that reality has a doubly dual nature at the level of ontology and with 
respect to the systemist observer (see later chapters). I argue that 
there is an objective existence, a reality independent from the ob-
server. However, what a human observer knows of objective reality at 
the ontological level is indirect and limited, dependent upon and aris-
ing from the functioning brain. I assert that reality with respect to the 
systemist observer is, therefore, constructed; i.e. subjective, inter-
preted, contextual, complex, emotional, biased—necessarily incom-
plete and imperfect at best, flawed and biased otherwise. This way of 
thinking is a form of constructivism (see §3.3.2.4). That which is 
known as reality from the standpoint of the systemist includes syn-
thesised abstractions which are herein afforded transitory, localised 
(as opposed to universal) ontological status. Our thoughts are real to 
us and we say that there are things called thoughts.
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What is problematic is that we are evolved (i.e. there is a physical 
mechanism) to match phenomena from objective reality with con-
tinuous adjustments to our subjective reality. We are not normally 
aware of this process. We do not normally think in the abstract about 
ourselves in the act of thinking, and say, for example, “What I think 
comes from me, thinking”. What we do normally do is simply, and by 
virtue of the evolution of our species, identify our subjective experi-
ences as the reality.
This view of reality allows me, as a critical systems pluralist, to utilise 
the paradigms of critical systems thinking to come to know complex 
systems through entirely different worldviews, and to approach them 
with a diverse array of theoretical and methodological tools.
2.2.2. Axiological, ethical and praxiological stance
Heron (1996) argues that our values are the guiding reason for all 
human action. Axiology is a branch of philosophy that studies how 
judgments about value are made. Ethics (as it concerns this research 
project) is the study of actions based on those values. Praxiology is 
concerned with “how we should act in an informed and reflective 
manner.” It is “primarily concerned with intervention and action.” It 
can be subdivided, say Mingers and Brocklesby (1997) drawing on 
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
23
Habermas (1993), into three aspects: “Effectiveness—questions 
about the extent to which desired ends are achieved; ethics—ques-
tions about the value and desirability of courses of action for indi-
viduals and communities; and morals—questions about the effects of 
an individual’s actions on other people” (Mingers and Brocklesby, 
1997).
Researchers demonstrate axiological skill by being able to articulate 
their values as a basis for making ethical judgements about what re-
search they are conducting and how they go about it. Saunders, 
Lewis et al. (2007) suggest that research should include a statement 
of values by the researcher, and I have done what amounts to the 
same (refer back to §1.3, The researcher’s perspective, and ahead to 
the remainder of this section). The tradition of phenomenology 
agrees; one of its tenets is that researcher values determine what are 
recognised as facts and interpretations (Powell, 1999).
This ties in with the ideology and methodologies of Critical Systems 
Thinking which emphasise reflexivity (self-reflection) of a special 
kind—critical reflexivity (ideological self-critique)—and transparency 
(conscious self-revealing in the telling). Transparency is recom-
mended as well to document the reflexivity and to counter any pre-
tence of absolutes: objectivity, certainty, understanding (Etherington, 
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2004; Cunliffe, 2008a). This research project is a product of critical 
reflexivity. It aims to be as transparent as possible, especially ax-
iologically, and relies upon a commitment to reflection and reflexivity 
in the tradition of critical systems thinking. These values are also 
aligned with my own morals.
2.2.3. Ethics and HUBS ethical procedures
This research project is conducted with reference to and compliance 
with the ethics procedures of Hull University Business School. These 
regulations and procedures are available for download from 
http://hull.ac.uk/hubs/downloads/students/ethical_procedures_resea
rch_teaching.pdf. Conducting this research will not place any person 
in a position of personal risk, whether physical or psychological. None 
of the data gathered is confidential, nor will its use cause personal 
harm to the authors of the material. The thesis cites its sources and 
properly credits all materials. 
2.2.4. Scope and purpose of this research
By theoretical support I mean that we need one solution that answers 
the question, “By what most basic underlying mechanism or envi-
ronment (that nature provides) do these methodologies, based as 
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they are on incommensurable paradigms, nevertheless work in prac-
tice when used pragmatically; that is, a-theoretically?”
2.2.5. A way forward
One simple step of logical induction has lead me to the realisation 
that there must be an ontological component operating which allows 
for and supports each systems paradigm and the incommensurability 
between them. The solution, as I see it, lies at the level of ontology. 
Rather than supporting just one paradigm, I feel that a single, under-
lying ontology is needed to explain the existence of the variety of 
paradigms. Why I see one ontology, which I call the P–S ontology, 
underlying others is explained in Chapter 6, along with a defence 
against charges of relativism. The proposed ontology, like all other 
ontologies, starts with a few assumptions; one is that the ontologies 
of the paradigms of critical systems thinking are each partial views of 
a much larger, infinitely multidimensional, a-paradigmatic ontology. 
“All paradigms constrain the way in which we can ‘see’ situations” 
(Yolles, 1996), like the learned blind men in the story of the blind 
men and the elephant:
It was six men of Hindustan
To learning much inclined,
Who went to see the Elephant
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(Though all of them were blind)
That each by observation
Might satisfy the mind.
Figure 3.  Blind monks examining an elephant, by Itcho Hanabusa.
The first approached the Elephant
And happening to fall
Against his broad and sturdy side
At once began to bawl:
"Bless me, it seems the Elephant
Is very like a wall".
The second, feeling of his tusk,
Cried, "Ho! What have we here
So very round and smooth and sharp?
To me 'tis mighty clear
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This wonder of an Elephant
Is very like a spear".
The third approached the animal,
And happening to take
The squirming trunk within his hands,
Then boldly up and spake:
"I see," quoth he, "the Elephant
Is very like a snake."
The Fourth reached out an eager hand,
And felt about the knee.
"What most this wondrous beast is like
Is mighty plain," quoth he;
"'Tis clear enough the Elephant
Is very like a tree!"
The Fifth, who chanced to touch the ear,
Said: "E'en the blindest man
Can tell what this resembles most;
Deny the fact who can,
This marvel of an Elephant
Is very like a fan!"
The Sixth no sooner had begun
About the beast to grope,
Than, seizing on the swinging tail
That fell within his scope,
"I see," quoth he, "the Elephant
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Is very like a rope!"
And so these men of Hindustan
Disputed loud and long,
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong,
Though each was partly in the right
And all were in the wrong.
So oft in theologic wars,
The disputants, I ween,
Rail on in utter ignorance
Of what each other mean,
And prate about an Elephant
Not one of them has seen! (Saxe, ca. 1850)
In the end each learned man, having only his own frame of reference, 
cannot begin to understand the others’ reports as those reports come 
from worldviews which are completely incommensurable with his 
own. Comparisons of one account against another are baseless; that 
is, there is no system of reference which includes both and could pro-
vide a basis for comparison. Differences between them are, likewise, 
not possible. Nor can they be integrated; the combinations are all 
nonsensical.
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2.3. Research objectives
This research seeks to map the divergence of theories of systems 
thinking and juxtapose a new vision for theoretical and methodologi-
cal pluralism in systems thinking and practice. It needs to explain two 
difficult issues in contemporary systems thinking and the importance 
of the need to resolve them, and to catalog recent attempts and pro-
pose a new framework as a way forward. The primary problem is that 
of divergent philosophical theories; the second (due to the first) is 
the need for theoretical support for cross-paradigm multimethodolo-
gies. 
2.3.1. Paradigm incommensurability and a possible 
reconciliation
The thesis seeks to explain paradigm incommensurability and why it 
is the root cause of theoretical divergence in systems thinking, and to 
show the need for theoretical support for multiparadigm multimeth-
odologies. It continues by arguing that the key to the solution lies at 
the level of ontology and then proposes and tests an alternative 
framework.
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2.3.2. A new ontology and theoretical framework
As previously stated, this thesis produces and defends a new ontol-
ogy and explains why it represents a new resolution of the issues sur-
rounding paradigm incommensurability and how it then grounds the 
multiparadigm multimethodologies. Originally, it was thought that the 
new ontology, alone, would be the major contribution of this research 
project, but I found that explaining an ontology means having an 
epistemological conversation. I found that neither ontology or epis-
temology can stand alone. Ontology supports and enables epistemol-
ogy, and epistemology explains and gives meaning to ontology. So, it 
was decided that the new ontology would have to be accompanied by 
a new epistemology. Subsequently, I found that explaining what the 
new onto-epistemology does and how it could be used by the system-
ist to inform multiparadigmatic multimethodological endeavours was 
actually a conversation about methodology or approaches to method-
ology. So what had originally seemed to be a rather ambitious but 
manageable research project quite ‘naturally’ expanded to become a 
very ambitious project for the creation of an entire theoretical frame-
work. Recognising that the goals were much too big and the time al-
lotted far too short to properly complete such a framework, the re-
search project was changed, along with the title, to Towards a 
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Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies. I have done my 
best to keep the scope of the materials presented in this dissertation 
to that which is manageable within these unavoidable constraints.
2.3.3. Experimental validation of assumptions
The research project takes a step toward validation with an experi-
ment designed to demonstrate one way in which the framework could 
be used, but more importantly, to check some basic assumptions it 
makes about systemists and their ability and willingness to engage in 
a multiparadigmatic approach to systemic intervention. I used the 
framework to inform the construction of semistructured interviews in 
which I walk each of them through each paradigm in a general way. 
Then, in each paradigm, I encourage them to investigate the problem 
scenario and to report what they see. I hoped to find out that sys-
temists could engage with their problem scenario in this serially-
multiparadigmatic approach; and that in so doing, might also discover 
significant new aspects of the problem scenario which might even 
transform their conception of it. Otherwise, I hoped that I would dis-
cover what were the most significant flaws in my process and as-
sumptions. Afterwards, I would ask each participant whether or not 
the experience had been of any value to them. Only if they did find it 
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valuable to take a multiparadigmatic approach to their problem sce-
nario would they accept and use my new ideas.
2.3.4. Gaps and contributions to the body of knowl-
edge
A review of the literature points out several instances where contem-
porary theorists note gaps in the body of knowledge in systems the-
ory related to our two problems: paradigm incommensurability and 
the need for theoretical support for cross-paradigm multimethodolo-
gies. Some simply say that more work needs to be done and leave it 
at that. Others have come up with ideas that point the way toward 
likely solutions. Still others, like Midgley (2000) and Jackson (2000), 
say that the problem of paradigm incommensurability remains to be 
solved.
[We] must accept that the paradigms are incompatible 
and cannot be integrated… There is a need, of course, for 
further research on how conversations between para-
digms can best be orchestrated. (Jackson, 2000) 
Each has since produced work which has made significant progress. 
Several systems theorists have produced materials that advance our 
understanding and approaches to the problem, but I assert that none 
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has so far managed to completely close the loop on the incommen-
surability issue in its own terms (cf. Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Jackson’s (2000) latest approach, Critical Systems Thinking and Prac-
tice (CST–P) and the suite of systems paradigms he names (function-
alist, interpretivist, critical-emancipatory and postmodern) forms the 
basis for this research project; what I have considered to be ‘stan-
dard’ critical systems thinking. In CST–P, Jackson says that the dis-
covery and critical decision making processes take place ‘above’ the 
paradigms, yet this is not explained. He seems to contradict himself 
when he says that this place is not some new paradigm. A gap in the 
body of knowledge is indicated by his call for further research. 
Midgley, too, admits there is no satisfactory theory yet “to account for 
the subjective (mental) existence of multiple incommensurable para-
digms” (Midgley, 2000). In his latest work on the subject is the idea 
that the solution will have to involve the creation of a new, critical 
systems paradigm. This idea, he says, seems to offer the only avenue 
that has not been proven fruitless. Ion Georgiou (2007) agrees.
That our second problem is dependent upon the first is because a 
cross-paradigm multimethodological approach to systems practice 
implies an application of some form of methodological pluralism. But 
the idea of pluralism amongst theoretically incommensurable meth-
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odologies is an obvious oxymoron. Midgley (2000), Jackson (2000) 
and others have either explicitly or tacitly acknowledged this deficit in 
systems theory. 
Sixteen systems theories involved with the thesis problems are dis-
cussed (Chapter 5):
• A System of Systems Methodologies (SoSM)
• Interpretive Systemology
• Critical Systems Thinking
• Creative Methodology Design
• Liberating Systems Theory
• Total System Intervention
• Ontological Complexity
• Critical Appreciation, Discordant Pluralism
• Diversity Management (Triple Loop Learning)
• Pragmatic Pluralism
• Critical Pluralism, Multi-paradigm Multimethodology
• Creative Design of Methods
• Systemic Intervention
• Coherent Pluralism, Critical Systems Practice
• Critical Multimethodology
• Georgiou’s Systems Epistemology
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2.3.4.1. Regarding the development and divergence of systems thinking
The thesis explores the historical development of systems thinking in 
an endeavour to uncover the grounding philosophies of the method-
ologies of its specific concern, and then to chart a ‘family tree’ of sys-
tems theories relating to these issues, grouping them them into the 
four critical systems paradigms defined in this thesis.7 See Chapter 4, 
Systems thinking, critical systems thinking, paradigms of critical sys-
tems thinking.
2.3.4.2. Regarding paradigm incommensurability and attempts to resolve 
the problem
This research is specifically concerned with the multiparadigm and 
multimethodological varieties of systems thinking and with the philo-
sophical attempts to resolve the central problem of paradigm incom-
mensurability. Each theory is examined in the context of the concerns 
of this research and situated historically in that context. Strengths 
and weaknesses are explored with the intent that theoretical progress 
can be leveraged with such knowledge. See Chapter 5, Multipara-
digm, multimethodological systems theories.
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poses of this research.
2.3.4.3. Regarding the proposal of a simple ontology which supports an 
underlying a-paradigmatic reality
Building on the leading edge of critical systems theories, the thesis 
explores and develops new ideas involving the concept of reality as 
being a-paradigmatic, and with the specialised needs of the systems 
community in mind, proposes a simple ontology that intrinsically sup-
ports reality as such. Theoretical support is drawn from Maturana’s 
Ontology of Observing (Maturana and Varela, 1980, 1987; Maturana, 
1988a; Bunnell, 2004a, b), Bhaskar’s Critical Realism (Bhaskar, 1989; 
Collier, 1994) and a new and specific, moderate form of pluralism 
(see Margolis, 1986; Pojman, 1995; Baghramian, 2004; Mosteller, 
2008). See also Chapter 6 “Process–Structure ontology, relativism, 
pluralism, the critical moment of becoming”.
2.3.4.4. Regarding the idea that reality presents itself to the systemist as 
a paradigmatic experience
The idea is to support the new ontology with evidence that explains 
how such an a-paradigmatic reality might naturally translate by the 
mind–brain (from what contemporary Critical Systems Thinking con-
siders a multi-paradigmatic reality) into a specifically-paradigmatic, 
constructed experience. See §6.11, The critical moment of becoming.
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2.3.4.5. To demonstrate how and why the P–S ontology works
To show how, for the systems practitioner, such an ontology facilitates 
a rich understanding of extant systems in problem contexts and theo-
retically legitimises a multiparadigmatic, pluralistic approach to meth-
odology, method making and practice. See Chapter 7, The framework 
to support multiparadigm multimethodologies.
2.3.4.6. The cataloguing of previous efforts regarding multiparadigm mul-
timethodological theory
To demonstrate that past attempts—multi- meta-, complementary 
bridging and pragmatic multiparadigmatic theories—have all failed to 
produce satisfactory bases !! for mixed-paradigm multimethodologies 
and that the calls for the creation of a new theoretical framework 
may be the way forward. 
2.3.4.7. The proposal for a new approach to critical systems thinking and 
practice
To put forth my own model based on the process–structure ontology 
that specifically supports cross-paradigm multimethodologies by 
grounding the deployment of each systems paradigm.
2.3.4.8. Experimental validation
An attempt to validate this new framework and assess its usefulness 
to the systemist requires a suitable complex problem situation as a 
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case study. An organisation thought of by its member stakeholders as 
‘at risk’ in terms of its future viability would be a suitable ‘problem 
situation’. The member stakeholders should be willing to be partici-
pate and be prepared to take action with the intent to improve it. One 
of the principle stakeholders in the forty year old International Soci-
ety of Systems Scientists (ISSS) who is familiar with my research 
suggested that I use the ISSS as the problematic scenario. It is a 
widely-held view within the Society that the ISSS is not growing in 
active membership and, unless corrective action is taken, many be-
lieve that it is then at risk of a serious decline. Difficult questions are 
on the minds and tongues of its members such as: What are the 
causes of this apparent decline? What will be the cost if we cannot or 
will not effectively address its causes and change this trajectory? 
What is the risk to the very identity of the Society? What, essentially, 
is its role?
It was assumed that a sample of ISSS members would be willing to 
participate in fairly brief, semi-structured interviews whilst we were 
otherwise together participating in the annual convention. Most who 
were asked to participate agreed and were even pleased to be asked 
to help with my research project, and each had a sense that they 
might be able to contribute something of value to benefit the ISSS. It 
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seemed to be a “win-win” situation. The experiment was designed to 
demonstrate the feasibility of such a multiparadigmatic approach to 
systemic research and intervention and to collect data from inter-
views with ten systems practitioners. See Chapter 8, Testing the idea 
of multi-paradigm deployment.
2.4. Research design, approach, objectives and methods
2.4.1. Introduction
The point is to craft a structured plan for rigorous research which will 
best address the research questions and lead to relevant outcomes. 
The theoretical framework from within which the research will be 
conducted, tested and reported is described in this section. An ex-
amination of each component and arguments supporting the choice of 
each component are included, as well.
All there is to know about systems theory is huge. The thesis repre-
sents an investigation into the development of the body of systems 
theory focusing on the lines of thinking that specifically address mul-
timethodological or multiparadigmatic systemic approaches. It then 
attempts to develop and test new theory. To do so necessitated 
knowledge about the philosophy of theory and about the philosophical 
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concerns of theories of theories. Knowledge about the studies of on-
tology and epistemology was also required. 
Of special significance is the issue of relativism, but there is some 
new material available which provides theoretical support for “a mod-
erate form of pluralism” (Baghramian, 2004). See §6.10.
I begin the introduction of background materials with a discussion of 
systems of logical thought (§2.5.1) and modes of approach to re-
search (§2.5.2), and discuss which are appropriate for this research 
project. Reflection and the learning process is the subject of §2.5.3. 
Reflexivity and radical reflexivity are covered in §2.5.4. Critical sys-
tems thinking is discussed throughout this dissertation and is the 
subject of §2.5.5.
The discussion moves on to the methodology and specific methods 
used for the design of the new ontology (§2.6). Section 2.7 examines 
theories about the researching of theory, about the development of 
new theory, and how to test, validate and evaluate theory. Sections 
2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 respectively address rigour and relevance, validity 
and reliability, replicability and generalisability. 
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2.5. General research methodologies
2.5.1. Systems of logical thought
Deduction, induction and abduction (methods of logical reasoning); 
analogy and metaphor (methods of inference); and teleology (a 
method of explanation through purpose) are terms which describe 
some of the various ways we can come to learn about the world and 
come to say that we ‘know’ something. This research uses each of 
them in operationalising the research plan and for communicating the 
ongoing processes of development to the reader.
Deduction is a method of reasoning that begins with a postulation 
and proceeds with rigorously testing its validity. In this way it is a lin-
ear process. It is typical of the traditional scientific method where 
laws present the basis of explanation, allow the anticipation of phe-
nomena, predict their occurrences and therefore permit them to be 
controlled (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Deduction allows deriving b as a 
consequence of a. In other words, deduction is the process of deriv-
ing the consequences of what is assumed. Given the truth of the as-
sumptions, a valid deduction guarantees the truth of the conclusion. 
Saunders, Lewis et al. (2007) list several characteristics typical of re-
search done in the deductive mode. Deductive research emphasises:
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• scientific principles
• moving from theory to data
• the need to explain causal relationships between variables
• the collection of quantitative data
• the application of controls to ensure validity of data
• the operationalisation of concepts to ensure clarity of defini-
tion
• a highly structured approach
• researcher independence of what is being researched
• the necessity to select samples of sufficient size in order to 
generalise conclusions
Induction is a method of reasoning typically used to build theory from 
an examination of the information collected for the study. The quali-
ties typical of research done in the inductive mode are those that 
emphasise:
• gaining an understanding of the meanings humans attach to 
events
• a close understanding of the research context
• the collection of qualitative data
• a more flexible structure to permit changes of research em-
phasis as the research progresses
• a realisation that the researcher is part of the research proc-
ess
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• less concern with the need to generalise
“I see chicken eggs. There must be a chicken somewhere” is a simple 
example of induction. In terms of logic, induction allows inferring a 
from multiple instantiations of b when a entails b. Induction is the 
process of inferring probable antecedents as a result of observing 
multiple consequents. Note that an inductive also statement requires 
perception (of the consequents) for it to be true. For example, the 
statement “it is snowing outside” is invalid until one looks or goes 
outside to see whether it is true or not (Edwards, 1967). 
Abduction, or inference to the best explanation, is a method of rea-
soning in which one chooses the theory that would, if true, best ex-
plain the relevant evidence. “I see eggs. There must be a chicken 
somewhere” is abductive. Abductive reasoning starts from a set of 
accepted facts and infers their most likely, or best, explanations 
(ibid.). Abduction allows inferring a as an explanation of b. Because 
of this, abduction allows the precondition a to be inferred from the 
consequence, b. Deduction and abduction thus differ in the direction 
in which a rule like “a entails b” is used for inference. Abduction is 
vulnerable to a logical error when there are multiple possible expla-
nations for b. Unlike deduction and in some sense induction, abduc-
tion can produce results that are incorrect within its formal system. 
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However, it can still be useful as a heuristic, especially when some-
thing is known about the likelihood of different causes for b. In the 
example, chickens are not the only source of eggs. However, the like-
lihood that the egg is from a chicken would be quite high if you were 
on a chicken farm. Still, there is the possibility of error.
Analogy and metaphor, and other figures of speech, for example, 
synonym, antonym and simile, invite the listener to infer something 
from another thing. For example, “A peach is like an apple” is an 
analogy. These techniques are an important way in which we learn 
new concepts by employing the qualities of other, known things. In 
this research, the methodology used in the experiment relies on the 
use of such techniques to describe what the interviewees were asked 
to do.
Teleology is the study of design and purpose in the material world. It 
is a way of explaining phenomena by the purpose they serve, rather 
than by postulated causes (NOAD, 2010). In the context of systemic 
thinking, teleological thinking is not deprecated; it is considered a 
tool we all use in practical, everyday reasoning. To understand some-
thing new or novel we might just ask, “What is it for?”, “What does it 
do?” and the answer satisfices. For instance, we may not know how a 
computer works. To most of us the computer is a ‘black box’ and it is 
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enough to know what it does. A computer has a keyboard and a 
mouse so you can type and point and click, and a screen so we can 
see what it is doing (cf. e.g. Rosenblueth, Wiener, et al., 1943).
The logic of this research project is in the largest sense inductive. 
That is, I wish to develop theory to explain our observations of multi-
ple, co-located ontological phenomena. It is also needed, for exam-
ple, to explain the production of epistemological phenomena emer-
gent from the level of ontology. Abduction is employed when alterna-
tive speculations about the source or cause of a phenomenon are 
considered, as in the development of ontological theory where there 
are valid alternative arguments. Deduction is used commonly and 
wherever it is appropriate, such as in the analysis of the experimental 
results. Teleological constructs are generally supplied to add context 
and catalyse associations.
2.5.2. Quantitative and qualitative modes of research
Quantitative research involves the collection of data that is analysed 
numerically or quantitatively as opposed to qualitative research which 
involves a descriptive or qualitative analysis of the information. This 
study takes a qualitative approach, rather than a quantitative one as 
the information gathered and analysed in this project is textual and 
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descriptive of theory and practice. Qualitative evidence, being less 
definitive than hard qualitative results, bears a stronger burden of 
proof. Typically (and as in this case where I use ten systemists) the 
researcher will present more than one account as compelling evi-
dence which, when compared with alternatives, is persuasive. In one 
step, a quantitative method is used to produce simple statistics to as-
sist the qualitative approach. 
Throughout this research, which is qualitative research, the reasoning 
logic of deduction, induction and abduction are used for purpose and 
the explanatory power available through the use of both the descrip-
tive tools of analogy and metaphor is employed as well within the 
various formal methodologies operating in the stepwise process de-
scribed in the research plan which is itself given structure by the con-
ceptual (theoretical) framework.
2.5.3. Reflection and learning 
A method for ‘looking back’ or reexamination and reevaluation stage 
in the process of learning and inquiry, reflection is necessary in the 
learning process. It provides the mechanism of re-evaluation of pre-
viously learned concepts in light of new ones. 
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Figure 4.  David Kolb’s Learning Cycle.
It is the process by which we improve our understanding and clarify 
our reasoning (Kolb, 1973a, b, 1976, 1984). According to Wilby there 
are three questions that underpin the process of reflection: 
‘What’ should I reflect on?, ‘Why’ is reflection necessary? 
and ‘How’ can I as an individual reflect on my actions and 
their implications? (Wilby, 2007)
The what will be looking back to assess ‘Have I done well?” The why 
is about my commitment to the process, and the how is about being 
thorough and reviewing my previous decisions. These questions are 
based on the twin standpoints of the effectiveness of the intervention 
and the moral responsibility of the facilitator. These questions are ad-
dressed in the content of this chapter; that is, the contributions to 
knowledge, the findings with regard to each of the contributing disci-
plines, the recommendations to be made, and issues that should be 
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addressed in further research. The third question: How can I as an 
individual reflect on my actions and their implications? (Brown and 
Wilby, 1996) is addressed by working through each section of this 
dissertation with the objective of being self-reflective alongside the 
practical reporting of the outcomes of this research.
Here, rather than assuming an imperialist or authoritative tone, the 
technique of reflection is also meant to be used critically8. Schön 
(1983) cautions the researcher not to assume an expert or authorita-
tive stance, but to maintain a reflective practice, open to learning in-
stead. He talks about the issue of framing and says that how we 
frame a situation determines how we will approach it. In this research 
project critical reflection is an important tool, vital to our ability to 
search for and consider alternatives. The theory it produces, too, asks 
the practitioner to reflect critically. Critical reflection should prompt 
the reader to come to his or her own understanding of the thoughts 
and ideas presented in this dissertation, and help the practitioner to 
develop an improved approach to research, design and intervention.
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8  and self-critically as well, see the next section.
2.5.4. Reflexivity, critical reflexivity 
Reflexivity as it is used here is method for a specialised form of re-
flection which simply means reflection upon oneself. It is reflection 
abstracted to a higher level; a method for thinking about one’s own 
way of thinking. Where in reflection we might ask, “What did I do?” 
we ask ourselves reflexively, “What was I thinking? Critical reflexivity 
entails looking critically at our practice to expose our ideological as-
sumptions that we can find reflected in what we do; and more impor-
tantly, to challenge those assumptions. It is, as Jackson says, asking 
ourselves “Are we doing the right things?” I would add: “What did I 
miss?” “What are my assumptions, biases, pre-judgements?” This 
radical form of reflexivity, according to Cunliffe (Cunliffe, 2008b), 
supplies a variant to the practice of reflexivity which liberates it from 
recursive “naval gazing,” a paradox built into the original theory. In 
practice, the intent is to “dramatize the intersubjective, continually 
deferred construction of meaning and create spaces for further re-
sponsive understandings.” 
2.5.5. Critical systems thinking
Critical systems thinking relies on critical reflexivity, above.
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Refer ahead to critical systems thinking (§4.4). A larger discussion 
about critical systems thinking occurs throughout the dissertation.
It is appropriate to note that I am a critical systems academic and 
practitioner and it is my natural tendency to approach any complex 
system with a critical systemic perspective. I think of this research 
project and dissertation as a complex ‘problem scenario’ and have 
taken a critical systems approach to ‘resolve’ it. To achieve the aims 
and objectives of the research project with respect to the develop-
ment of new critical systems theory requires a critical analysis of 
critical systems theory, itself. That is, theory has been rightly called 
upon to improve itself. 
2.6. Methodology and methods for the design of the new 
ontology and its theoretical framework
The aim is to build a framework for the constituent components of 
this research project. First and foremost, it is not the aim of this re-
search to develop a case study using existing theory and testable hy-
potheses as one might expect of the typical Ph.D. dissertation. Rather 
it is to build a new model of thought, a new framework for practice. It 
is informed, first of all, from a critical study made of existing theories 
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in order to establish the relevance of this project and to anchor its 
new theory on the leading edge. 
2.6.1. Researching and developing theory
The word philosophy comes from the ancient Greek for love of knowl-
edge or love of wisdom. It connotes the scholarly study of general 
matters such as the nature of existence, the meaning of the word 
truth, how one can know beauty and art, why it is that things are as 
they are, etc. We appeal to philosophy when we seek rational an-
swers to our deepest general questions as opposed to the less- or ir-
rational ways of mysticism, mythology or dogmatic prescriptions be-
cause philosophy is based on logical argumentation and…
…rationally critical thinking of a more or less systematic 
kind about the general nature of the world (metaphysics 
or theory of existence), the justification of belief (episte-
mology or theory of knowledge), and the conduct of life 
(ethics or theory of value). (Quinn, 1995)
Philosophy functions, therefore, to promote the most general sys-
tematisation of civilised thought. By providing the generic notions, 
philosophy should make it easier to conceive of “the variety of spe-
cific instances which rest unrealised in the womb of nature” (Sher-
burne, 1966). Its importance lies in its sustained effort to make such 
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schemes explicit, and thereby capable of criticism and improvement 
(Whitehead, 1929).
Metaphysics is, to many, an emotionally-loaded word owing to its 
mischaracterisation by detractors as pseudo-science, myth or mysti-
cism. In Process and Reality (1929), Alfred North Whitehead defines 
it simply as speculative philosophy, the technical language of which 
represents “attempts to obtain explicit expression of general ideas 
presupposed by the facts of experience” (Sherburne, 1966). Such a 
philosophy is necessarily inadequate or incomplete unless its scope 
includes whatever is found ‘in practice.’ Indeed, metaphysics is noth-
ing but the description of the generalities which apply to all the de-
tails of practice (ibid.). 
Methodologically, metaphysics (i.e., speculative philosophy) is
…the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary 
system of general ideas in terms of which every element 
of our experience can be interpreted. By this notion of ‘in-
terpretation’ I meant that everything of which we are 
conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall 
have the character of a particular instance of the general 
scheme. (Whitehead, 1929)
Bohm suggests that metaphysics is fundamental to every branch of 
science. Although it is not a ‘well-defined study, on top of which we 
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erect a towering structure of physics, chemistry, biology, sociology, 
and so on,’ it is nevertheless ‘something that pervades every field,’ 
and ‘conditions each person’s thinking in varied and subtle ways’ 
(Bohm, 1970). To contrast the two, metaphysics may be thought of 
as being less rigorous in its formulation and of a broader or less-
specific domain and scope than the more logically derived and more 
specific varieties of philosophy. Certainly, though, the processes of 
testing the match between theory and experience and of continuous 
improvement are integral to the practice of them both. In either case, 
the proper test, says Whitehead, is not that of finality, but of progress 
(Sherburne, 1966).
I begin with a cursory, bottom-up exposition of the foundational com-
ponents of philosophy employed both in the research into existing 
theory and the creation of new theory: logic, methodology, episte-
mology, axiology and ontology. This bottom-up, specific-to-general 
view of the research-philosophic terrain is a more in keeping with the 
way of systems thinking.
2.6.2. Multimethodology
A methodology is a template for a plan of action and, as such, pro-
vides theoretical guidance to the practice of research methods; a sys-
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tematic, descriptive, procedural template for action; a guide or a ge-
neric set of rules to process what you have in order to produce some 
desired effect or outcome (Midgley, 2000). Philosophically, methodol-
ogy is general in the sense that it is meant to be applied on different 
occasions to the specific instance or ‘problem context’ at hand 
(Checkland, 1981). In terms of process and structure, methodology 
identifies the structure and features of the generic target for which it 
is designed, defines the processes that are to be performed on them 
and describes the intended affects. A method is that which is actually 
done; methods are derived from the methodology in the specific 
case. For example, one method of interpretivism is participants dis-
cussing their concerns amongst themselves.
A multimethodological approach to this research is required; that is, 
more than one methodology will be used in this research project and 
dissertation. The contributions are twofold—results from research into 
systems theories connected with multi-paradigm practice; and the 
development of a new framework of ontology, epistemology and 
methodology to support multiparadigm multimethodological ap-
proaches to systemic practice. Testing, too, requires multiple meth-
odologies and methods—semistructured interviews are analysed with 
critical hermeneutics, simple statistics are compiled, qualitative and 
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quantitative results are triangulated, reflection and reflexivity are 
employed in critical manner to correct and improve.
The methodologies used in this research project are listed and ex-
plained in the following sections.
2.6.3. Literature search
The research begins by examining secondary sources—the relevant 
literature in the field. A thorough search for literature was an active 
part of the research process. Materials are retrieved from several 
sources: information based on prior knowledge from past course work 
and research projects, advice elicited from personal contacts, queries 
of various online databases, library catalogs, search engines, journal 
sites and encyclopaedic materials: books, papers, collections, journal 
articles and reviews. Especially rich and helpful resources were made 
available from the Brynmor Jones library at Hull University. 
2.6.4. Vertical and horizontal research
Citations and references within the text of the documents examined 
led to additional sources, authors and topics supplying breadth and 
background for interesting and tangentially-related materials. The 
authors determined to have made contributions significant to this 
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study became subjects themselves, and searches into their bodies of 
work were conducted to pursue materials which could provide a 
deeper understanding of their thoughts and to follow the evolution of 
those thoughts longitudinally over time. Critiques and supporting 
works written by others were drawn in as well to provide balance, 
add dimension, and place each work within the larger context of the 
systems movement.
2.7. Methodology and methods for testing the new frame-
work
2.7.1. Textual analysis
The processes of understanding text and acquiring knowledge are 
complex, embedded situational experiences. Once written, texts are 
stand-alone artefacts, disassociated from whatever the author’s origi-
nal understanding and intent might have been by factors such as the 
nature and constraints of communication and writing and other fac-
tors such as culture and time. Consequently the researcher must be 
able to place the source material itself within a larger context of 
breadth, depth, alternative voices and a before and after historical 
context. These essential accompaniments support the interpretive ac-
tions and validity claims of any critical evaluation. These three requi-
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sites were not, however, fully present prior to this project’s literature 
review, but formed as a consequence of it. It was therefore necessary 
to review each document at least twice. First, to become familiar with 
the material and subsequently to reinterpret it within the ‘rich pic-
ture’. 
2.7.2. Phenomenological hermeneutics
The textual review process is guided by the methodologies of modern 
and critical hermeneutics (see §2.7.3) (Gadamer, 1970; Foucault, 
1972; Bleicher, 1980; Ricoeur and Thompson, 1981; Thompson, 
1981; Outhwaite, 1987; Tilley, 1990; Gasparski, 1991; Huspek, 
1991; Kneer and Nassehi, 1991; Locke, 1991; Ford, 2006). The mod-
ern form of hermeneutics was broadly described as one of the three 
categories of knowledge by the German philosopher and sociologist 
Jürgen Habermas (1970). Given the wide range of philosophic influ-
ences on hermeneutics there is no single approach to its practice. It 
generally refers to “research that actively engages in the interpreta-
tion of texts” (Fischer, 1994).
Critical hermeneutics, for instance, relies closely on 
the ideas of Habermas, whereas phenomenological 
hermeneutics is more strongly wedded to the in-
sights of Gadamer. Despite its considerable varia-
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tions, the hermeneutic tradition represents certain 
key ideas and practices for its adherents. (Prasad, 
2005) 
Critical to this study is that “in its very roots… hermeneutics recog-
nises the tricky nature of interpretation–as constituted of multiple 
and conflicting rather than of simple, uniform meanings” (Gadamer, 
1960). The hermeneutic approach “denies both that there is a single 
objective true interpretation transcending all viewpoints and that we 
are forever confined within our own viewpoint. Interpretation is 
rather something to be arrived at by a gradual interplay between the 
subject-matter and the interpreter's initial position” (Lacey, 1986). To 
practice hermeneutics requires the researcher to establish a close re-
lationship with the text in order to more closely identify with its richer 
meaning. 
Importantly, “since detachment [as in positivism] from the text is not 
favored,… the suggested approach is a dialogue or conversation be-
tween text and interpreter as a method of achieving both textual and 
self-understanding” (Gadamer, 1960). In Gadamer’s view, “the her-
meneutic conversation between an interpreter and a text is a dia-
logue in which the interpreter puts questions to the text, and the text 
in return questions the interpreter” (Prasad, 2002). “The term dia-
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logue here is obviously used in a metaphorical sense and conveys no-
tions of ‘listening’ to texts and allowing them to ‘speak’ to us” (Fras-
cina, 1994). “In this process, the interpreter is able to reach some 
awareness of her or his presuppositions and can reinterpret the text 
with a new set of more meaningful questions. Like the hermeneutic 
circle, the dialogue with the text is (theoretically) an endless iterative 
process” (Prasad, 2005). In practice, the iterations are done only until 
some satisfactory level of understanding is achieved.
2.7.3. Critical hermeneutics
Hermeneutics began as the theory of textual interpretation, particu-
larly mythical and sacred texts. Its practitioners struggled with the 
problem of characterising how people find meaning in texts which ex-
ist over many centuries and are understood differently in different 
epochs (Winograd and Flores, 1986). In more recent years, the philo-
sophical study of the act of interpretation led to critical theory and 
the more fundamental questions such as, “What is it that we bring to 
bear on the act?” and “From where does what we bring to bear 
come?” 
Heidegger (1962) rejects both the simple objective 
stance (the objective physical world is the primary 
reality) and the simple subjective stance (my 
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thoughts and feelings are the primary reality), ar-
guing instead that it is impossible for one to exist 
without the other. The interpreted and the inter-
preter do not exist independently: existence is in-
terpretation, and interpretation is existence. Preju-
dice is not a condition in which the subject is led to 
interpret the world falsely, but is the necessary 
condition of having a background for interpretation 
(hence Being) (Winograd and Flores, 1986).
Gadamer, following on Heidegger’s work, said, 
It is not so much our judgments as it is our preju-
dices that constitute our being... the historicity of 
our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal 
sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness 
of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are 
biases of our openness to the world. They are sim-
ply conditions whereby we experience something—
whereby what we encounter says something to us. 
(Gadamer and Linge, 1976, 2008)
John B. Thompson first proposed ‘critical hermeneutics’ in his doctoral 
thesis, then developed his ideas into a book, Critical Hermeneutics: A 
study in the thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas (Thomp-
son, 1991). His theory combines and improves upon ‘ordinary lan-
guage philosophy’ from linguistics, ‘critical theory’ from Habermas 
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(who was influenced by Heidegger), and ‘hermeneutic phenomenol-
ogy’ from Ricoeur. He describes it as: “a reformulation of the meth-
odology of depth interpretation, as a critical theory for the interpreta-
tion of human action,” and used “to clarify the conditions under which 
a statement can be considered to be true” (ibid.); which are in turn 
based on his underlying theories of human action, interpretation, and 
truth.
Here, critical hermeneutics is a principal methodology employed for 
analysis of the research data: documents, interviews and other arte-
facts considered in this study. Because of this tradition, the interpre-
tive approach to the literature review is informed, reflexive, and theo-
retically well grounded.
That critical hermeneutics was used as a methodology for this study 
comes from a careful consideration of alternative methodologies for 
textual analysis. My requirement that each investigated theory be 
done from within its own world-view (with respect to the problem of 
paradigm incommensurability), requires a methodology that is as in-
clusive as possible of alternate ways of seeing the ‘world’. Critical 
hermeneutics is such a methodology. It avoids the “well-known short-
comings” of other social theories yet “does not grind to a paradoxical 
halt as still others do” (Thompson, 1991).  
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Thompson’s development of critical hermeneutics begins with Hei-
degger who, being key to the development of existentialism, herme-
neutics, deconstruction, postmodernism, and continental philosophy 
in general, had a great influence on Paul Ricoeur who called him “one 
of the outstanding contemporary representatives of hermeneutic 
phenomenology.” It was Ricoeur who then developed a theory of text, 
of human action (the Philosophy of Will), and from them, modern 
hermeneutics. Jürgen Habermas provides critical social theory, from 
which Thompson uses the ideas of human and societal struggle, ac-
tion and the logic of discourse, and other ideas such as that of ap-
proaching interpretive truth through the force of better argument 
alone. “[Thompson’s] analysis of Habermas’ work is much more 
penetrating than most others,” says Giddens:
Thompson’s Critical Hermeneutics is, then, a modern so-
cial theory and methodology specifically for qualitative, 
depth interpretation of text or other meaning-laden ver-
bal or behavioural activities. It incorporates Ludwig Witt-
genstein’s Ordinary Language Philosophy, Paul Ricoeur’s 
Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Jürgen Habermas’ Critical 
Social Theory and addresses and improves on the short-
comings of each of them. (Giddens, 1981)
From a study done in 2007, I wrote about Thompson’s critical herme-
neutics that…
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The methodology is useful for a researcher faced with the 
task of deep qualitative analysis of complex, dense, tech-
nical or otherwise difficult text and the search for mean-
ing and enlightenment. It cannot yield hard answers or 
reveal an absolute truth. Its strengths are in its firm 
philosophical grounding and sound conceptual framework. 
And by virtue of its pedigreed inheritance from the 
brightest minds in recent times and in its historical evolu-
tion (successive passes to incorporate improvements), it 
is said that “it wears designer genes.” And therein lies its 
greatest weakness—youth. As a new theory, it has not 
been subjected to many trials. In fact, I could find no ref-
erences. Another is its demand on the researcher. As a 
recursive process, you decide to stop only when your 
analysis is sufficient; there is no avoiding the intellectual 
demands of the reflection process. (Bowers, 2007)
2.7.4. Semi-structured interviews and thought ex-
periments
Regardless of their intended goal, all thought experiments 
display a patterned way of thinking that is designed to al-
low us to explain, predict and control events in a better 
and more productive way. (Ackermann, 1992)
Any theory must survive many tests in real-world practice to be able 
to make a true claim of validity (or to have any chance of wide accep-
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tance), but time constraints on this project would not permit any such 
careful study.  
A thought trial is an imaginative substitute for 
physical trial and error. Instead of testing a hy-
pothesis by acting it out in real life, you test it ‘in 
thought’ by relying on your beliefs about what is 
possible. Here, you trade reliability for speed. How-
ever, any trial-and-error process—even one per-
formed in thought—takes a long time when there 
are lots of alternatives. To cope, we complicate the 
hypothetical act so that it can rule out a whole class 
of possibilities. Complexity is also prompted by our 
frequent failure to have any direct intuition about 
whether a hypothesis fails; for we can respond to 
the gap by building a link to another, apparently ir-
relevant intuition. Once the supposition attains a 
degree of complexity, it qualifies as a thought ex-
periment. (Sorensen, 1992)
The intention for combining interviews and thought experiments is to 
add support for claims of validity, repeatability and generalisability al-
ready gained through rigorous use of the other methods, the struc-
ture of the conceptual framework, and the research procedure. In this 
case I am attempting to exercise the new theory. At the same time I 
am looking for data which suggests that certain assumptions made by 
the new theory may be valid—I am not testing hypotheses  as such in 
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the deductive, positivist sense. Although each component employed 
in this multimethodological qualitative approach “is individually sus-
ceptible to abuse, fallacy, and error... collectively, they provide a net-
work of cross-checks that make for impressive reliability” (Sorensen, 
1992).
Our thought experiments begin first by stipulating a plausible sce-
nario and some context for it, then walking the reader through the 
intervention using the proposed theory. It is a type of storytelling, 
first ‘talking through’ the problematic scenario. The goal being to ex-
ercise the framework comprehensively, asking them about how they 
see the problem scenario and how they might initially approach it; 
what sort of investigation they would undertake, and to get them to 
describe what would be their own approach to the intervention, what 
actions they would take, and why.
A weakness of the thought experiment interview as a methodology is 
due to the imaginary nature of the hypothetical situation considered 
by the interviewee, rather than the practical realism that could be af-
forded by an actual application of it by a systemist engaged in a sys-
temic intervention. Hypotheticals are by their nature simplistic when 
compared to the infinite complexity of real-world scenarios. No pre-
tence will be made that our thought experiments prove anything. 
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They are, however, a practical compromise for time, and more useful 
at this preliminary stage of theory development than when we are 
further along. It affords the opportunity to learn from mistakes im-
prove, and as we shall see, the unexpected can occur with this 
method, as well.
2.8. Regarding rigour and relevance
Every effort has been made to ensure that this research is conducted 
transparently, is demonstrably rigorous in purpose, scope, breadth 
and depth, does not overreach and that it is executed with technical 
competence. A continuous engagement with the learning process 
throughout the research project was put in place to build improve-
ment into the research experience. Resources for such include Hull 
University Business School’s postgraduate training—a series of formal 
postgraduate courses on research theory, methods, practice, writing 
and ethics. It is understood that qualitative research is not used to 
‘prove’ theories, but to enrich the body of knowledge in aspects that 
cannot be produced using traditional quantitative or reductionist 
methodologies. 
Rigor and Relevance in Management Research was the topic of a lec-
ture by a visiting expert, Dr. Luiz Moutinho, the Foundation chair of 
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Marketing at the University of Glasgow. To paraphrase, he essentially 
said “Today’s research is so boring!  It’s written in turgid, difficult lan-
guage just to impress other academics… We tend to take safe, little 
baby steps, which may be very rigorous, but that have the effect of 
minimising relevance… Where are the bold ideas?” His point was that 
it is quite possible to conduct and publish interpretive research that is 
both rigorous and relevant.
This study aims towards relevance to academics and systems theo-
rists as it hopes to add significantly to the body of systems theory, 
and to practitioners to the extent that completeness and clarity in-
forms and enables increased competence. Possibly the greatest bene-
fit to the systems community may come through the influence that 
coherent theory should have on reversing the forces trending towards 
divergence or atheoretical pragmatism and to become a force, in-
stead, towards convergence.
2.9. Regarding validity and reliability
The development of the research project and its execution rely on the 
tools of reflexive critique, dialectical critique, and a plural structure.
The key epistemological question is, “Can the approach to 
the study of the social world, including that of manage-
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ment and business [or systems thinking and practice], be 
the same as the approach to studying the natural sci-
ences?” The answer to that question points the way to 
the acceptability of the knowledge developed from the re-
search process. (Saunders, Lewis, et al., 2007)
Validity and reliability of the research is addressed by making explicit 
the premises and assumptions of the research and the researcher, the 
objectives and motivation as well as the need for this research, by 
the development of a research procedure within a complete and 
proper theoretical framework, by employing several accepted strate-
gies for data collection and methodologies for its interpretation and 
support for its logical argumentation (triangulation), and by the de-
sign and rigorous use of testing procedures.
Adherence to the scientific method is the typical yardstick for meas-
uring the success or failure of a research project vis a vis the stated 
research questions, but a qualitative approach cannot match with the 
classical epistemology and its experimental method and refutability 
(Simon, 1996). The application of the scientific method (which as-
sumes positivism and prescribes reductionism) to the research of sys-
tems theory and practice is not feasible for several reasons, among 
them:  
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• Theory (particularly at the level of ontology) is not generally 
reducible to axiomatic statements. At some level, a stipula-
tion must be made which is not provable by formal logic 
(and is not stated as being so).  
• Theory, by definition is highly generalised. Richness is oth-
erwise sacrificed for precision. 
• Subjective and interpretive thoughts resist quantifiability.  
• The functionalist–objectivist paradigm in which reductionism 
and the scientific method have validity is but one paradigm 
among many. The validity of research findings apply only 
within paradigms supporting the methods by which they are 
produced (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).
2.9.1. Internal validity
Has a reasonable argument been developed in sup-
port of the hypotheses?
Does cause precede effect?
Can cause and effect be demonstrated to be neces-
sary and sufficient? (Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998)
As this research aims to add to the body of theory pertaining to criti-
cal systems thinking and practice, the required input data is to be 
found in the body of published literature. The methods used to locate, 
to collect and to evaluate this data as previously elaborated include 
vertical and horizontal literature searches, textual (interpretive) 
analysis, modern and critical hermeneutics. Reflection and reflexivity 
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(reflection upon oneself) are employed in the written style within an 
overall critical approach.
Internal validity is also a function of the content of the dissertation 
and of the qualities of design and execution of the research itself.
2.9.2. External validity
Is evidence preserved? (Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998)
This is qualitative research of an essentially speculative nature. The 
philosophies studied and produced herein refer to concepts that are 
infinitely complex in terms of dimensions, attributes or variables, are 
necessarily based ultimately on some logically supported assumption. 
Researcher bias is admittedly inescapable; instead, it is transparently 
disclosed. No pretence of objectivity or absolute truths is or could be 
assumed in this case. The subjects of this research are, instead, con-
sidered interpretively and approached critically using accepted, quali-
tative research methodologies. The goal is to make progress in the 
field of critical systems theory, adding to the body of knowledge with 
respect to what is known about the problems considered and with 
credible proposals to resolve them. 
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As this research project is not the traditional type of objective ex-
periment where an independent variable can be manipulated to show 
correlation with a dependent variable while other factors are held 
constant, nor is it possible to perform repeated testing due to time 
and word count constraints, a weaker form of internal and external 
validity is appropriate. Internal validity in this sense will depend on to 
what extent the theory created is sufficiently supported by the evi-
dence and the logical progression of developments. Argumentative 
conclusions should be held up against and prevail over plausible al-
ternatives.
The proper test is not that of finality, but of progress. 
—Whitehead. (Sherburne, 1966)
2.10. Regarding replicability and generalisability
This is not designed to be a replicable project. Others with access to 
the same materials would interpret them in distinct ways and there 
would necessarily be different outcomes. With continued examination 
of these and additional materials as they come to light this research, 
its thesis, products and conclusions has become a continually reflec-
tive and reflexive pursuit of learning and improvement. Although 
there is much more to be learned from existing literature, the time 
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constraint forced an end to the literature review. Even so, it continues 
to evolve within me. It has become a learning journey.
Generalisability does apply to the conclusions and proposed theories 
of this research project inasmuch as the project yields ideas which 
are useful to the reader, researcher or systemist in the application of 
these ideas to their own specific situations. Sherburne (1966) re-
minds us that the ultimate proof of any philosophy is that it continues 
to explain what is observed in reality. Consequently, a new phenome-
non that cannot be explained by existing theory signals a shortcom-
ing and foreshadows a new, better one (Kuhn, 1962, 1996). This is 
roughly isomorphic to Darwin’s explanation for the evolution of living 
species, an analogy first mentioned in the Introduction and one that 
we will return to again, in §6.2.
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Chapter
3. Paradigms and incommensurability
3.1. Introduction
The reader will find in this chapter definitions of many of the terms 
used in this dissertation, including: ontology, epistemology, paradigm, 
multiparadigm, paradigm incommensurability, systems thinking, criti-
cal systems thinking, reflection, and reflexivity. (Refer back to §2.6.2, 
Multimethodology, for definitions of methodology, multimethodology 
and method.)
In this chapter, the thesis reviews issues surrounding incommensura-
ble paradigms and focuses on existing theories which nevertheless 
support research, design and engagement with systems multipara-
digmatically. Beginning with A System of Systems Methodologies 
(Jackson and Keys, 1984), the origins, development and evolution of 
these theories is mapped in Figures 10–13 which help to illuminate 
the progression and increasing sophistication of each school of 
thought and to establish, at the bottom-present, the contemporary 
state of the multiparadigmatic multimethodological critical systems 
theories. The theory developed in this research project appears as 
well, to indicate its theoretical lineage and locate it within the evolv-
ing tradition of systems thinking. 
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3.2. Paradigms, ill-fitting theories and incommensurability
Burrell and Morgan’s paradigms have been debated and criticised 
(Midgley, 2011) but systemists who are familiar with the branch of 
systems thinking called critical systems thinking, mainly the Europe-
ans, find the idea of systemic paradigms especially useful. In the 
study by Jackson and Keys (1984) the dozens of systems methodolo-
gies known to them at the time were examined to determine their 
underlying assumptions about the nature of the world in which each 
were designed to operate. They were ‘assigned’ to a particular group, 
or ‘worldview’, making those implicit assumptions explicit. 
A year later, Jackson’s Critical Systems Thinking (1985a,b) took its 
supporting philosophy from Burrell and Morgan’s groundbreaking So-
ciological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis (1979)—the concept 
of ‘paradigms’ as groups of theoretical approaches having similar 
onto-epistemological foundations.9 Where, using the terminology cus-
tomary at the time, systems and systemic approaches were either 
‘hard’ or ‘soft’, Critical Systems Thinking (CST) favoured instead a 
more precise understanding based on onto-epistemologies. These be-
came what are called in this paper the positivist/structural-
functionalist (often shortened to either ‘positivist’ or ‘functionalist’) 
76
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and the interpretivist paradigms.10 Assumptions about the nature of 
the world are known as onto-epistemological assumptions, or para-
digms in critical systems thinking. 
Today there are many more methodologies than there were in 1984 
and those us in the field of critical systems thinking commonly refer 
to them as ‘belonging’ to this or that paradigm because the concept 
of paradigm provides context. The set of all methodologies is much 
more easily understood and more readily accessible when grouped by 
‘worldview’. New methodologies become easier to learn and to teach, 
and therefore to be used. In this way, the paradigms support and fa-
cilitate theoretical and methodological pluralism. 
Not all systems theories fit neatly into just one or another of these 
paradigms, however. Multimethodologies (which call for the use of 
more than one methodology in the same project) are theories which 
cannot be ‘adopted’ by or assigned to a single paradigm if those 
methodologies are ‘from’ different paradigms (that is, if they have 
radically different onto-epistemological foundations). And there are 
complex systems theories such as CST, Second Order Cybernetics 
and a variety of pluralistic theories11 which are ‘larger’ than any one 
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11  See the subsections of §5.4.
of our paradigms. The most widely referenced of these in the field 
from which it takes its name is Critical Systems Thinking (Mingers, 
1980; Jackson, 1985; Spear, 1987; Jackson, 1989, 1991c). As this 
research shows, CST has been improved over time and has been the 
inspiration for several other theories. Jackson calls his latest version 
Critical Systems Thinking and Practice (Jackson, 1993, 2001). All 
such theories and practices which do not fit neatly into one paradigm 
have been criticised by theorists for what is known as paradigm in-
commensurability (see §3.2.1).
This research project represents another attempt to move critical sys-
tems thinking forward in spite of the incommensurability issue. Its ul-
timate objective is to advance new theory leading in a practical way 
to improved outcomes for systemic interventions in complex con-
texts. Systemic thinking acknowledges the complexity, turbulence 
and diversity of organisational contexts and requires theory which 
can properly ground naturally multiparadigmatic, multimethodological 
approaches and praxis. Without such theory the real-world implica-
tions are:
• Constraints upon the grasp the practitioner may have of sig-
nificant aspects of the problem situation and its context, es-
pecially with respect to the variety of those which can only 
present themselves in alternative paradigmatic contexts.
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• Limitations in the variety of methods which may be deployed 
to affect an ongoing intervention, especially with respect to 
methodologies aligned with alternative paradigms.
• Effectiveness which suffers a lack of informed guidance from 
proper theory and coherent multimethodological approaches 
to naturally multiparadigmatic problem situations. 
Critical systems thinking has liberated us from the one-size-fits-all, 
‘hard’, positivist approach to everything for all occasions (Flood, 
1990), or what from a larger perspective has been called imperialist 
or isolationist practices (Midgley, 1992a). In fact, the word ‘critical’ 
itself signifies an ethical commitment to critical reflexivity; that is, to 
self-reflection and ideological critique (Gregory, 1992). And unlike 
atheoretical pragmatism, critical systems thinking is built upon a solid 
foundation of theory.12
This dissertation describes four, generally accepted conceptual para-
digms which were adapted from and developed alongside develop-
ments in modern social theory (most importantly Burrell and Mor-
gan’s social paradigms (1979), updated by Morgan and Smircich 
(1980)) which are herein named positivist/structural-functionalist, in-
terpretivist, critical-emancipatory and postmodernist-poststructuralist 
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systems paradigms (Jackson, 1987a, 1989; Flood and Jackson, 
1991a, b, c; Jackson, 1991a, b, c; Jackson, 2000).
Figure 5.  Four paradigms of critical systems theory.
Paradigms are simply groupings of like onto-epistemological ap-
proaches or traditions in research and practice. Each one is described 
in those terms, ahead. Each advantages a unique world outlook and 
assumes distinctive approaches to shared universal concepts. Within 
each paradigm are compatible points of view about the world’s consti-
tution and its structure; its values, concerns, conventions and as-
sumptions; its ‘truths’ and the traditional ways of working in the 
world. What is nice is that each paradigmatic view is known to be 
valid and each offers a world of rich insights unavailable from the 
others. Very briefly:
The positivist/structural-functionalist (or simply ‘functionalist’) sys-
tems paradigm is the world of modern science and social science; the 
world of logical proofs and deductions, verifiable facts and hypothe-
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ses, exact measurements, objective observation, unbiased certainty 
and universal truths. Its so-called ‘hard’ problems tend to be pre-
cisely definable, stable, operational, and technical (Tsoukas and Pa-
poulias, 1996). 
The interpretivist systems paradigm takes care to point out that each 
of us sees the world subjectively and understands it in a unique way. 
It is concerned with reconciling issues of individuality and personal 
differences, with the social world and aesthetics. It accepts that we 
disagree and are unpredictable. Reasoning is more often inductive 
and situated.  The so-called ‘soft’ problems tend to be broad, volatile 
and ambiguous (ibid.). 
The postmodernist-poststructuralist (or simply ‘postmodern’) systems 
paradigm is known to be ill defined, which presents an opportunity to 
the Systems community to take from the various opinions out there 
just what it finds useful and to set aside solipsistic controversies. In 
the version I advocate, this paradigm holds to an acute appreciation 
of the limitations of human understanding. It appreciates a world of 
unfathomable depth and interactive dimensionality, a world of events 
which are sometimes fleetingly transient or spontaneous. Its nature 
thwarts our attempts to ‘know’ it through the use of language. Reliant 
upon language, our biases are unavoidable and we must reflexively 
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question the very bases of our assumptions. This exposes us to our 
limitations and should engender transparency, humility and open-
mindedness. 
The critical-emancipatory (or simply ‘critical’) systems paradigm can 
be characterised by its three commitments, or themes for de-
bate13—to critical reflection, pluralism, and emancipation or ‘im-
provement’ (Flood and Romm, 1996). As it is the paradigm which is 
central to the thinking in this research project and the theory that is 
developed in the dissertation, it is explored ahead in great detail.
3.2.1. Why are paradigms incommensurable?
If we cannot agree what the problem is because we cannot agree 
what reality is, then there is no hope for a solution. Richard Rorty 
gives an example where adherents of different paradigms come to 
loggerheads when they try to work together, unable to agree on the 
nature of the problem due to their fundamentally different (realist vs. 
constructivist) views of the underlying nature of the problem.
A realist… would say that one of these [views] is misled, 
that one group perceives correctly, and the other per-
ceives incorrectly. Strict constructivists will complain that 
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13  Suggested by Midgley (1996, 2000) to avoid connotations of uncritical 
acceptance.
there is no way to confirm one way or another, since the 
goal of inquiry (Reality) must be assumed to be under-
stood at the outset. [In their view,] the Realist hope… is 
simply to arbitrarily freeze the infinite circularity that 
plagues human reasoning which vainly hopes to validate 
itself with a secure foundation. (Rorty, 1982)
The social scientists Burrell and Morgan (1979) coined the modern 
use of the word paradigm and famously described four basic para-
digms of social science (Figure 6).
Figure 6.  The four social paradigms of Burrell and Morgan (1979).
Burrell and Morgan observed that research is expected to be con-
ducted within a single paradigm and researchers are required to align 
themselves with one of them because, as a ‘worldview’, each of the 
paradigms can only be understood from ‘within’ that worldview. They 
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emphasise “the separateness of [the] four paradigms” due to their 
underlying differences in ontology and epistemology “and the devel-
opment of theory and research in isolation” (Mingers, 1997a). 
The central disadvantage of having these different paradigms is that 
each represents a self-contained, internally defined worldview. Each 
is a complete worldview in (and of) itself, exclusive of the others and 
‘inwardly focused’. More precisely:
• The basic construction and internal concepts of each para-
digm are so different that they cannot be directly combined 
without corrupting one or both. One cannot be well under-
stood from the point of view of another. 
• There is no common basis for the critique or evaluation of 
one paradigm from within another, so there is no valid way 
to connect them indirectly. Each is valid in itself and only 
well understood from ‘within’ it.
• There is no neutral or extra-paradigmatic platform on which 
to stand for any comparison, translation or arbitration be-
tween them—any such point of view would necessarily be 
paradigmatic.
• Any meta-paradigmatic or meta-theoretical approach from 
‘above’ which ‘includes’ them necessarily corrupts our view 
of them.
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Altogether, this is why the paradigms are said to be valid, but incom-
mensurable. 
The paradigm incommensurability thesis asserts that be-
cause paradigms differ in terms of the fundamental as-
sumptions that they bring to organizational inquiry, re-
searchers must choose the rules under which they do re-
search from among the alternatives on offer. They must 
then commit themselves to a single paradigm, although 
sequential movement over time is permissible. Multi-
paradigm research is proscribed [(ruled out)] for a num-
ber of reasons, the most notable of which is the supposed 
irreconcilable objectivist–subjectivist ontological and epis-
temological dichotomies that exist between the empirical-
analytic and interpretive paradigms respectively. How-
ever, as Burrell and Morgan (1979) and Astley and van 
der Ven (1983) have shown, there are other related di-
chotomies such as structure versus agency, determinism 
versus voluntarism, causation versus meaning, and object 
versus subject. The opposing positions is each dichotomy 
represent alternative competing ‘truths’ about the world, 
and, as such, they resist reconciliation or synthesis. (Min-
gers and Gill, 1997) 
Jackson (Norman, not Michael) & Carter (1991) say that 
Burrell and Morgan were quite specific that a synthesis 
between paradigms cannot be achieved, that they must 
remain discrete and develop independently—in other 
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words, that the paradigms are incommensurable. This in-
commensurability stems from the commitment to oppos-
ing beliefs in the nature of the foundational assumptions… 
Incommensurability could be explained by the argument 
that each paradigm has a discrete language of its own—
although they may, and probably do, share common sig-
nifiers, the signifieds entailed are radically different. …
[And] although addressing ostensibly the same phenom-
ena, they are based upon fundamentally different hy-
potheses about the nature of the world, the role of sci-
ence and the problematics to be resolved.
Paradigm incommensurability should not be considered a liability, in 
fact, say (Norman) Jackson and Carter,
…the effect of paradigm incommensurability is to estab-
lish the integrity of each paradigm, obviating the neces-
sity for interminable justifications of different ontological, 
epistemological and methodological approaches to the 
subject area, different beliefs about human nature and 
whether organization studies is primarily prescriptive or 
descriptive. What it implies is that each paradigm must, 
logically, develop separately, pursuing its own problem-
atic and ignoring those of other paradigms as paradig-
matically invalid, and that different claims about organi-
zations would, in an ideal world, be resolved in the light 
of their implications for social praxis. (Jackson and Carter, 
1991).
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They summarize it this way…
Incommensurability is not negotiable, it is a characteristic 
of the [B&M onto-epistemological] model — without it, 
paradigms are an unnecessary elaboration of what is al-
ready elaborate and complex [ibid.].
In critical systems thinking, paradigm incommensurability occurs be-
tween the four paradigms: positivist/structural–functionalist, interpre-
tivist, critical-emancipatory and postmodernist-poststructuralist. 
Typically, reference is made to three different paradigms 
that can be crudely characterized as hard (positivist), 
treating the organizational world as objective, essentially 
the same as the natural world; soft (interpretivist), treat-
ing human organizations as fundamentally different, 
based on subjective meaning and interpretation; and 
critical, accepting the place of both hard and soft but em-
phasizing the oppressing and inequitable nature of social 
systems. These paradigms, and the methodologies that 
embody them, are often said to be incommensurable be-
cause their underlying assumptions are believed to be ir-
reconcilable. (Mingers and Gill, 1997)
The postmodernist-poststructuralist paradigm is involved in incom-
mensurability as well, because of its very different tenet that the true 
nature of reality is multidimensional, situational, infinitely complex 
and ultimately unknowable. It asserts that paradigms are simplistic, 
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their world views are narrow and prejudicial, they make too many as-
sumptions; and worse, each pretends to have an exclusive claim on 
the truth.
There are some paradigms, traditions, perspectives, value 
systems, or cultures that are so antagonistic to one an-
other that there is no position from which they can be 
reconciled. (Gregory, 1996a) 
3.2.2. Why do we need different paradigms?
All paradigms constrain the way in which we can ‘see’ 
situations. (Yolles, 1996) 
Paradigms may be ‘incommensurable’, but nevertheless, they repre-
sent valid and consistent worldviews. And if, as says Yolles, each has 
its own constraints, their variety suggests to this researcher, and to 
the critical systems thinker in general, that the employment of multi-
ple paradigmatic views affords the practitioner a deeper appreciation 
of what is ostensibly the same phenomena than could any one of 
them, alone. 
And, importantly, as each theoretical perspective brings with it its 
own packaged set of practical methodologies, this widening ‘perspec-
tivity’ widens the variety of methods which may be brought to bear in 
complex situations. As Mingers and Gill (1997) explain, a methodol-
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ogy is “a structured set of guidelines for activities to undertake to im-
prove the effectiveness of an intervention. Such methodologies are 
based, implicitly or explicitly, on particular philosophical assumptions 
concerning the nature… and the particular view of the world that is 
sometimes called a paradigm”. 
To summarise and oversimplify my claim: the functionalist paradigm 
has proven itself indispensable and it grounds most of the field of 
systems thinking. Interpretivism adds concern for personalities and 
works with human-to-human concerns. Critical-emancipatory systems 
thinking tells us to be aware as well of the dimension of political 
power and coercion, and reminds us to reflect, critically, upon our-
selves as well, and to utilise other worldviews. And postmodernism 
asks us to consider our human condition, to allow for ambiguity, and 
to question our terms. As systemists, I believe we need them all and 
we need to use them as well as tools for enquiry, understanding, and 
for acting.
3.2.3. ‘Virtual’, or ‘micro-’ paradigms
Whereas a paradigm is a general, onto-epistemological worldview 
that is widely accepted and adopted, an individual operates with a 
personal Weltanschauung—”a comprehensive conception or appre-
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
89
hension of the world especially from a specific standpoint” (Merriam-
Webster, 1997), or worldview (Yolles, 1996) that is sometimes called 
a ‘virtual’ paradigm, or a ‘micro-’ paradigm. It is similar to speak of 
one’s network, or framework, of assumptions. In the experiment 
(Chapter 8) ten interviews are conducted. At the beginning of each 
interview, the interviewee is asked to tell a story which is intended to 
reveal their own micro-paradigm, which I then refer to as their ‘natu-
ral’ paradigm. It is important to note that our micro-paradigm is not 
enduring and stable, rather it is socially constructed (§3.3.2.3) and 
evolves with experience (discussed throughout Chapter 6).
3.3. Ontology, epistemology, onto-epistemology
There is much confusion between ontology and epistemology, even, 
as it turns out, by theorists and philosophers. Although their defini-
tions seem straightforward—ontology is the study of what exists and 
about categorisation of those things; and epistemology is the study of 
knowledge and knowledge making, about how logic is applied and 
used, and about the validity of statements expressing knowledge 
claims, truth or fact. Ontology is about being-ness; epistemology is 
about knowing-ness.
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3.3.1. Ontologies
Ontology is traditionally defined as the science of being qua being, or 
being in terms of Being. Ontic inquiry is concerned with the things or 
entities of the world. It is not concerned with the nature of particular 
beings but with the nature of Being as such (Heidegger, 1962). It in-
volves inquiries into the fundamental basis of existence, or the 
grounding for what ‘is’. Ontology is an a priori science, inquiring into 
the pure possibilities applicable to any domain (Georgiou, 2007). An-
other way of expressing that is to say that ontological existence is 
granted to the stuff that makes up the things which are.  
Pure ontological reality has been called ‘reality-as-it-is-in-itself’. I pre-
fer this concept (which precludes us) rather than the term ‘objective’ 
(which moves us). I use the term reality as-it-is-in-itself to speak of a 
purity of non-interpretation and to refer to existence which is not in 
any way the product of the mind. Conversely, the concept of an ob-
jective existence requires logical interpretation and the concept of 
truth, as it holds that it can truly be said that there are objects or 
things which have particular intrinsic characteristics. 
Among the many other ways to understand this, to philosophers like 
Heidegger (1962) ontological inquiry is concerned with “what it 
means to Be; with the Being of things or entities.” Researchers attend 
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to what can be studied and to that which is the nature of their re-
search. Classically, there are two basic views:  1) that the world is 
objective and external to the researcher, and  2) that the world can 
be understood only by examining the perceptions of the human ac-
tors. In the first view, there is one reality and in the second view re-
alities are multiple, as seen by the observers (Craib, 1992).
The ontological assumptions of most systems theories are not made 
explicitly and must be inferred from their epistemological concerns 
(see Epistemologies, §3.3.2). Those which do address ontology spe-
cifically—works by Bertalanffy, Laszlo, Mingers and Gill, Flood, Jack-
son, Midgley, Fuenmayor and Georgiou are covered ahead in the dis-
cussions of those theories.
3.3.1.1. Objectivism
Objectivism is a view about the nature of reality that holds that real-
ity is something that exists ‘out there’, independent of the human 
mind or perception. Objects or things that exist are instantiations 
with intrinsic qualities. Critiques of the objectivist ontology centre on 
limitations with respect to the human observer and the boundary be-
tween the extrinsic object and the intrinsic subject (see subject-
object dualism in §6.4). There are several epistemologies based on 
the objectivist ontology, each with its own qualifications allowing for 
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varying kinds of uncertainties, particularly when it comes to human 
and social aspects.
Saunders, Lewis et al. (2007) explain one such objectivist sociological 
position, which holds that: 
Social entities exist in reality external to social actors. An 
example of this type of entity is management. That man-
agement in a particular organisation has a reality that is 
separate from the managers that inhabit that reality.
For example, he says, a researcher may adopt an objectivist position 
for a study having to do with management practice because even 
through a complete change in management personnel the manage-
ment process is essentially unchanged. This assumes that manage-
ment is a role independent of the manager as a person. Other social 
entities are things such as cultural norms and so-called institutions 
such as marriage (ibid.). The idea that social entities have real exis-
tence is aligned with structural functionalism, included in the 
positivist/structural-functionalist paradigm. Refer ahead to §4.5.2.
Objectivists view the culture of an organisation as something that an 
organisation has, rather than taking the subjectivist view that the or-
ganisation is a culture as a result of a process of “continuing social 
enactment” (Smircich, 1983). Management theory and practice, says 
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Smircich, prefers the objectivist orientation to culture, seeing it (cul-
ture) as a variable, something that can be manipulated in order to 
produce the sort of state desired by managers. It is just this sort of 
manipulation that is the greatest danger of the objectivist way of 
thinking, says critical social theory which is embraced by the critical-
emancipatory paradigm, discussed ahead in §4.5.4.
3.3.1.2. System as ontology
Bertalanffy described the basic parameters of what we can call a sys-
temic ontology, which he called “finding out the nature of the beast” 
and “how systems are realized at the various levels of the world of 
observation.” This simple statement turns out to be far more complex 
than it appears at first. Bertalanffy begins clearly enough. First, ‘real’ 
systems are to be afforded ontological status.
What is to be defined and described as system is not a 
question with an obvious or trivial answer. It will be read-
ily agreed that a galaxy, a dog, a cell and an atom are 
real systems; that is, entities perceived in or inferred 
from observation, and existing independently of an ob-
server. (Bertalanffy, 1968)
In other words he agrees with objectivism. But then he gets on the 
slippery slope: 
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On the other hand, there are conceptual systems such as 
logic, mathematics (but e.g. also including music) which 
essentially are symbolic constructs; with abstracted sys-
tems (science) as a subclass of the latter, i.e. conceptual 
systems corresponding with reality. However, the distinc-
tion is by no means as sharp and clear as it would ap-
pear. (ibid.)
He seems to be more willing to grant ontological status to abstracted 
“conceptual systems corresponding with reality” than to purely ab-
stract conceptual systems that are “essentially symbolic”.  He tries to 
clarify, but is in the end unable to find a line of demarcation between 
what is ‘real enough’ and what is not.
An ecosystem or social system is “real” enough, as we 
uncomfortably experience when, for example, the ecosys-
tem is disturbed by pollution, or society presents us with 
so many unsolved problems. But these are not objects of 
perception or direct observation; they are conceptual 
constructs. The same is true even of the objects of our 
everyday world which by no means are simply “given” as 
sense data or simple perceptions, but actually are con-
strued by an enormity of “mental” factors ranging from 
gestalt dynamics and learning processes to linguistic and 
cultural factors largely determining what we actually 
“see” or perceive. Thus the distinction between “real” ob-
jects and systems as given in observation and “concep-
tual” constructs and systems cannot be drawn in any 
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commonsense way. These are deep problems which can 
only be indicated in this context. (ibid.)
He essentially tries to divide what is merely perceived to be “in corre-
spondence with reality” from what is “construed” through the use of 
higher abilities. The decision, then, as to what is real and what is not 
real on this basis simply cannot be made. Bertalanffy does not dis-
criminate. Later, in the ontology of process, we will see that critics 
say that it is common for positivists to fall into the trap of reification, 
wherein they see ‘things’ which are merely construed.
General System thinkers may have generally agreed at the time with 
Ervin Laszlo who, in 1971, was to my knowledge the next to publish 
on the subject of systems ontology. To Laszlo, a systems ontology is 
simply “the general theory of system qua system” (1971, 1973). His 
system in the ontological sense is defined as having two basic varie-
ties: mental and physical, or mind and matter. He, too, mounts the 
slippery slope. But rather than just admitting that his argument is un-
raveling as does Bertalanffy, Laszlo continues to take himself seri-
ously (my remarks added in brackets):
...it is entirely consistent to assert that human conscious 
purposes could cause systems of this [tangible] kind to 
form. They would then be called “artificial” as contrasted 
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with “natural” systems. … Classical conceptions of real 
things, as naturally originating solid particulars, must be 
surrendered as inconsistent when the more fertile per-
spective of organizational invariance is adopted as the cri-
terion of real entities. And when we do adopt organiza-
tional invariance as the [ontic] criterion [!!!] then relative 
persistence, origin, substance, level of integration, mani-
fest functions and properties, are so many specifications 
of characteristics of systems, and not touchstones of their 
reality. According to the here advanced theory, any or-
ganization of events that satisfies the state and function 
postulates of systems is real (concrete, veridical), and all 
such actualities are biperspectival, analyzable to physical 
as well as to mental sets of events. The consequent 
proposition, that transient social organizations, as well as 
artificially created machines, have mental events, must 
be accepted [!!!]: using the differentiation and functional 
level of integration of subsystems as the criterion of the 
mentality [nay, complexity] of the systems, we do not at-
tribute anything like human minds to less organised sys-
tems. And if each of us has mind-events and is systemi-
cally organised, then other systemic organizations have 
mind-events in the analogously oriented introspective 
analysis. When organization is the criterion of existence, 
then it is also the criterion of mentality: the alternates 
are either an arbitrary cut-off point for mind, or the logi-
cally consistent but unfruitful tenet of solipsism14. 
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14  Solipsism asserts that reality is only mental. See §6.4.
Essentially, Laszlo settles the ontological argument by granting onto-
logical status to everything. The argument will be made later in this 
thesis that this concept of system as ontology does not serve the 
practitioner nor is it philosophically sound.
Laszlo’s was the last system-as-ontology to gain acceptance in the 
systems community. Others, generally based on pick-your-favorite 
isomorphy: hierarchy, emergence, holon, autopoiesis, dynamic equi-
librium… have been suggested but none stands up to scrutiny for the 
same reasons. That there could be a systems ontology is an idea that 
was finally laid to rest with the coming acceptance of the interpretiv-
ist theories and those that followed (e.g. critical-emancipatory and 
postmodernist-poststructuralist) with their own, incommensurable 
paradigms. 
3.3.1.3. Subjectivism 
Subjective means dependent on the mind or an individual's percep-
tion for its existence (Audi, 1999). Extreme subjectivism questions 
“whether there exists an external world worthy of study” [emphasis 
added] (Burrell and Morgan, 1979), but does not deny the existence 
of an external world. Subjectivism accepts the concept that ‘reality’ is 
created from the perceptions and consequent actions of social actors, 
and that these then have an external existence that can be objec-
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tively studied. It also holds that social phenomena are created sub-
jectively which, through the process of social interaction, these social 
phenomena are in a constant state of revision. To study the details of 
a situation, the researcher “must understand the reality or perhaps a 
reality working behind them” by exploring the subjective meanings 
motivating the actions of social actors in order to be able to under-
stand those actions (Remenyi, 1998). To illustrate, says Remenyi, the 
position “that customer service in an organisation has a reality that is 
separate from the customers that receive that reality” is an objectiv-
ist view. The subjectivist view is that… 
customer service is produced through the social interac-
tion between service providers and customers and is con-
tinually being revised as a result of this. In other words, 
at no time is there a definitive entity called ‘customer 
service’. It is constantly changing. (ibid.)
Smircich noted that objectivists would say that culture is something 
that an organisation ‘has’, but that subjectivists would: 
…reject this as too simplistic and argue that culture is 
something that is created and re-created through a com-
plex array of phenomena which includes social interac-
tions, physical factors such as office layout to which indi-
viduals attach certain meanings, rituals and myths. … It is 
the meanings that are attached to these phenomena by 
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social actors within the organisation that need to be un-
derstood in order for the culture to be understood…. [but] 
because of the continual creation and re-creation of an 
organisation’s culture it is difficult for it to be isolated, 
understood and manipulated (Smircich, 1983).
3.3.1.4. Monism, dualism, ontological pluralism
The terms monism and dualism are needed to put ontological plural-
ism in the proper context. Monism is the belief that all that exists is 
made up of just one basic, or ontic type. One monist position is that 
all that exists is matter, accessible to us empirically; another is that 
all that exists is of the mind, of our own creation. Dualism admits to 
the existence of both mind and matter, what philosophers call ‘sub-
ject’ and ‘object’, respectively. Midgley (2000) says that objectivism 
relies on the concept of subject/object dualism, which in its naive 
form requires the real existence of boundaries. Subject/object dual-
ism, he says, is a view of the world which holds that there are inde-
pendent objects which are observed by subjects who observe from 
the outside, without influencing the objects. With respect to what is 
observed, the observer is on the outside and the boundary between 
them is a real one. 
The concept of ontological pluralism is the general belief that reality 
has many different origins and takes many different forms, such as 
100
mind, matter, “other” (Lacey, 1986) or “many temporal and eternal 
kinds” (Whitehead, 1929). In this research project ontological plural-
ism is an central concept. I explore the notion that there are many 
valid ontologies and seek to provide a contrast with other theories 
which specifically limit the domain of ontic types.
3.3.1.5. Language as ontology
According to cognitive theories such as reflexivity and phenomenol-
ogy (discussed later), language in the broadest sense is the stuff of 
reality. Radical reflexivity is one form which focuses on discourse, or 
the use of language. Cunliffe (2008b) says that “language constitutes 
thought” and that “reality is constructed in the process of discourse.” 
The postmodernist-poststructuralist paradigm sees language at the 
ontological level and considers it a constraint which limits our ability 
to ‘know’ anything with certainty. See §4.5.5, ahead.
3.3.1.6. Process ontology, emergence, or becoming
The postmodern traditions have the latitude such that many ontolo-
gies are admissible because of its central theme that “there is no sin-
gle reality to be described” (Craib, 1992). Because reality is infinitely 
complex, say others, it is ultimately unknowable (Taket and White, 
1996). One such ontology directly related to this research project is 
that of process, emergence, or becoming. With this ontology, accord-
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ing to Chia, organisation studies takes on a new and radically differ-
ent dimension. 
Instead of thinking about organizational analysis as con-
cerning the analysis of organizations or the analyses of 
theories of organization, it can be more fruitfully con-
ceived as a critical intellectual practice of deconstructing 
or dismantling the logical and rhetorical structures of lan-
guage. This is the intellectual orientation adopted by a 
postmodernist reading of organization. It is one inspired 
by an ontology of becoming (Chia, 1996).
Wood (2005), whose research centres on the cutting edge of organi-
sation and management theory, identifies reification (giving a concept 
the status of existence) as a crutch used by objectivists who see 
‘things’ but which are actually only emergent properties of underlying 
processes. Reification is also a central theme for Chia, but where 
Wood sees emergence, Chia sees becoming.
Adopting an emergent and processual approach in social 
analysis enables us to avoid the problems of reification of 
social entities such as ‘individuals’ and ‘organizations’ 
and, instead, directs our attention to the underlying or-
ganizing processes which create these effects that are 
then subsequently taken to be concrete existing entities 
in their own right. ...the process of reification or objectifi-
cation is [mistakenly] effectively ‘forgotten’ in the recon-
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struction of events thereby enabling the observer/theorist 
to believe in the prior existence of social entities such as 
organizations. Once the existence of such entities is ac-
cepted, it is not difficult to see how the modernist/
representationalist discourse can be legitimated and sus-
tained. To break this theoretical closure in modernist 
thinking, postmodern writers insist upon the necessity to 
explain how modern knowledge, in particular the organ-
izational codes they implicitly rely upon, structures our 
thinking processes enabling us to thereby generate these 
social effects. Thus, postmodern thinking enables us to 
see that theories of organization, as institutionalized 
modes of thought, are themselves outcomes of primary 
organizing processes. What all these imply is that we 
need to begin to think of ‘organizations’ not as ‘things’ 
whose properties such as unity, identity, permanence and 
structure can be explored and described, but rather as 
loosely emergent sets of organizing rules which orient in-
teractional behavior in particular ways within a social col-
lectivity. In short, the study of organization should in-
volve the study of the emergence of organization rather 
than the relatively static features displayed of this consti-
tutive process. It is this ‘upstream’ attitude towards or-
ganizational inquiry which is adopted here. (Chia, 1996)
3.3.2. Epistemologies
One of the three roots of philosophy (the other two being ontology 
and ethics), epistemology concerns what constitutes acceptable 
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knowledge in a field of study (Saunders, Lewis, et al., 2007) and is 
concerned with issues such as: truth, answers, description, theory, 
method, justification, dialectic, investigation, thinking, the human 
perspective, the focus on relationships between variables and even 
time. Epistemology investigates the nature of knowledge, its possibil-
ity, its scope and limits and the processes of acquiring and possessing 
it. Related to the acquisition of knowledge, epistemology also con-
cerns itself with issues such as: perception, memory, proof, evidence, 
belief and certainty (Georgiou, 2007). 
Epistemologies are concerned with what constitutes acceptable 
knowledge in a field of study. Across epistemologies, the most impor-
tant distinction is what the researcher considers important in what 
they study (Saunders, Lewis, et al., 2007).
Of the three main components of theory (ontology, epistemology, 
methodology), epistemology is the one most concerned with con-
sciousness. In fact, consciousness can be defined in terms of episte-
mology. Consciousness is, says Georgiou,
…that phenomenon which enables the human being to 
epistemologically engage with other phenomena. Instead 
of being a purely instinctual or reactive phenomenon, 
consciousness actively enables knowledge and its ma-
nipulation and so, at root, consciousness is epistemologi-
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cally actively engaged with other phenomena. (Georgiou, 
2007)
Epistemologies are not stand alone and self contained. They are one 
part of a greater philosophical-theoretical-practical spectrum consti-
tuting a framework of ideas. An imaginative way of expressing that is 
to say that an epistemology ‘exists’ between an ontology (which pro-
vides and supports the world which the epistemology seeks to under-
stand and evaluate) and methodologies (which prescribe ways of 
working in the world with that understanding). Methods are then ac-
tions guided by methodological concepts to intervene in some specific 
‘situation of concern’. 
As with ontologies, this thesis is concerned with only a few of the 
many published epistemologies—those related to this study in sys-
tems thinking. The reader is directed ahead to a more thorough dis-
cussion in the context of the paradigm. 
• modernism (§3.3.2.1)
• anti-realism (§3.3.2.2)
• positivism (§4.5.2.1 and Figure 8)
• structural functionalism (§4.5.2.3)
• interpretivism (§4.5.3)
• social constructionism (§3.3.2.3)
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• critical social theory (emancipatory) (§4.5.4)
• critical systems thinking (§3.3.2.5)
• realism, critical realism (§3.3.2.6)
• postmodernism (§4.5.5)
3.3.2.1. Modernism
The traditional epistemology of the scientific method, modernism in-
sists upon investigation and reliable proofs, rejecting older traditions 
such as rote and repetition and dogma which, due to its successes, it 
has almost completely displaced. Its acceptance since the late 19th 
Century has continued to spread. Some call it the first epistemology. 
Other epistemologies have since emerged but they are lesser known 
by far. To most, modernism is considered the only acceptable episte-
mology and is often resolutely defended as such. Glasersfeld, the fa-
mous constructivist once complained that “a vociferous faction led by 
the Académie des Sciences de Paris would like to chain epistemology 
to the Newtonian model of the universe” (Glasersfeld, 1999).
Reductionism is a more specific type of modernism that follows the 
logic that a thing can be understood in terms of its parts. Jackson 
(1997) explains that because of its reliance on reductionism, modern-
ism is the wrong way to deal with systemically complex problems. In 
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fact, this was the impetus for the creation of systems thinking as a 
discipline.
Complex problems involve richly interconnected sets of 
‘parts’ and the relationships between the parts can be 
more important than the nature of the parts themselves. 
New properties, ‘emergent’ properties, arise from the way 
the parts are organized. Even if the parts constituting a 
complex situation can be identified and separated out, 
therefore, this may be of little help because the most sig-
nificant features, the emergent properties, then get lost. 
Further, although in the natural sciences it is often possi-
ble to test … Finally, in seeking to understand and inter-
vene in social systems, people are inevitably at the center 
of the stage. It is necessary to take into account different 
beliefs and purposes, different evaluations of the situa-
tion, the danger of self-fulfilling prophecies, and the sheer 
bloody-minded capacity of individuals to falsify any pre-
diction made about them. (Jackson, 1997)
3.3.2.2. Anti-realism
Anti-realism is a category of philosophy begun as a rejection of clas-
sical realists’ assertions. It includes the philosophical tradition of ide-
alism, which asserts that all that exists is some variation of mind or 
spirit. There is also a very new line of thinking called correlationism, 
which is “the idea according to which we only ever have access to the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term 
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considered apart from the other” (Meillassoux, 2008). This is a line of 
reasoning which seems to be in alignment with Maturana’s work (see 
especially §6.8).
3.3.2.3. Social constructionism
Social constructionism views reality as being socially constructed and 
is focused on ‘reality’ in its internal existence. Giambattista Vico’s fa-
mous maxim is that humans can know only what they themselves 
have constructed (Vico, 1708). Human actors seek to make sense of 
their world 
… through their interpretation of events and the meanings 
that they draw from these events. In turn their own ac-
tions may be seen by others as being meaningful in the 
context of these socially constructed interpretations and 
meanings. (Smircich, 1983)
Social actors may place many different interpretations on the situa-
tions in which they find themselves as a consequence of their own 
view of the world, or micro-paradigm (§3.2.3). These different inter-
pretations are likely to affect their actions and the nature of their so-
cial interaction with others. In effect, what happens externally is con-
sequential. Social constructionists see everything as, in some way, a 
social construction. This is not to say that they see the world as onto-
logically unreal. Rather, they propose that the notions of real and un-
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real are themselves social constructs, so that the question of whether 
anything is real is just a matter of social convention (ibid.). 
Since its conception in Berger and Luckman’s Social Construction of 
Reality (1966), social constructionism has proved its usefulness and 
affinity in interpretive social and systems studies. Reflexivity, increas-
ingly considered essential to qualitative investigation, is one of its de-
rivatives. Other methodologies such as conversation analysis, coding 
and content analysis, discourse analysis, autoethnography, narrative 
analysis, semiotics and social poetics owe to it their existence.  “I 
know the world as socially constructed,” says Etherington. “Social 
constructionism has challenged modernist notions of truth and reality, 
and invited us to explore how meanings and identity are created 
through language, stories and behaviour, and to think about how we 
know what we know” (Etherington, 2004).
However, I believe the strict-constructionist’s view that ‘reality’ de-
pends on social convention is a form of relativism which must be re-
jected on logical grounds because it does not acknowledge any form 
of objective existence. The objective existence of so-called ‘real’ 
things must be granted because their existence can be proved by 
their affects. (Try doing without ‘real’ air for a few minutes, for exam-
ple.) The ontological stance of relativism taken by strict-social-
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perhaps it is merely incomplete (see Chapter 6: subject-object dual-
ism, the P–S ontology).
3.3.2.4. Constructivism
Constructivism is a theory describing how learning happens. “Social 
constructivism views each (personal) learner as a unique individual 
with unique needs and backgrounds. The learner is also seen as com-
plex and multidimensional. Social constructivism not only acknowl-
edges the uniqueness and complexity of the learner, but actually en-
courages, utilizes and rewards it as an integral part of the learning 
process” (Wertsch 1997).
“The theory of constructivism is generally attributed to 
Jean Piaget, [and importantly to cybernetics, von Glasers-
feld (1989)] who articulated mechanisms by which 
knowledge is internalized by learners. He suggested that 
through processes of accommodation and assimilation, 
individuals construct new knowledge from their experi-
ences. When individuals assimilate, they incorporate the 
new experience into an already existing framework with-
out changing that framework. This may occur when indi-
viduals' experiences are aligned with their internal repre-
sentations of the world, but may also occur as a failure to 
change a faulty understanding; for example, they may 
not notice events, may misunderstand input from others, 
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or may decide that an event is a fluke and is therefore 
unimportant as information about the world. In contrast, 
when individuals' experiences contradict their internal 
representations, they may change their perceptions of the 
experiences to fit their internal representations. According 
to the theory, accommodation is the process of reframing 
one's mental representation of the external world to fit 
new experiences. Accommodation can be understood as 
the mechanism by which failure leads to learning: when 
we act on the expectation that the world operates in one 
way and it violates our expectations, we often fail, but by 
accommodating this new experience and reframing our 
model of the way the world works, we learn from the ex-
perience of failure, or others' failure.” (ibid.)
3.3.2.5. Critical systems thinking
Epistemology is reflection on the gaining and disseminat-
ing of knowledge and on the validity of that knowledge… 
[But reflection] tells us absolutely nothing about how to 
deal with our inescapable lack of comprehensive knowl-
edge and understanding… Critical, or self-reflective, ideas 
amount to an adequate epistemological ideal for social in-
quiry in terms of systems rationality, sociological episte-
mology, and of course systems practice. (Flood and Ul-
rich, 1990)
The critical systems epistemology is an approach to systems practice 
that is closely associated with the theory called ‘critical systems 
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thinking’, the subject of §4.4, where the epistemology is explained 
within the larger theory. Please also refer ahead to the critical-
emancipatory paradigm, §4.5.4.
3.3.2.6. Realism, critical realism
Based on objectivist ontology, realist epistemology therefore sees 
meaning ‘out there’ and available to us, awaiting its discovery. There 
are several different ‘flavours’ of realism each with its own qualifica-
tions allowing for varying kinds of uncertainties, particularly when it 
comes to the human involvement in that reality ‘out there.’ Social re-
alists (e.g. structural functionalists, §4.5.2.3) perceive social reality 
as having a hard, objective existence, external to the individual 
(Jackson, 1999). Direct realists, on the right, so to speak, say simply 
that what you see is what you get: what we experience through our 
senses portrays the world accurately. Whereas, to the left, the critical 
realist understands that complete reliance upon our senses can be 
misleading. Critical realists assume that… 
There are sensory illusions and things aren’t always what 
they seem to be. First, there is the thing itself and the 
sensations it conveys. Then, there is mental processing 
that goes on sometime after that sensation meets our 
senses… As researchers we will only be able to under-
stand what is going on… if we understand the… structures 
that have given rise to the phenomena that we are trying 
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to understand. What we see is only part of the bigger pic-
ture. We can identify what we don’t see through practical 
and theoretical processes of the… sciences. (Bhaskar, 
1989)
Critical realists argue that what we experience are sensa-
tions, the images of the things in the real world, not the 
things directly. Critical realists point out how often our 
senses deceive us. What we really see are representa-
tions of what is real. (Saunders, Lewis, et al., 2007)
Critical realism, according to Saunders, Lewis et al. (2007), is the 
norm today for approaching problems in business and management:
We would argue that the critical realist’s position that the 
social world is constantly changing is much more in line 
with the purpose of business and management research 
which is often to understand the reason for phenomena 
as a precursor to recommending change.
3.4. Approaches to the problem of paradigm incommen-
surability
Although it has long been the goal of critical systems theorists to rec-
oncile this issue and, as we shall see, many attempts have been 
made, there is currently no proper unifying theory which completely 
supports, explains and operates in a world in which multiple para-
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digms coexist and co-operate or coordinate between and amongst 
themselves; no theory from which informed methodological pluralism 
emerges naturally allowing us to draw upon the great diversity of ex-
isting theories and methodologies. That is, none which are:
• explicitly multiparadigmatic (using Burrell, Morgan and Smir-
cich’s concept of paradigms as onto-epistemological groups 
of theories)
• explicitly multimethodological (calling upon the use of exist-
ing methodologies which may be from different paradigms as 
needed in the same project)
• theoretically coherent and consistent (not suffering incom-
mensurability, not suffering epistemological relativism)
It has been said that paradigm incommensurability must be acknowl-
edged and that “we must learn to accept a degree of incommensur-
ability” (Jackson, 1997). “Unless we abandon the idea of paradigm 
altogether” says Zhu (2009), “it [incommensurability] will not go 
away and it cannot just be ignored.”
The premise of the thesis is that if a suitable multiparadigmatic the-
ory could be developed to support the positivist/structural-
functionalist, interpretivist, critical-emancipatory and postmodernist-
poststructuralist paradigms (without changing or subsuming them), it 
would be possible to build a proper theoretical framework around it 
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(i.e. ontology, epistemology, and methodology) where the methodol-
ogy is a multiparadigm multimethodology such as those which al-
ready exist but suffer from incommensurability and relativism issues.
Most anomalies are resolved by normal means; most pro-
posals for new theories do prove to be wrong. If all mem-
bers of a community responded to each anomaly as a 
source of crisis or embraced each new theory advanced 
by a colleague, science would cease. If, on the other 
hand, no one reacted to anomalies or to brand-new theo-
ries in high-risk ways, there would be few or no revolu-
tions. (Kuhn, 1962, 1996) 
There are four known approaches to the problem of paradigm in-
commensurability:
• atheoretical pragmatism
• complementarism / bridging
• metaparadigmatic / subsumption
• creation of a new paradigm
Each of these approaches has been proposed and are critically re-
viewed in the sections to follow. All except the last have proven flaws. 
The last approach, that systems theorists should lay claim to a new 
paradigm is the jumping off point that inspires the solutions that are 
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the main products of this research project—a theoretical framework 
for a different approach to systemic practice which includes a new on-
tology, epistemology and methodology. 
Of course, there are other ways to classify theories besides their 
onto-epistemological assumptions. If paradigm incommensurability is 
such a problem say some, why not just abandon the idea of ‘para-
digm’ as we know it (Zhu, 2010)? The basic message of the pragma-
tists is that there are problems or difficulties with using any theory. 
Each situation is unique, they say, so why be tied to any theoretical 
approach? Pragmatism is the subject of the next section. Others may 
call for other ways to classify methods that avoid the concerns of on-
tology and epistemology, but every philosophical or theoretical ap-
proach (including this research) does make implicit if not explicit as-
sumptions about the problem situation itself and its environment (on-
tological assumptions); and it has some rational way to express its 
concepts of the situation, what it is that is of concern (epistemological 
assumptions). 
Given this, I suggest we educate ourselves and leverage those as-
sumptions to our advantage, rather than minimise their importance. 
Participant 2 says in her interview (ahead) that “to the man who has 
a hammer, everything is a nail; but what if all you have is a ham-
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mer?” Look for other tools! The tool you use must be the proper tool 
for the job that needs done or you end up with a mess. I believe sys-
tems will continue to evolve by adding to and improving the para-
digms as we improve our understanding of problems and opportuni-
ties and gain new abilities to engage with them more effectively. 
Midgley, et al. (2007), for example, have a new framework for evalu-
ating systemic participative methods which takes account of a wide 
range of other considerations which are relevant to the evaluation 
and use of different methods, considerations which are matters of 
concern to all four paradigms.
3.5. Pragmatism 
In discussing pragmatism I will use the definition of pragmatism 
given by Jackson (1987b), more correctly referred to as atheoretical 
pragmatism and not to be confused with other forms such as Ulrich’s 
‘critical pragmatism’ (2007), or American pragmatism which is the 
basis for Churchman’s social systems design (1968, 1979). American 
pragmatism is actually “one of the philosophical traditions that has 
informed the development of critical systems thinking (and from 
which as Brauer (1995) notes, we still have much to learn” (Midgley, 
1997b).
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Despite the ‘direct connection’ some say that a pragmatic approach 
affords them, Flood and Romm point out out the dangers atheoretical 
pragmatism which could make for irresponsible practice:
No apparent reference is made to inferable underlying 
theory or methodological rules. There is no reflection 
about which theory or methodology is relevant, when, or 
why. Practitioners have some command over the tools 
that they use and find out about, more or less, by trial 
and error. It is a rather weak heuristic approach. This 
may lead to unfortunate social consequences through 
heuristic in vivo experimentation on social situations, 
running the risk of unnecessary levels of damage and dis-
tress. Furthermore, a preconceived, pre-structured ap-
preciation of the situation is likely to prevail giving rise 
(effectively) to predetermined solutions. In this way a 
pragmatic approach is likely to maintain or even increase 
the power of elites… Pragmatism accepts a form of non-
reflective eclecticism. (Flood and Romm, 1995a)
Pragmatism is an alternative approach to practice which de-
emphasises the role of theory, focusing instead on what has been 
shown to produce practical results in the past or upon the reasoned 
skills of an expert practitioner. Pragmatists may settle for a form of 
pragmatism kept up-to-date with contemporary scholarly thought 
(Ruwhiu and Cone, 2010), but even this pseudo-critical pragmatism 
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can degrade into ad hoc tactics which are hit-or-miss, trial-and-error, 
or inspired by the call to “let’s just do what worked the last time.” I 
believe that systemic interventions enacted without the grounding 
and guidance from theory are not suitable for complex situa-
tions—when the risks are high, the costs of failure too dear, especially 
when other people’s lives are affected. As opposed to merely rational-
ising past performances retrospectively, 
The practical importance of theory is that it can transform 
practice… by exposing and correcting cognitive errors im-
plicit in that practice. (Collier, 1994)
And, because it is explicit, a theory can be transformed so that it al-
ways informs and remains relevant. “The proper test of theory,” said 
Whitehead (1929), “is not that of finality, but of progress.” 
Pragmatists are concerned with developing a flexible and responsive 
practice to systemic intervention, says Jackson (1987b), “by bringing 
together the best elements of what may appear to be opposing 
strands [of management and systems thought] on the criterion of 
what ‘works’ in practice.” That in and of itself is not a bad thing, but 
the central problem is that because they are “distrustful of theory,” 
the pragmatic approach lacks credible theoretical support. Instead, 
“proven techniques… are employed together in the course of 
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problem-solving if the situation warrants it” (ibid.). Flood (1989) ex-
plains why this is problematic in an allegory: 
The craftsmen [of old] were able to build complex struc-
tures using their own tool kit but had no idea why the 
thing stood up, why a beam fixed one way cracked but 
fixed another way did not. They only knew how to do it 
from the practice of trial and error. 
Refer ahead to the interview with Participant 9 where this fundamen-
tal failing of pragmatism arises in the context of the classroom.
A pragmatist might try to justify pragmatism because of the difficult 
problems that philosophy sometimes presents. An example is the 
problem of paradigm incommensurability which I claim has been un-
resolved since Burrell and Morgan. To the pragmatist, it seems the 
theorists are relativists, anyway: 
“Why, it is simply not logical,” the pragmatist would say, 
“that one could accept one ontology (which by definition 
defines the stuff of reality and denies the existence of all 
else) one moment, then simply throw it out and accept 
another. Only a supreme being could possibly recreate 
reality to suit a (somehow) preexisting situation. And you 
and I would not survive to tell of it!” Flood (1989)
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Implicitly acknowledging such paradoxes, pragmatists adopt the phi-
losophy that philosophy (all but theirs) does not matter so much and 
should be de-emphasised (Midgley, 1989a; Taket and White, 1996). 
Wendy Gregory (1996a) describes pragmatism thus:
According to Jackson [1987b], a pragmatist will use 
whichever “tool” appears suitable for tackling the particu-
lar situation s/he has been made aware of. Here, choice 
of methodology will be based purely on personal experi-
ence rather than theory (Flood, 1989). Since any systems 
practitioner is able to choose which methodology to em-
ploy (the argument runs), s/he is obviously able to 
“jump” between paradigms depending on the problem 
situation being faced, and the chosen methodology. How-
ever, such movements between paradigms are never 
made explicitly, and could not be communicated in a rig-
orous, theoretical way to other practitioners (Midgley, 
1989a). … Pragmatists do not undertake reflexive inquiry, 
preferring instead to simply use whatever works in prac-
tice. They rely on “trial and error” learning to guide their 
usage. (Flood, 1989)
Perhaps, though, pragmatism may become the default method for in-
vestigation in the case of a totally novel situation, when a bizarre 
situation is initially approached with reasoned hypotheses, by probing 
and trial-and-error tests. Solutions are not too infrequently reverse 
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
121
engineered, after all. Also, in the experiment (Chapter 8) I was very 
surprised to learn of another case for pragmatism: giving a demon-
stration is an effective, pragmatic way of introducing a theory by 
showing its method to be effective first, before explaining the theory. 
Another attraction, as postmodernists are wont to tout, is that it can 
be fun. We should, they say, look for opportunities to have fun with 
what we so seriously call our ‘problems of concern’ (Taket and White, 
1996). Pragmatism is discussed again in the next chapter and in 
§4.5.5, the section on the postmodern-poststructural paradigm of 
critical systems thinking.
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Chapter
4. Systems thinking, critical systems thinking, para-
digms of critical systems thinking
4.1.1. Introduction
The pioneers of system theory had grand visions, among them the 
unification of the sciences with a common language for solving prob-
lems of all kinds in even the most complex cases. In General System 
Theory (GST), systems are said to exist as components in interaction 
within some environment. Various aspects or qualities of systems are 
identified: holism and the idea of emergent properties, isomorphism, 
open systems in dynamic equilibrium, networks, cycles and flows, hi-
erarchy, synergy, resilience, etc. Yet, more than seventy years later, 
the systems community remains relatively small and our field is not 
generally known to the public. What has frustrated our grand 
dreams? What is causing the ever-increasing divergence of our once-
unified field of theories and methods? Why do we hear one systems 
practitioner say to another “What you do has absolutely nothing to do 
with what I do”; or worse, “The way you think makes no sense to 
me”? If you were to ask nine systems practitioners “What do you 
mean by ‘system’ and ‘systems thinking’” you likely to get nine dif-
ferent answers. Using metaphor as a conceptual tool, Jackson 
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(2003a, b) has said that one might rightly say that systems are like 
machines, or that systems are like organisms or they are like brains, 
or teams, or all flux and transformation; or systems are cultures, sys-
tems are political, systems are psychic prisons, instruments of domi-
nation, or even that they are like carnivals! It is clear that ‘systems’ 
and ‘systems thinking’ no longer fits inside its original home of gen-
eral system theory. The variety of what we call ‘systems’ is great, as 
are the many ways to approach them with ‘systems thinking’. 
In the past, when the methods available at the time were found to be 
inadequate or even inappropriate when applied to a particular class of 
problem context (that is, when practice overstepped the boundary of 
its successful applicability), an entirely radical, new way of looking at 
and dealing with the problem would eventually emerge and obsolete 
the contemporary milieu. For example, scientific enquiry replaced 
widely believed myths; germ theory replaced what was thought to be 
miasma or ‘bad air’, biological reproduction displaced spontaneous 
generation. Kuhn (1962) gave us the term paradigm to describe 
these milieus or worldviews. In terms of advancing science, eventu-
ally the old paradigm was overthrown and the new paradigm took its 
place. He called each of these transitional periods an epistemological 
crisis. 
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Burrell and Morgan (1979) translated (i.e. moved) this concept as a 
way to view different approaches to organisational analysis and de-
fined four sociological paradigms. Importantly, although they break 
with each other epistemologically, these sociological paradigms do not 
replace their antecedents, but are considered to remain valid, concur-
rently. That is, they are all valid but different onto-epistemologically. 
The use of the term ‘paradigm’ throughout this dissertation is not 
meant in the Kuhnian sense, but from Burrell and Morgan. 
4.2. General system theory
The following quote, wherein Ludwig von Bertalanffy introduces his 
General System Theory (GST), is especially relevant. Although some 
of the concepts he speaks of are understood today in different terms, 
they are nonetheless fundamental to this research.
Entities of an essentially new sort are entering the sphere 
of scientific thought. Classical science in its diverse disci-
plines, be it chemistry, biology, psychology or the social 
sciences, tried to isolate the elements of the observed 
universe—chemical compounds and enzymes, cells, ele-
mentary sensations, freely competing individuals, what 
not—expecting that, by putting them together again, con-
ceptually or experimentally, the whole or system—cell, 
mind, society—would result and be intelligible. Now we 
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have learned that for an understanding not only the ele-
ments but their interrelations as well are required: say, 
the interplay of enzymes in a cell, of many mental proc-
esses conscious and unconscious, the structure and dy-
namics of social systems and the like. This requires ex-
ploration of the many systems in our observed universe 
in their own right and specificities. Furthermore, it turns 
out that there are general aspects, correspondences and 
isomorphisms common to ‘systems.’ This is the domain of 
general system theory; indeed, such parallelisms or iso-
morphies appear—sometimes surprisingly—in otherwise 
totally different ‘systems’. (Bertalanffy, 1968)
As I see it, Bertalanffy defined general system theory as having ‘sys-
tems with isomorphies between them’ as its ontology. ‘System-ness’ 
then could be said to exist in and between things and that is what 
was to be studied, epistemologically. Fuenmayor and López-Garay 
(1991) said of it:
The onto-epistemological claim for ‘wholeness’ is immedi-
ately found in its core. The ontological statement, ‘Things 
(phenomena) are wholes which transcend the mere col-
lection of their parts,’ is logically followed by the episte-
mological claim stated as ‘Things (phenomena) should be 
studied as wholes and not as mere aggregates of parts.’ 
…
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The systems onto-epistemological claim is that phenom-
ena cannot simply be reduced to their physical abstrac-
tion and then be analysed (decomposed in parts). That 
would imply losing their ‘emergent property’ or holistic 
sense.
It is worth interjecting here that general system theory (GST), as I 
have already said, aspired to be accepted amongst the other sci-
ences. It gives away its objectivist ontology and positivist epistemol-
ogy (see §3.3.1.1) in phrases like ‘quantifiable measurements’, ‘mod-
els of reality’, ‘mathematical descriptions’, and in studies of GST by its 
own proponents, as in this one by Laszlo which implies a reliance on 
a knowable, objective and law-like ‘scientific’ universe.
Consider, then, the here advanced hypothesis as a con-
ceptual model, of the systems theoretical species, map-
ping into potentially quantifiable constructs certain recur-
rent general features of the scientifically observable uni-
verse. … General systems synthesis, I suggest, is the 
building of models of models. (Laszlo, 1975)
4.3. Divergence as diversity – a system of systems meth-
odologies 
Critical systems thinking as a category of theory had its origin in the 
article Towards a System of Systems Methodologies (Jackson and 
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Keys, 1984); its raison d'être being to organise the dozens of sys-
tems methodologies by their ‘affinity’ or effective appropriateness to 
particular categories of problem situations and to guide the practitio-
ner to their more appropriate selection. In A System of Systems 
Methodologies (SoSM), Jackson & Keys classified problem contexts by 
each of two aspects: the systems type: mechanical or systemic; and 
the participants’ relationship to it: unitary or pluralist, referring to 
whether or not there is consensus on the problem as it is understood. 
The coercive relationship (whether or not there are issues of power 
and control, or coercion,) was added soon thereafter (Jackson, 
1987a). Other methods of classifying systems also existed at the 
time; for example, Bánáthy’s (1987) five major types of systems: 
rigidly-controlled, deterministic, purposive, heuristic, and purpose-
seeking (Oliga, 1988) was also intended to help the systemist choose 
an approach. In an attempt to match Bánáthy’s scheme with Jack-
son’s system, I have merged them in the following table:
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Participants’ 
relationship
System: 
Mechanical
System: 
Systemic
Unitary
Mechanical-unitary 
(Rigidly Controlled, 
Deterministic): 
Classical OR, Sys-
tems Engineering, 
Systems Analysis, 
(Living systems 
process analysis, 
Management cy-
bernetics)
Systemic-unitary (Pur-
posive): Organizational 
cybernetics, Socio-
technical systems 
thinking, General sys-
tems theory, Modern 
contingency theory, 
(Living systems proc-
ess analysis, Systems 
design)
Pluralist
Mechanical-
Pluralist (Heuristic): 
Dialectical inquiring 
systems, e.g. 
SAST; (Double-
loop organizational 
learning)
Systemic-pluralist 
(Purpose Seeking): In-
teractive planning, 
SoSM.
Coercive
Mechanical-
Coercive: method-
ologies yet to 
emerge
Systemic-Coercive: 
methodologies yet to 
emerge
Table 1.  A System of Systems Methodologies (Flood and Jackson, 1991b), 
plus Choosing Design Methods (Bánáthy, 1987) in parentheses.
Regarding its adoption, Jackson identifies and acknowledges some 
difficulties with SoSM in identifying the problem context. The wider 
the system’s boundaries are drawn, for example, the more likely is 
the problem context to become systemic-pluralist (i.e. more systemi-
cally complex and less-well agreed by the principals). Also, the way 
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any problem context is perceived is going to depend very much on 
the individual who is observing it—on the available information and 
on their unconscious Weltanschauung, or worldview.
Jackson and Keys’ framework was the first to focus on and classify 
the variety of problem situations and to match those types with an 
appropriately categorised group of systems methodologies according 
to the assumptions they each made about the problem scenario. It 
imagined the whole set of systems methodologies as individually 
complementary across the spectrum of systemic scenarios. Although 
not thought of in those terms at the time, in retrospect we can see 
that it was implicitly multiparadigmatic. These paradigms were 
unitary-pluralist-coercive/mechanical-systemic, not yet onto-
epistemological worldviews. And ‘A System of Systems Methodolo-
gies’ was not yet a multimethodology. Nevertheless it catalysed sev-
eral successive generations of of improvements—all from its then-
radical idea that systemists could leverage philosophical divergence 
by re-imagining methodological diversity as complementarism by 
considering the relative merits of each approach with respect to the 
presenting situation. 
The theory is critically reviewed ahead in §5.4.3.
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4.4. Critical systems thinking
In 1985, Jackson introduced critical systems thinking, an evolutionary 
step forward in categorising the methodologies of systems thinking in 
deeper terms; ontology—the constitution of the world in which a the-
ory assumes it operates, and epistemology—the world's values and 
the knowledge we can have of it. Four groups of these onto-
epistemological assumptions form the 'paradigms' of critical systems 
thinking. They are discussed in the sections just ahead. The theory 
itself is reviewed in §5.4.5.
In his book, Systems Approaches to Management, Jackson (2000) 
distills the essence of what it means to operate in each one of the 
paradigms of critical systems thinking. With each of his ‘generic’ 
methodologies he takes a bottom up approach, explaining each of 
their philosophies in four easily digested packages. The book presents 
them as though they are general “constitutive rules.” Their application 
may be to methodology, but they are, themselves, epistemological. I 
use them as the basis for the definitions of the paradigms because 
they are given in terms that are accessible to the systems practitio-
ner. See the following sections.
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4.5. Paradigms of critical systems thinking
4.5.1. Historical development
One would surely construct a modern taxonomic ‘family tree’ of sys-
tems philosophy beginning with Bertalanffy’s General System Theory 
(1950) as the trunk. The remaining parts of the tree, its various 
branches and leaves, could be constructed to illustrate any one of a 
number of different perspectives on systems thinking. Flood and 
Gregory (1989) identified these four approaches to writing a history:
1. Linear, chronologically sequential.
2. Structuralist, branched by structural developments. This 
model is scientific.
3. A world-view, or cognitive, psychological model. By ‘gestalt’, 
or ‘epistemological break’.
4. Genealogical; networks cutting across discourse; dynamic, 
power-relations focused. Seeking “to reveal history in all its 
nuances, subtleties and violence.”
To construct a tree to illustrate a paradigmatic classification of theo-
ries and methods as put forth in this dissertation, method three ap-
plies. According to this view there are four primary branches—the 
paradigmatic ‘worldviews’ of critical systems theory: functionalist-
structuralist, interpretivist, critical-emancipatory, and postmodern-
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poststructural. These paradigmatic branches in turn support and or-
ganise each specific system theory by its date of introduction. 
Branches of the tree fork when an old theory is improved or a new 
theory introduced. Altogether, the variety suggests incremental and 
evolutionary advancement in each specific area of systemic under-
standing. We can imagine twigs to represent each methodology of 
any particular theory, and leaves for the various methods employed, 
or actions taken in real situations. The following diagram illustrates 
one such view.
Systems
Thinking
Positivist- 
functionalist)
General Systems Theory
Interpretivist
Critical-emancipatory
Postmodernist
Interpretive Systemology
Pragmatic Pluralism
Soft Systems Methodology
Critical Systems Heuristics
Living Systems Theory
…
…
…
Critical Systems Thinking
…
Figure 7.  Branching structure of systems theories by paradigm. 
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Before the concept of paradigm was established, other worldviews 
and ways of organising systems thinking had been devised. Most 
sought to ‘systematise’ the world specifically in one, two or three di-
mensions; for example: Boulding’s (1956) nine categories of systems 
complexity, Beer’s (1967) systems classes according to their suscep-
tibility to control, Checkland’s (1971) systems map of the universe in 
five classes, Jordan’s (1981) taxonomy of eight cells from three di-
mensions, and Deetz’s (1996) four dimensions of discourse (Mingers, 
2001, p.249). In a System of Systems Methodologies, Jackson and 
Keys (1984) used two dimensions: systems in the world were seen as 
1. either unitary or pluralist, i.e. whether or not those involved 
agreed as to the nature of the system being considered; and 
2. systems were either simple or complex. (Coercive was added to 
this dimension less than a year later (Jackson, 1985).)
The first publication I could find which classified systems theories in 
terms of ‘ontology’ and ‘epistemology’ and which spoke of ‘paradigms’ 
is Fuenmayor’s (1985) thesis wherein he identified positivism and in-
terpretivism. 
“What is the relation between wholeness and Being?”, “Is 
it possible to have holistic knowledge?”, “If so, how 
should we search for it?” …
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“The discussion about the ill-definedness, the lack of 
theoretical rootedness, and the non-critical character of a 
systems approach becomes much clearer if we bear in 
mind the difference between those two meanings/
intentions stemming from the notion of wholeness.”…
If… a systems approach is to be liberated to the cogitative 
realms of free inquiry and scientific endeavour, it would 
need a systems theory upon which to be formally based. 
Obviously, a systems theory founded on the idea of 
wholeness should conceptually develop the “central intui-
tion” of “wholeness.” This means that a systems theory 
requires a systems philosophy comprised of both onto-
logical and epistemological aspects. A systems ontology 
would present an answer to the question: “What is it that 
makes the whole more than the sum of its parts?” That 
is,“What is this central intuition of wholeness?” A systems 
epistemology would treat the possibility and boundaries 
of knowledge with regard to wholeness, as well as how 
that knowledge can be methodically sought. (Fuenmayor, 
1985)
Fuenmayor’s theory, interpretive systemology, is the subject of 
§5.4.4.
Total Systems Intervention, or TSI,  was the first to call itself a multi-
paradigmatic systems theory. As originally conceived it was called a 
‘meta-theory’ encapsulating and directing the use of the others: the 
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functionalist and interpretivist paradigms, and the newly-named 
‘emancipatory’ paradigm. TSI called for a ‘critical’, or self-reflective 
(i.e. reflexive) approach to systems intervention, thereby co-opting 
the term ‘critical’ from the social sciences… to which it gave instead 
the term ‘emancipatory’ (see Jackson, 1989). The radical ‘postmod-
ern’ or ‘post-structural’ paradigm was subsequently advocated for by 
systems thinkers, for example Taket and White (1993); and the 
meta-paradigm, ‘critical systems thinking‘ was merged with the 
emancipatory paradigm to become the ‘critical-emancipatory’ para-
digm (see Fuenmayor, 1991).
The theories which make up a paradigm have essentially like-
constructed realities—common underlying or compatible ontologies 
and epistemologies—plus their own member methodologies. Each 
paradigm is therefore associated with a set, or family, of methodolo-
gies. The ‘perspectivity’ afforded by a particular paradigmatic view is 
therefore shaped and constrained ontologically and epistemologically. 
Ontologically we ask, “What is the nature and makeup of the world?” 
and epistemologically we ask, “What are the various approaches to 
knowing and understanding the world, our values and beliefs?” The 
consequent methodologies express guidelines for ways in which we 
would interact with the world and which, when operationalised, be-
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come actionable methods (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Flood and Jack-
son, 1991a; Midgley, 2000). The systemist benefits a great deal from 
the concept of paradigms. Rather than having to deal with a different 
understanding of reality for each theory, the paradigm delimits the 
general worldview for all its associated theories.
The remainder of this chapter sets out the theoretical landscape for 
the current practice of critical systems thinking in terms of the para-
digms broadly accepted by its academics and adopted by its practi-
tioners. Beginning with positivism/structural-functionalism and ending 
with postmodernism-poststructuralism, I approach them in a natural 
(historic) order because it is this perspective which seems to best 
convey their reason for being. Each new paradigm can be seen as a 
response to a crisis built up from the various anomalies, failings and 
dilemmas encountered by practitioners operating within the theoreti-
cal framework(s) of their day. As first understood by Kuhn (1962, 
1996),
Each new paradigm is preceded by such a period of crisis 
which catalyses a relatively chaotic interregnum when 
various diverse, pragmatic, and trial-and-error attempts 
are made to synthesize methods which, as witnessed by 
their success, demonstrate a more comprehensive under-
standing of the then-problematic situation. 
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An ‘epistemological break’ occurs when a new theory is accepted and 
supplants the dominance of the old. Kuhn said that the new episte-
mology effectively destroys the status quo. Burrell and Morgan’s 
(1979) work, later updated by Morgan and Smircich (1980) estab-
lished the contemporary understanding of paradigms as coexisting 
social paradigms whereby each one has validity and utility within its 
own conceptual domain.
The first epistemological break in systems theory was from positivism 
and structural functionalism to interpretivism, marked by Checkland’s 
(1981) Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), which called for: 
…moving away from instrumental control of positivist ap-
proaches towards a mutual understanding through inter-
pretivist systems thinking… (Flood and Ulrich, 1990)
Other interpretivist approaches followed, include cognitive mapping 
(Eden and Ackermann, 2001), and strategic choice approach (Friend, 
2001). See the list in §4.5.3.
The paradigms that followed positivist/structural-functionalist are so-
cial (people-centric) paradigms. What Craib says about social para-
digms is worth remembering. “A value judgement [epistemology] 
about the ideal society underlies any social theory” (Craib, 1992).
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4.5.2. Positivist/structural-functionalist
General System Theory (GST), established in the post-World War II 
era as a radical new way of understanding complexity, was designed 
as a new field of scientific inquiry by its founders. Nevertheless, GST 
was established on the de facto platform of scientific principles—those 
regarding the nature of logical inquiry and for making proof-of-
validity (truth) claims. As such, systems thinking began as an onto-
logically objectivistic and epistemologically positivistic school of 
thought. In these days before the emergence of any alternative para-
digms, to be ‘unscientific’ was simply unthinkable. Oliga explains the 
mindset in terms of an unquestioned ontology:
In the scientific method (however defined) an ontological 
unity was assumed in the sense that all objects in the 
universe, regardless of whether these were inert, living, 
conscious, or rational beings, were taken to be of funda-
mentally and qualitatively the same kind. Thus the only 
meaningful questions of scientific inquiry centred on epis-
temology and methodology. (Oliga, 1988)
Per Gregory (1992), what were for a time called ‘hard’ systems theo-
ries include:
• Bertalanffy’s essentially biological philosophy of General Sys-
tems (1950a.b)
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• Wiener’s 1948 and Ashby’s 1956 related work on cybernetics 
and “leaning/thinking” machines
• Shannon and Weaver’s 1949 information and communication 
theories (related to cybernetics)
• Operations research Hall (1962); Rivett & Ackoff (1963); 
Churchman, Ackoff & Arnoff (1975), von Neumann & 
Morgernstern’s games theory (1953); others 
• System dynamics Forrester (1961, 1969, 1971) for model-
ling social & global processes
 
These theories purport to deal with 
…hard, tangible data (‘facts’) relating to situations in 
which the goals and means can readily be identified. Ad-
ditionally, they all rely on quantitative methods for re-
solving the problems as stated, and take for granted the 
possibility of maximising or optimising some entity re-
lated to the problem. More recently (Dando & Bennett, 
1981; Jackson, 1991a) they have been described as be-
ing underpinned by either a functionalist or structuralist 
[structural functionalist] social theory. (Gregory, 1992)
4.5.2.1. Positivism
Positivism aims to provide an accurate description of the laws and 
mechanisms that operate in the context. It reflects the philosophy of 
traditional science and is adopted by the typical scientist, engineer, 
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mechanic, pilot, builder, etc. It is based on a world that is fact-based 
and measurable. Ontologically objectivist, positivists assume that 
there is a stable, law-like external reality. A characteristic is the exis-
tence of objective, absolute and unconditional truths. Epistemologi-
cally, this reality is knowable, so disputes over the true nature of a 
thing (the truth) can be resolved through additional inquiry. Of high-
est regard is replication. Only phenomena that can be observed will 
lead to the production of credible data. The observer is detached ax-
iologically and believes that observations can and should be objec-
tively experienced and value free. The assumption is that “the re-
searcher is independent of and neither affects nor is affected by the 
subject of the research” (Craib, 1992). Methodologically, positivism 
advocates the use of highly structured methodologies in order to fa-
cilitate replication (Gill and Johnson, 2002). Emphasis is placed on 
quantifiable data that lend themselves to statistical analysis; how-
ever, ‘it is perfectly possible to adopt some of the characteristics of 
positivism in … research, for example, hypothesis testing, and use 
largely qualitative methods’ (Saunders, Lewis, et al., 2007). Positiv-
ism is attributable to the Renaissance and the Machine Age, to the 
processes of analysis, reductionism, cause & effect, and determinism 
(Flood and Jackson, 1991a; Craib, 1992). 
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Figure 8.  Positivism – theory and characteristics.
Jackson (2000) tells us how to spot positivism: 
If a theory is underpinned by objective assumptions, it 
will have certain distinguishing characteristics. Social re-
ality will be perceived as having a hard, objective exis-
tence, external to the individual (i.e., the theory adheres 
to a realist ontology). The theory will seek to establish 
the existence of regularities and causal relationships in 
the social world (positivist epistemology). 
And Saunders and Lewis, et al. (2007) describe the work and ration-
ality of the stereotypical positivist researcher:
Only phenomena that you can observe will lead to the 
production of credible data. You are likely to use existing 
theory to develop hypotheses. These hypotheses will be 
tested and confirmed in whole or part, or refuted, leading 
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to the further development of theory which may then be 
tested by further research. 
The research is undertaken, as far as possible, in a value-free way. 
This assumes that ‘the researcher is independent of and neither af-
fects or is affected by the subject of the research’ (Remenyi, 1998). 
The positivist researcher will be likely to use a highly structured 
methodology in order to facilitate replication (Gill and Johnson, 
2002). Furthermore, the emphasis will be on quantifiable observa-
tions that lend themselves to statistical analysis. 
Following that logic, here Laszlo reveals the philosophical heritage of 
systems thinking:
…that the data of systems synthesis are theories—”first-
order” models of the experienced world—and not experi-
ences themselves. Its basic conceptual assumption is that 
the first-order models refer to some common underlying 
core termed “reality,” and that this core is generally or-
dered. Thus the special orders elucidated by the many 
empirical-level models serving as its data can be inte-
grated into a second-order model exhibiting a species of 
general order. In view of the fitness of systems concepts 
to remain invariant when passing from one first-order 
model to another, thereby permitting the translation of 
terms and concepts as particular transformations of the 
invariance stated in the systems language, the second-
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order model constitutes a general systems theory. It in-
tegrates the findings of the many specialized first-order 
sciences in an optimally consistent framework, thus 
serves as the foundation upon which we can build the 
here advocated structure of systems philosophy. (Laszlo, 
1973)
4.5.2.2. Critique of positivism
It seems only natural to me that, because it was the first modern 
paradigm – the last to completely eclipse prior understanding – that 
positivism has, in the past, claimed an exclusive on the truth. In 
onto-epistemological detail, Harre (1961) helps to explain:
The criteria for existence, then, are as follows: An object, 
O, exists if and only if a unique individual can be found 
which fulfils a description of O, sufficiently detailed to en-
able it to be discriminated from other members of its do-
main. For example, provided there are heavenly bodies, 
... the earth’s one natural satellite exists. According to 
this criterion, which includes the unique individual crite-
rion above, objects exist only in domains [e.g., heavenly 
bodies]. Once a domain is accepted then one can ask 
whether or not such-and-such [e.g., the moon] exists. 
Here we get our first characterisation of positivism:
Positivism is a doctrine according to which there is only 
one acceptable domain.
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Of course, as there are different choices of unique do-
main, so there are different varieties of positivism. Pre-
scriptive metaphysics is concerned with the advocacy or 
condemnation of domains.
An exclusivity to ‘the truth’ cannot be claimed by the proponents of 
functionalist approaches in light of the legitimacy of the other sys-
tems paradigms which have since proven themselves valid and useful 
and have shown that the original paradigm is but one generalised 
Weltanschauung, or worldview. 
Bunning (1992) relates the thinking and motives of the day:
… a strong conviction that empirical science was not 
merely a form of knowledge but was, in fact, the only 
source of positive knowledge of the physical world.
… the desire to cleanse people’s minds of mysticism, su-
perstition and all other forms of pseudo-science.
… a belief in the necessity of a programme for extending 
scientific knowledge and technical control to human soci-
ety and to make technology primarily a political and 
moral force in that society.
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In their research on the differences between the paradigms, Flood 
and Ulrich (1990) criticised the use of ‘non-reflective’ positivism in 
social contexts: 
1. it does not lead to objectivity; 
2. it is expert driven; 
3. the systems epistemological ideal will always be ignored; 
4. what is claimed is epistemologically untenable; 
5. what is said is ideologically conservative; and 
6. therefore what would be achieved is maintenance or 
strengthening of power relations.
And conclude that… 
… there is only one way in which we can claim ”objectivi-
ty“–in the general sense of freedom from hidden presup-
positions–for our empirical basis of rational discourse: 
namely, by acknowledging, in each case, the knowledge-
constitutive interests on which the validity and meaning 
of ”facts“ depend. To claim objectivity for one’s knowl-
edge by referring to the objectivity of one’s empirical ba-
sis is an impossible undertaking; but to pursue the ideal 
of objectivity in the sense of emancipating oneself and 
others from the objectivist illusion is an indispensable 
idea. (ibid.)
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My thinking is that in Flood and Ulrich’s critique, although it does 
have the redeeming quality of requiring transparent critical reflexivity, 
fails to acknowledge that there are simply times when ‘the illusion of 
objective reality’ is adequate for the micro-purpose at hand (suffi-
ciently simple and tightly bounded), such as when some attribute of 
the larger system must be measured and monitored to provide feed-
back. That is, intervention sometimes calls for one or more methods 
based in whole or part on positivistic thinking. The directness of ap-
proach and the efficiency and effectiveness of positivist methods are 
undeniably some of the reasons the positivists have been so success-
ful. Unfortunately it seems as though we practice combining multiple 
methods across paradigms illegitimately until the problem of para-
digm incommensurability is resolved. Until then in such cases it 
seems the informed practitioner is forced into elaborate apologies for 
the use of positivistic methods for the otherwise implied appearance 
of objectivity.
Perhaps the most pernicious problem with positivism-functionalism is 
that there is no acknowledgement of any limits on its remit. It incor-
porates a belief that it always applies in all situations and that the 
truth can always be found; that is, unless we are dealing with unob-
servable phenomena where truth is elusive—these phenomena are 
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excluded from legitimate inquiry. But our knowledge will continue to 
grow and in that way everything is possible, they say. Any other way 
of thinking is not scientific and should be dismissed for not being 
properly logical. The positivist-functionalist asks, “Are we doing it 
right?” “Is there a better way this can be done?” Many positivist 
methodologies are focused solely on efficiency—being cheaper, faster, 
leaner. There is no moral imperative or ethical critique in positivist-
functionalist philosophy. Nothing requires the practitioner to do ‘good’ 
or ‘no harm’ or ‘what is right’: We can deplete the commons, pollute 
the environment, exploit the workers, race to the bottom. We can 
build the world’s most efficient gas chamber. “Results are all that 
matter.” “Do unto others before they do unto you.” “Whatever it 
takes.” “What’s the bottom line?” Before the establishment of the 
critical-emancipatory paradigm in the 1980s systems science de-
served the bad reputation it got in the 1960s.
4.5.2.3. Structural functionalism
“Jackson [1987a] has come up with the useful label ‘structuralist’ to 
describe the group of systems approaches that include cybernetics, 
General Systems Theory, and sociotechnical design” (Schecter, 1991). 
According to Jackson, structuralism “looks for underlying social struc-
tures which underpin the observed phenomena. These are not distin-
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guished in Burrell and Morgan, and we don’t have a radical structural-
ist paradigm in critical systems thinking” (Jackson, 2000). 
Structural functionalism, or ‘functionalism’ as it most often called, is 
the social analog of scientific positivism. Social scientists who take 
this stance are “those who prefer working with an observable social 
reality and for the end products of their research to be law-like gen-
eralisations similar to those produced by the physical and natural sci-
entists” (Remenyi, 1998:23). 
Functionalism focuses on the structure and workings of society. 
Structural functionalists see society as made up of inter-dependent 
sections which work together to fulfil the functions necessary for the 
survival of society as a whole. People are socialised into roles and be-
haviours which fulfil the needs of society. Structural functionalists be-
lieve that behaviour in society is structural. They believe that rules 
and regulations help organise relationships between members of so-
ciety. Values provide general guidelines for behaviour in terms of 
roles and norms. These institutions of society such as the family, the 
economy, the educational and political systems, are major aspects of 
the social structure. Institutions are made up of interconnected roles 
or interrelated norms. For example, inter-connected roles in the insti-
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tution of the family are of wife, mother, husband, father, son and 
daughter (Holmwood, 2005).
The theory is based around a number of key concepts. First, society 
is viewed as a system – a collection of interdependent parts, with a 
tendency toward equilibrium. Second, there are functional require-
ments that must be met in a society for its survival (such as repro-
duction of the population). Third, phenomena are seen to exist be-
cause they serve a function (ibid.).
Structural functionalists believe that one can compare society to a liv-
ing organism, in that both a society and an organism are made up of 
interdependent working parts (organs) and systems that must func-
tion together in order for the greater body to function. An example of 
this can be found in the theory of Emergence. Structural functionalist 
sociologists say that the different parts of society e.g. the family, 
education, religion, law and order, media etc. have to be seen in 
terms of the contribution that they make to the functioning of the 
whole of society. This ‘organic analogy’ sees the different parts of so-
ciety working together to form a social system in the same way that 
the different parts of an organism form a cohesive functioning entity 
(ibid.).
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Regarding the systemic analysis of human-centred systems, systems 
theory, following Talcott Parsons (1949, 1951), began as a structural 
functionalist, or ‘functionalist’, theory—a form of objectivism. Its 
name reflects the fact that social structures are emphasised and 
placed at the centre of analysis, and social functions are deduced 
from these structures. According to this theory, society is like an or-
ganism. It evolves and adapts in order to survive. 
Society is seen as being in a natural state of equilibrium or balance. 
According to the equilibrium model, as change occurs in one part of 
society there must be adjustments in other parts. If this does not 
take place, the society's equilibrium will be threatened and strains in 
the social order will occur (ibid.). Parsons posited that society 
changes in four distinct and inevitable processes. These are:
1. “Differentiation - refers to the increase in complexity of so-
cial organisations
2. Adaptive Upgrading - whereby social institutions become 
more specialised in their processes
3. Inclusion - this occurs where groups previously excluded 
from society because of such factors as race, gender, social 
class etc. are now accepted
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4. Value Generalisation - this is the development of new values 
that tolerate and legitimate a greater range of activities” 
(ibid.).
Not surprisingly, a similar theory swaps cause and effect: ‘function-
al–structuralism’ which is not generally associated with systems 
thinking takes social functions as real and says that social structures 
result as affects (Craib, 1992).
Laszlo (1973) commented early on about the rationale for structural 
functionalism:
[A] good part of our present trouble results from the en-
capsulation of modern man in different, water-tight com-
partments–man as an anthropological, psychological, 
economic unit while forgetting “man” as living and expe-
riencing whole–such new conception, synthesizing differ-
ent aspects and perspectives in terms common to all of 
them… [The structural functionalist approach] may well 
contribute toward the resolution of contemporary prob-
lems whose “bracketing out” [has] led to the sterility of 
conventional analytic philosophy.
...Such models can be built by using at least two basic 
methods. One takes the world as we find it and examines 
the various systems that occur in it (physical, biological, 
sociological, etc.) and then draws up statements about 
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the observed regularities. The second method goes to the 
other extreme, and considers the set of all conceivable 
systems and then reduces the set to a more reasonable 
size. Ashby identifies the former as the empirical method 
of von Bertalanffy and his collaborators, and the latter as 
the axiomatic method which he himself has recently fol-
lowed.
 …Empirical observation is meaningless without the 
imaginative envisagement of various abstract possibilities 
which are then seen either to be, or to fail to be, exempli-
fied in the content of observation.
Note: The modern practice of grouping systems into onto-
epistemological paradigms brought with it changes in terminology. 
‘Soft’ systems are now called ‘interpretive’ systems (Jackson, 1982; 
Fuenmayor, 1985). ‘Hard’ systems are now called ‘functionalist’ sys-
tems (Fuenmayor, 1990), referring to positivism plus structural func-
tionalism.
4.5.2.4. Critique of structural functionalism
Poststructuralism is a philosophy which rejects the deterministic con-
nection between objective ‘signifier’ and subjective ‘signified’. Post-
structuralism is contained within the fourth critical systems paradigm 
which shares its name—the postmodern-poststructural paradigm. See 
the section on poststructuralism, §4.5.5.2.
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Within the critical systems thinking literature, says Schecter (1991), 
critiques of the structuralist approach have mainly addressed Stafford 
Beer’s management cybernetics (c.f. Ulrich, 1981; Jackson, 1988a), 
focusing on its weaknesses in dealing with human subjectivity and 
with power relations. 
Ulrich (1981) argues that cybernetics is ill-suited to work with social 
systems because it stresses intrinsic control rather than intrinsic mo-
tivation, the syntactic level of communication rather than the 
semantic-pragmatic level, purposiveness rather than purposefulness, 
and tool design rather than social systems design (Schecter, 1991).
Jackson (1988a) argues that Beer’s Viable System Model (VSM) over-
emphasises the importance of structural design and underemphasises 
the importance of culture, that it ignores self-consciousness of human 
subjects, and that it is of limited use in facilitating discussion of pur-
poses. He also argues that the VSM has the potential of autocratic 
misuse, despite Beer’s intentions. He notes that there is little in 
Beer’s work about how inequalities of power arise, or how they can 
be reduced. Finally, he observes that the VSM “provides no mecha-
nisms either for the democratic determination of purposes or for fa-
cilitating debate about the nature of the purposes served” (ibid.).
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Oliga argues that the structuralist approach is based on the ideology 
of sociological unitarianism, including a consensus view of organisa-
tions and a positive or neutral view of power (Oliga, 1989a, b). Yet 
few organisations are characterised by true (uncoerced) consensus, 
and power can clearly be used for negative ends (Schecter, 1991) 
(see Poststructuralism, §4.5.5.2).
4.5.2.5. A generic positivist-functionalist systems methodology
Jackson (2000) created a ‘generic’ methodology to serve as a model 
for each of the systems paradigms. Here is the first one, using his 
terminology:
A functionalist systems methodology is a structured way 
of thinking, with an attachment to the functionalist theo-
retical rationale, that is focused on improving real-world 
problem situations.
1. A functionalist methodology uses systems ideas as the basis 
for its intervention strategy and will frequently employ 
methods, models, tools and techniques which also draw 
upon systems ideas.
2. The claim to have used a systems methodology according to 
the functionalist rationale must be justified according to the 
following guidelines:
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a. an assumption is made that the real-world is systemic;
b. analysis of the problem situation is conducted in sys-
tems terms;
c. models aiming to capture the nature of the situation are 
constructed enabling us to gain knowledge of the real-
world;
d. models are used to learn how best to improve the real-
world and for the purposes of design;
e. quantitative analysis is presumed to be useful since sys-
tems obey mathematical laws;
f. the process of intervention is systematic and is aimed at 
discovering the best way to achieve a goal;
g. the intervention is conducted on the basis of expert 
knowledge;
h. solutions are tested primarily in terms of their efficiency 
(do the means use minimum resources?) and efficacy 
(do the means work?)
3. Since a functionalist systems methodology can be used in 
different ways in different situations, and interpreted differ-
ently by different users, each use should exhibit conscious 
thought about how to adapt to the particular circumstances.
4. Each use of a functionalist systems methodology should 
yield research findings as well as changing the real-world 
problem situation. These research findings may relate to the 
theoretical rationale underlying the methodology itself and 
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how to use it, to the methods, models, tools and techniques 
employed, to the real-world problem situation investigated, 
or to all of these. (Jackson, 2000)
4.5.3. Interpretivist
The term ‘interpretive sociological paradigm’ was coined by Burrell 
and Morgan (1979), acknowledging a growing awareness that the so-
cial world is qualitatively different from the natural world. We know 
that no two humans (the basic units of the social world) are quite 
alike. Not even ‘identical’ twins. (If you doubt this, ask them.)  Worse 
still, no human, let alone the social world, even remains unchanged 
from one moment to the next. This means that, in systems terms, 
the interpretive systems are truly complex systems because, among 
many other things, they are composed of people: conscious, 
language-based, self-aware; they have memories and stories and in-
stincts, emotions, and art. They interact and learn and adapt multi-
dimensionally, in a continuous manner. Social systems can be seen as 
an emergent property resulting from the behaviour and interaction of 
human beings. Compared with the more ‘mechanical’ types of sys-
tems that were the domain of the positivists, Sir Geoffrey Vickers put 
it simply – ‘Human systems are different’ (Vickers, 1983).
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What we now call the ontological change from realism to nominalism 
is illustrated in this quote by Checkland of the need…
…to remind ourselves that we have no access to what the 
world is, to ontology, only to descriptions of the world 
[after Wittgenstein], … that is to say, to epistemology… 
Thus, systems thinking is only an epistemology, a par-
ticular way of describing the world. It does not tell us 
what the world is. Hence, strictly speaking, we should 
never say of something in the world: ‘It is a system,’ 
only: ‘It may be described as a system.’ The important 
feature of paradigm II [interpretivist] as compared with 
paradigm I [positivist-functionalist] is that it transfers 
systemicity from the world to the process of enquiry into 
the world. (Checkland, 1981, p.671)
And so Checkland translated (shifted) the concept of ‘system’ from 
ontology to epistemology, as a tool for understanding.
Interpretivist methodologies include: 15
• Warfield’s Interactive Management
• Warfield’s Nominal Group Technique (NGT) 
• Warfield’s Interpretive Structural Modelling (ISM, 1976) *
• Ackoff’s Interactive Planning (IP, 1974, 1976)*
• Churchman’s Social Systems Design
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15  Items marked * added by the author; others from Jackson (2000).
• Mason & Mitroff’s Strategic Assumption Surfacing & Testing 
(SAST)
• Ackoff’s Social Systems Sciences (S3)
• Checkland’s Soft Systems Methodology (SSM, 1981)
• Senge’s Soft Systems Thinking
• Soft Operational Research, Soft System Dynamics, Soft Cy-
bernetics
Fuenmayor (1990), while agreeing with Jackson that soft 
systems thinking has been regulative in character, argues 
that this is not due to a basic flaw in the interpretivist 
paradigm upon which the soft approach is based, but 
rather to the lack of interpretive systems theory and to 
the instrumental and regulative intent of soft systems 
practice. (Schecter, 1991)
4.5.3.1. Critique of interpretivism
Oliga argues that the soft systems approach has made an ontological 
break with empiricism but not an epistemological break (Oliga, 1988, 
1989a, b). While the soft systems approach rejects the “objective 
world” of empiricism, and advocates an ongoing process of dialogue 
and learning, it assumes that the possibility of the practitioner attain-
ing “objective” knowledge of the world approach overemphasises the 
role of worldviews, thereby neglecting the competing influences of 
social structural factors and the influence of these factors on the for-
mation and maintenance of worldviews. 
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Perhaps the first widely read critique of the soft systems approach 
from the critical systems perspective was Jackson’s (1982) path-
breaking paper on the work of Churchman, Ackoff and Checkland. 
Jackson maintains that soft systems thinking is an ad-
vance over hard systems thinking because it recognises 
the importance of subjectivity. However, he argues that 
the soft approach is unable to deal with issues of power 
and social change. While soft systems thinking is able to 
explore the world views of different actors, it has little to 
say about how these views are formed and maintained, or 
why some dominate over others. Soft systems thinking 
assumes the existence of a free, open and democratic 
debate among all stakeholders. Yet few such situations 
exist. Soft systems thinking does not concern itself with 
studying how distorted communication happens, nor with 
how to bring about undistorted communication. To Jack-
son, this stems from its neglect of objective social condi-
tions. (Schecter, 1991)
In 1982 Jackson remarked, “It is surprising to find that at the mo-
ment no genuinely interpretive systems theory exists… Such a theory 
would have to probe the systemic nature of the interpretations indi-
viduals employ in constructing the social world” (Jackson, 1982). 
Fuenmayor believed that Jackson’s concerns about interpretivism 
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could be repaired with some new, interpretivist systems theory (see 
§5.4.4)
In 2000, Flood criticised what he called “non-reflective” interpretivism 
and explained that it was unfit for critical systems practice and could 
not be adopted as a critical systems epistemology because:
1. it promotes the notion of subjectivity;
2. there are no explicit directives in the theory that aim to 
prevent the approach from being expert driven;
3. by recognising social communicative action it takes one of 
several necessary steps for ‘reaching out’ toward the sys-
tems epistemological ideal;
4. it would be epistemologically tenable in its own sociological 
terms if full participation was facilitated, however, because 
false consciousness and the ‘effects of material conditions’ 
are not dealt with critically, the rationality is clearly episte-
mologically impoverished;
5. it may well lead to ideological conservatism; and 
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6. therefore there is nothing in the rationality that helps to 
prevent the maintenance of power relations (citing Flood 
and Ulrich, 1990).
In 2000, Flood described what would be acceptable.
[Only] critical, or self-reflective ideas amount to an ade-
quate epistemological ideal for social inquiry in terms of 
systems rationality, sociological epistemology, and of 
course systems practice. (Flood, 2000)
Interestingly, he makes no reference to Fuenmayor (1989a, b), 
whose Interpretive Systemology had generally satisfied those re-
quirements eleven years earlier (see §5.4.4).
4.5.3.2. A generic interpretivist systems methodology
Here is Jackson’s ‘generic’ interpretivist systems methodology which, 
as I said earlier, is epistemological:
1. “An interpretive systems methodology is a structured way 
of thinking with an attachment to the interpretive theoreti-
cal rationale that is focused on improving real-world prob-
lem situations.
2. An interpretive systems methodology uses systems ideas as 
the basis for its intervention strategy and will frequently 
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employ methods, models, tools and techniques which also 
draw upon systems ideas.
3. The claim to have used a systems methodology according to 
the interpretive rationale must be justified according to the 
following guidelines:
a. there is no assumption that the real-world is systemic;
b. analysis of the problem situation is designed to be crea-
tive and may not be conducted in systems terms;
c. models are constructed which represent some possible 
“human activity systems”;
d. models are used to interrogate perceptions of the real-
world and to structure debate about changes which are 
feasible and desirable;
e. quantitative analysis is unlikely to be useful except to 
clarify the implications of worldviews;
f. the process of intervention is systemic, is never-ending, 
and is aimed at alleviating unease about the problem 
situation and generating individual and organizational 
learning;
g. the intervention is best conducted on the basis of stake-
holder participation;
h. changes that might alleviate the feelings of unease or 
contribute to learning are evaluated primarily in terms 
of their effectiveness, elegance and ethicality.
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4. Since an interpretive systems methodology can be used in 
different ways in different situations, and interpreted differ-
ently by different users, each use should exhibit conscious 
thought about how to adapt to the particular circumstances.
5. Each use of an interpretive systems methodology should 
yield research findings as well as changing the real-world 
problem situation. These research findings may relate to the 
theoretical rationale underlying the methodology, to the 
methodology itself and how to use it, to the methods, mod-
els, tools and techniques employed, to the real-world prob-
lem situation investigated, or to all of these.” (Jackson, 
2000)
4.5.4. Critical-emancipatory
The third onto-epistemological paradigm of critical systems thinking, 
called ‘critical-emancipatory’ in this dissertation, requires us to distin-
guish between some similar-sounding concepts: critical reflection, 
critical reflexivity, and critical (emancipatory) social theory. It has to 
be said that the word critical has different meanings depending on 
the context in which it is used. “To be critical” generally means to in-
vestigate with doubt, and systems thinking has always required such 
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critical reflection which asks questions such as “What happened?”, 
“Did we do it right?”, “Did we do it well?”, “Can we improve?” Critical 
reflection is looking back at what has occurred and, with the benefit 
of hindsight, to critique it. “What went right?” “What went wrong?” 
Critical reflection is a vital component of the learning process (see 
Kolb’s (1973a, b, 1976, 1984) learning cycle, Figure 4).
But critical systems thinking incorporates one higher level of abstrac-
tion—to self-reflection, or what is called reflexivity throughout this 
dissertation; where we ask, for example, “Did we do the right thing?”, 
“Do we have our system boundaries right?”, “What might we have 
missed?” “What don’t we know?” In other words, in contemporary 
systems literature the term ‘critical’ is most often associated with the 
requirement for critical reflexivity, or self-critique. 
However, in the social sciences, the term ‘critical’ is most often con-
nected with the idea of political power (i.e. power over others) and 
dominance and control, after Marx and Habermas. To social scientists, 
critical issues are those which are understood as having aspects of 
domination and subordination, expression and repression, subjuga-
tion and liberation. To that meaning, critical systems thinking has is-
sued the word emancipatory. In other words, what social sciences call 
critical concerns, critical systems thinking calls emancipatory con-
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cerns and this dissertation follows that tradition. (Systemists who do 
not care for the connotations of the word ‘emancipatory’ have tried 
‘liberation’ and ‘improvement’.) Worse, systemists often pile on both 
meanings when referring to the critical paradigm, hence here it is 
called the critical-emancipatory paradigm.
It has been said that science often operates on the assumption that 
the end justifies the means. That statement should be qualified, how-
ever. Rather than embody any sort of ruthlessness as the phrase 
would suggest, I suggest that science is ideally value free. As its en-
thusiasts will tell you, its ethical use is something about which science 
itself has no opinion. That may be the best supporting reason for 
other paradigms, especially the critical-emancipatory paradigm which 
seeks to provide ethical guidance to the systems practitioner regard-
ing humanistic issues of power and control. Gregory (1992) goes so 
far as to say that, “It is suggested that any social inquiry must con-
tain elements of reflexive (philosophical) and scientific (practical) in-
quiry together with ideology-critique and critical self-reflection in or-
der to bring about the emancipation of individuals and groups.”
Many social and systems thinkers have criticised other paradigms and 
their methodologies for their emphases on control, compliance, 
agreement and the normalisation of the status quo—a charge most 
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commonly made against the interpretivist paradigm. For example, 
Fuenmayor said,
We should recognize however that the degree to which 
soft systems thinking can bring about change in the real-
world is determined by its essentially regulative charac-
ter. It does not pose a real threat to the social structures 
which support the Weltanschauungen with[in] which it 
works. (Fuenmayor, 1989a)
Critiques such as these led to the recognition of what Jackson called 
coercive contexts—those characterised by significant inequalities of 
power. As with science, other paradigms of systems thinking have lit-
tle to say about power and control issues, hence there is a need for 
emancipatory approaches to systemic practice (Schecter, 1991).
Jackson has championed the emancipatory paradigm in critical sys-
tems thinking. Emancipatory methodology, he explained, is generally 
… a structured way of thinking, with an attachment to the 
emancipatory theoretical rationale … that is focused on 
improving real-world problem situations. … Emancipatory 
systems methodology uses systems ideas as the basis for 
its intervention strategy and will frequently employ meth-
ods, models, tools and techniques which also draw upon 
systems ideas. (Jackson, 2000)
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
167
Claims that a systems methodology satisfies the emancipatory ra-
tionale, says Jackson, must be justified according to the following 
guidelines:
• An assumption is made that the real-world can be-
come systemic in a manner alienating to individuals 
and/or oppressive to particular social groups.
• Analysis of the problem situation is designed to reveal 
who is disadvantaged and how they are disadvan-
taged by current systemic arrangements.
• Models are constructed which reveal the sources of al-
ienation and oppression and propose alternative social 
arrangements in which these disappear.
• Models are used to enlighten the alienated and op-
pressed about their situation and what they can do 
about it.
• Quantitative analysis may be useful especially to cap-
ture biases in existing systemic arrangements.
• The process of intervention is systemic and is aimed 
at improving the problem situation for the alienated 
and/or oppressed.
• The intervention is conducted in such a way that the 
alienated and/or oppressed begin to take responsibil-
ity for their own liberation.
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• Changes designed to improve the position of the al-
ienated and/or oppressed are evaluated primarily in 
terms of ethicality and emancipation.
• Since an emancipatory systems methodology can be 
used in different ways in different situations, and in-
terpreted differently by different users, each use 
should exhibit conscious thought about how to adapt 
to the particular circumstances.
• Each use of an emancipatory systems methodology 
should yield research findings as well as changing the 
real-world problem situation. These research findings 
may relate to the theoretical rationale … underlying 
the methodology, to the methodology itself and how 
to use it, to the methods, models, tools and tech-
niques employed, to the real-world problem situation 
investigated, or to all of these. (Jackson, 2000)
Jackson lists these theories, themes, and methodologies associated 
with the emancipatory rationale:
• Emancipation as Liberation
• Critical Operational Research–Management Science (OR/MS)
• Habermas & the Critical Systems Approach
• Interpretive Systemology
• Freire’s Critical Pedagogy
• MacIntyre & the Moral Community
• Capra’s Ecological Sustainability
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• Emancipation Through Discursive Rationality
• Beer’s Team Syntegrity
• Ulrich’s Critical Systems Heuristics
• The Theory & Practice of Boundary Critique
The commitment to emancipation is a commitment to human beings 
and their potential for full development via free and equal participa-
tion in community with others. It is also a commitment to recognising 
the barriers to human emancipation–unequal power relations and the 
conceptual traps which perpetuate them–and incorporating this un-
derstanding into systems thinking (ibid.).
The ideas of Jürgen Habermas, “the most influential modern thinker 
of the critical theory persuasion” (Jackson, 2000), were used to un-
dergird the philosophy of critical systems thinking. In Habermas’ the-
ory of knowledge constitutive interests (1971), humans have techni-
cal, practical, and emancipatory interests owing to our socio-cultural 
nature. Very briefly, the first two interests are about prediction and 
control for work, and interaction for mutual understanding, which he 
says are the principal means by which we strive to shape our physical 
and social environments. The third is derived from the exercise of 
power which distorts our means of achieving the goals of the other 
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two—an interest in learning how to liberate ourselves and control our 
own destinies. 
In his theory of communicative action (or ‘communicative compe-
tence’)  Habermas (1981) explains that humans are of ‘three worlds’: 
objective, social and subjective. In an ideal speech situation which 
requires communicative competence, the better argument will prevail 
through the process of discourse. Consensus would therefore be ra-
tional and genuine. Action would thus be subject to full public control. 
But for an individual to achieve communicative competence, society 
must establish special conditions relating to freedom and justice. 
These ideals can never be achieved in an absolute sense but, says 
Jackson (2000), we can still use the theory in order to unmask distor-
tions which thwart their achievement. Habermas believes we can lib-
erate ourselves and better control things in the technical and practical 
aspects of our world by understanding what it is that prevents us 
from doing it perfectly now. 
4.5.4.1. A generic critical systems methodology
Here is Jackson’s ‘generic’ critical systems methodology (the ‘generic’ 
emancipatory methodology follows). I have marked out the prefix 
‘meta-’ to update it according to the author’s (2003b) understanding:
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
171
1. “A critical systems [meta-]methodology is a structured way 
of thinking which understands and respects the uniqueness 
of the functionalist, interpretive, emancipatory and post-
modern theoretical rationales, and draws upon them to im-
prove real-world situations.
2. A critical systems [meta-]methodology makes use of a vari-
ety of creativity enhancing methods and techniques to ex-
amine the problem situation while ensuring, minimally, that 
it is viewed from the functionalist, interpretive, emancipa-
tory and postmodern perspectives.
3. A critical systems [meta-]methodology uses generic sys-
tems methodologies, which can be clearly related back to 
the four theoretical rationales, as the basis for its interven-
tion strategy—often employing the tactic of naming one 
methodological approach as dominant and others as de-
pendent, with the possibility of this relationship changing 
during the course of the intervention.
4. The claim to be using a generic systems methodology, ac-
cording to the particular theoretical rationale it is designed 
to serve, must be justified according to the principles and 
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guidelines established for the use of each generic systems 
methodology.
5. The generic systems methodologies called for use in critical 
systems practice will themselves frequently employ meth-
ods, models, tools and techniques which also draw upon 
systems ideas.
6. The choice of generic systems methodologies and of sys-
tems methods, models, tools and techniques will, in part, 
rest upon an appreciation of their different strengths and 
weaknesses as discovered during action research
7. In order to ensure responsiveness to the complexity and 
heterogeneity of the problem situation addressed, attention 
must be paid to ensuring a pluralism of “clients”, theoretical 
and methodological pluralism, pluralism in the modes of 
representation employed, and pluralism in the facilitation 
process.
8. Since a critical systems [meta-]methodology and the ge-
neric systems methodologies it employs can be used in dif-
ferent ways in different situations and interpreted differ-
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ently by different users, each use should exhibit conscious 
thought about how to adapt to the particular circumstances. 
9. Each use of a critical systems [meta-]methodology and the 
generic systems methodologies it employs should yield re-
search findings as well as improving the real-world problem 
situation. These research findings may relate to the rela-
tionship between different theoretical rationales, to the 
theoretical rationales underlying any generic systems meth-
odology used, to the generic systems methodologies them-
selves and how to use them, to the methods, models, tools 
and techniques employed, to the real-world problem situa-
tion investigated or to all of these.” (Jackson, 2000)
4.5.4.2. A generic emancipatory systems methodology
Here is Jackson’s ‘generic’ emancipatory systems methodology:
1. “An emancipatory systems methodology is a structured way 
of thinking, with an attachment to the emancipatory theo-
retical rationale, that is focused on improving real-world 
problem situations.
2. An emancipatory systems methodology uses systems ideas 
as the basis for its intervention strategy and will frequently 
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employ methods, models, tools and techniques which also 
draw upon systems ideas.
3. The claim to have used a systems methodology according to 
the emancipatory rationale must be justified according to 
the following guidelines:
a. an assumption is made that the real-world can become 
systemic in a manner alienating to individuals and/or 
oppressive to particular social groups;
b. analysis of the problem situation is designed to reveal 
who is disadvantaged and how they are disadvantaged 
by current systemic arrangements;
c. models are constructed which reveal the sources of al-
ienation and oppression and propose alternative social 
arrangements in which these disappear;
d. models are used to enlighten the alienated and op-
pressed about their situation and what they can do 
about it;
e. quantitative analysis may be useful especially to capture 
particular biases in existing systemic arrangements;
f. the process of intervention is systemic and is aimed at 
improving the problem situation for the responsibility for 
their own liberation;
g. changes designed to improve the position of the alien-
ated and/or oppressed are evaluated primarily in terms 
of ethicality and emancipation.
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4. Since an emancipatory systems methodology can be used in 
different ways in different situations and interpreted differ-
ently by different users, each use should exhibit conscious 
thought about how to adapt to the particular circumstances.
5. Each use of an emancipatory systems methodology should 
yield research findings as well as changing the real-world 
problem situation. These research findings may relate to the 
theoretical rationale underlying the methodology, to the 
methodology itself and how to use it, to the methods, mod-
els, tools and techniques employed, to the real-world prob-
lem situation investigated, or to all of these.” (Jackson, 
2000)
4.5.4.3. Critical systems heuristics 
Ulrich’s (1983) critical systems heuristics was the first methodology 
to be admitted to the critical-emancipatory systems paradigm. Basi-
cally, critical systems heuristics intends to help ensure that the 
boundaries around what we call our “system” are critically and ethi-
cally considered and involve all those affected by our actions as inter-
ventionists. Critical systems heuristics plays a large role in shaping 
critical systems thinking and is discussed in several sections of this 
dissertation (e.g. §5.4.14, §5.4.16).
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4.5.5. Postmodernist-poststructuralist
4.5.5.1. Postmodernism
If there is one thing about postmodernism on which almost everyone 
agrees, it is that postmodernism is ill-defined. This means that I must 
clarify its definition for the purposes of this study and affords me the 
opportunity to work with that concept in a way that I believe is more 
in keeping with the spirit of systems thinking as it is currently being 
used and with respect to the other systems paradigms. While some 
feel postmodernism is a destructive or self-defeating doctrine, I 
choose to see distinct advantages in its ideas. Some merely react to 
the term in ignorance, associate its philosophy with cults or hippies 
who want to wreck our norms and overthrow common knowledge. I 
see its radicalism as a tactic for knocking us back on our heals to get 
our attention and as a way of destabilising our sense that we have 
got it all right—so that we might accept its challenge “to think deeper 
and wider in time and space,” as Participant 8 says in her interview 
(§8.3.8). Postmodernism wants us to ‘look behind the curtain’ to see 
gross over-generalisations, notice our unquestioned assumptions and 
norms and unintentional biases. Look to its ontological roots in lan-
guage.
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In my view, postmodernism ultimately calls for humility, respect for 
others and their dignity, compassion, generosity, art and beauty and 
love—all concerns which come from the recognition of life as transi-
tory, experiential, tenuous, constructed and localised (embedded in 
the present situation; derived longitudinally). 
I especially appreciate process theory points out that “we have to 
work with what we have got” (Wood, 2005) and get on with it. 
The common understanding that existed about the nature 
of systems thinking and the meaning of the key concepts 
used began to break down in the 1970s. A shared set of 
concerns was replaced by different factions championing 
hard, soft, critical and other perspectives [e.g. postmod-
ern vs. critical, 1992-94]. The systems movement had 
succumbed to the paradigm wars that had overwhelmed 
other disciplines such as sociology. It is now widely ac-
cepted, and must be the starting point for any contempo-
rary study of systems methodology, that these various 
strands of the systems movement use the concept ‘sys-
tem’, and all the other important systems ideas, in differ-
ent ways. […] My assumption is that there is nothing 
about systems thinking that allows it to stand above the 
paradigms and to remain isolated from disputes between 
perspectives emanating from different paradigms. (Jack-
son, 2000)
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4.5.5.2. Poststructuralism
Poststructuralism is also part of the postmodern paradigm. The 
reader replaces the author as the focus of interpretation. Poststruc-
turalists reject the structuralist view of language as a system of asso-
ciations between signifiers (words, symbols) and significands (those 
to which the signifiers refer) and the resultant webs of meaning which 
can be understood and shared. Structuralist ideas have been taken 
too seriously and that has given legitimacy to the use of language as 
a way to wield power over others that it should not have, they say. All 
of us play elaborate language games as ways to shape the truth and 
influence others. Poststructuralism rejects the deterministic link be-
tween signifier and significand. 
I think we shall lose ourselves in confusion and obscurity, 
in the so-called human sciences, because in those do-
mains the distinction between word and thing is con-
stantly blurred… Foucault may yet prove useful, … to 
grasp the interrelations of “power” and “knowledge” that 
literally constitute us as human beings. (Hacking, 1984)
As reflexivity is a central theme of critical systems thinking, how re-
flexivity is understood by poststructuralists is especially important 
and enlightening. It stems from their belief that all forms of knowl-
edge are circumscribed by assumptions and commitments that influ-
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ence what we do, say and write. ”We therefore cannot be neutral nor 
put ourselves outside our research,” says Cunliffe (n.d.). 
Drawing on the work of Derrida (e.g., 1976, 1978) and 
Foucault (1970, 1972), poststructuralist approaches to 
reflexivity are concerned with revealing the instability of 
language and truth claims by exploring the oppositional 
nature of meaning, the multiple readings of texts, the 
tenuous relationship between author/text/subject/reader, 
and the power relationships that exist in what are often 
seen to be neutral and normalized organizational—and 
research—processes. … 
Poststructuralist approaches… focus on the instability of 
language and meaning; they see agency as a product and 
site of language rather than as a human endeavour, and 
are interested in linguistic and discursive processes rather 
than relational ones. Scholars taking poststructuralist ap-
proaches to reflexivity examine the impact of often-
contested linguistic, textual and discursive processes on 
power-ridden institutional practices and subjectivities. In 
addition, they challenge the privileging of particular 
meanings and forms of knowledge and representations 
(see Chia 1996; Choi 2006; Gatenby and Hume 2004). 
(Cunliffe, n.d.)
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4.5.5.3. A generic postmodernist systems methodology
The following is Jackson’s ‘generic’ postmodernist methodology. I 
have already noted that Jackson’s ‘generic’ methodologies are epis-
temological in that they are about methodology. “Postmodern sys-
tems practice is a way of thinking and acting, with an attachment to 
the postmodern theoretical rationale, that is focused on disrupting 
real-world problem situations by critically questioning all received 
opinion and accepted ways of doing things.
6. Postmodern systems practice uses systemic and anti-
systemic ideas as the basis for its intervention strategy and 
will frequently employ methods, models, tools and tech-
niques which also draw upon systems ideas.
7. The claim to have used systems thinking and systems ideas 
according to the postmodern rationale may be sustained lo-
cally (as opposed to universally) according to the following 
guidelines:
h. an assumption that the real-world is constructed in such 
a way through discourse that particular groups and/or 
individuals are marginalized;
i. intervention in the problem situation is designed to re-
veal who is marginalized by existing power/knowledge 
structures;
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
181
j. diverse forms of pluralism are used to surface subju-
gated discourses and to allot marginalized voices to be 
heard;
k. diverse forms of pluralism are used to allow relevant 
stakeholders to express their diversity and, possibly, 
grant a ‘consent to act’; 
l. quantitative analysis is unlikely to be useful except as 
part of the process of deconstruction;
m. the process of intervention takes the form of local (as 
opposed to universal) strategizing and subversion in an 
endeavor to allow new knowledge to come to the fore;
n. the intervention is conducted in such a way that conflict 
is reclaimed and diversity and creativity are encour-
aged;
o. facilitators and participants in the intervention take re-
sponsibility for any actions on the basis of exception, 
emotion and ethics.
8. Since postmodern systems practice can take different forms 
in different situations and be interpreted differently by dif-
ferent users, each use should exhibit conscious thought 
and/or an emotional response about how to adapt to the 
particular circumstances.
9. Each case of postmodern systems practice may yield re-
search findings as well as changing the real-world problem 
situation. These research findings may relate to the theo-
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retical rationale underlying the practice, to the framework 
for applying a postmodern systems approach, to the meth-
ods, models, tools and techniques employed, to the real-
world problem situation investigated, or to all of these.” 
(Jackson, 2000)
My own understanding of postmodernism in critical systems thinking 
is slightly different as explained in various places throughout the dis-
sertation, and that is justified because postmodernism itself is both ill 
defined and general (and arguably must remain so).
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Chapter
5. Multiparadigm multimethodological systems 
theories
The flexibility that can be gained by extracting methods, 
models, tools and techniques from different methodolo-
gies, and using them in combination, now seems to me to 
be so essential that its gradual acceptance should be seen 
as a third landmark [after SoSM and TSI] on the way to 
the establishment of coherent pluralism in systems think-
ing. (Jackson, 2000)
5.1. The case for pluralism
Building on work by Reed (1985), Jackson has identified four strate-
gies for the overall development of systems thinking: 
…isolationism (each approach develops independently of 
the others); imperialism (one approach absorbs the rest); 
pragmatism (practitioners use any method based on their 
immediate need, without regard to theory); and pluralism 
(the complementary development of all approaches). 
(Jackson, 1987a)
Isolationism and imperialism were later split into two types each:
Flood has expanded the four alternatives into six, distin-
guishing between methodological isolationism (use of one 
method only) and theoretical isolationism (use of multiple 
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methods, but guided by one paradigm), and also between 
imperialism by annexation (one approach incorporates 
the best elements from other approaches) and imperial-
ism by subsumption (one favored approach provides the 
“what” and the other approaches provide the “how” ac-
cording to the needs of the situation) [(Flood, 1989a, b)].  
(Schecter, 1991)
The resulting six strategies for the development of systems thinking 
are, therefore, 
• methodological isolationism
• theoretical isolationism
• imperialism by annexation
• imperialism by subsumption
• pragmatism
• pluralism
Practitioners choose from the same approaches to systemic interven-
tion as well, says Jackson (1999). Isolationists “see their own ap-
proach to management science as being essentially self-sufficient. 
They believe there is nothing to learn from other perspectives which 
appear to them not to be useful or, perhaps, even sensible.” There 
are imperialists who have “a fundamental commitment to one epis-
temological position but a willingness to incorporate other strands of 
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management science if they seem to be useful… [but] explain the ex-
istence of alternative approaches… in terms of the approach to which 
they grant hegemony” (ibid.). Pragmatists pick and choose amongst 
the various systems methods based solely on what seems warranted 
by the current situation, not bothering with philosophical issues or 
‘artificial’ theoretical distinctions. This practice is dismissed, however, 
because it does not “support the development of management sci-
ence as a discipline” among other reasons (ibid.). The pluralist strat-
egy would supply the theoretical support that pragmatism lacked. It 
would
… seek to respect the different strengths of the various 
trends in management science, encouraging their theo-
retical development and suggesting ways in which they 
can be appropriately fitted to the variety of management 
problems that arise. It was argued that a metamethodol-
ogy would develop which could guide theoretical endeav-
our and advise analysts, confronted with different prob-
lem situations, which approach is most useful. In these 
circumstances, the diversity of theory and methods in 
management science could be seen to herald not a crisis 
but increased competence and effectiveness in a variety 
of different problem situations… Pluralism… offers the 
best hope of reestablishing management science as a co-
hesive discipline and profession—and on firmer founda-
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tions than those which supported the traditional [1987a] 
version. (Jackson, 1997)
Flood has also provided an in-depth exploration of the implications of 
Jackson’s argument, exploring the consequences of each approach in 
turn. His conclusion, like Jackson’s, is that pluralism is the only ade-
quate option (Schecter, 1991).
As a critical systems practitioner myself, I try to see the larger prob-
lem through each paradigmatic ‘lens’, especially during the discovery 
process. In doing so I remake my distinctions; that is, I deliberately 
construct new boundaries around closely related aspects of the prob-
lem as it presents itself in the moment to creating conceptual sys-
tems and subsystems which are best understood through that sys-
tems paradigm, never expecting these boundaries to stay put as the 
real situation and my view of it continuously changes—see boundary 
making and critical systems heuristics (Ulrich, 1988, 1989) (§4.5.4.3) 
the act of distinction (Maturana, 1988a) (§5.2) and the critical mo-
ment of becoming (Bowers, 2010a and §6.12).
Likewise, the new methodology proposed herein (§7.3) directs a se-
rial approach through multiple paradigms. These might each be called 
‘phases’ but I think that term implies an engagement in a sequential 
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manner with a particular start and an end, which is not the way I 
think of it or would operationalise it. 
5.2. Contemporary state of pluralist systems theory
Basic systems thinking is a general approach to problem solving or a 
way of seeing ‘problems’ as parts of an overall system and its envi-
ronment and is concerned with the relationships between the con-
stituent parts. Generally, simple and well-understood problems are 
easily solved, but systems thinking is especially useful when the is-
sues are far from simple and well understood. Systemists study, de-
sign or intervene in situations which are: novel; especially complex or 
heterogeneous; rapidly changing yet persistent; those which involve 
lots of interacting parts, people, or unknown or unfamiliar resources; 
with problems which may be risky (politically or otherwise), persis-
tent or long term. I like to say the easy problems have all been 
solved. For example, the systems I am especially interested in are 
those which constrain or negatively impact the lives of people who 
would otherwise make more of themselves.
Of course we hope not to overlook what might be important, but as 
this dissertation emphasises, no matter how carefully or how hard or 
how long we look, there is still a danger that what may be critical to 
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the successful outcome of a particular study, design or intervention 
may be unseen or overlooked because the information we may need 
may simply not exist (in a meaningful form) in the paradigm we are 
using. 
This brings us to what Maturana and Bunnell call the problem of dis-
tinction (Maturana, 1988a; Bunnell, 2004b). Bunnell, herself ex-
plained this to me at the ISSS 2010 conference. She said the act of 
observing is about making distinctions; which implies that there are 
alternative ways of doing so. What I call an ontology she says is a 
particular way of ‘cleaving the universe’ by which we distinguish a 
domain of existence and non-existence. What is critical to realise is 
that, once we have cleaved the universe a particular way, that which 
does not exist—if it were to exist, would also have to be of that do-
main. 
When we make a distinction
We cleave a ‘this’, and a ‘not this’,
And the domain in which the distinction is valid
Co-arises with the distinction. (Bunnell, 2010)
According to this philosophy, the ‘reality’ of the universe so cleaved 
may simply not intersect with the domain of existence of something 
else, and my point is that that something else may be critically im-
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portant. Consequently, the practitioner may only recognise a piece of 
the ‘larger’ problem context. And that represents a constraint upon 
effectiveness. 
Here are three examples: First, if we were to consider the problem of 
airport congestion and choose to focus our investigation and inter-
vention on efforts to optimise the operations of air traffic controllers, 
we might not detect their seething dissatisfaction with issues of 
overwork, forced overtime, and a perceived lack of concern by man-
agement. In another situation, perhaps we focus on consensus build-
ing and ignore a culture of oppressive control and nepotism by those 
in power. Lastly, by focusing on pragmatic concerns of the present we 
may undervalue the long-term need to foster the next generation or 
fail to recognise ongoing damage being done to the ecosystem.
Brocklesby spoke of the unexamined paradigm.
For those who, hitherto, have uncritically accepted the 
transcendental “rightness” of their own preferred para-
digm, the awareness that objectivity is biologically unat-
tainable [see §6.8, Maturana and Varela (1980, 1987)], 
and that in the end it all comes down to values and pref-
erences, may trigger a change in their thinking. Even if it 
does not, and they decide to stick with what they know, 
at least knowing about competitors provides a platform 
from which to examine unexamined assumptions. When 
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there are no alternatives people are not in a good position 
to know what they have, so the presence of alternatives 
forces them to present their position, to defend it, and 
thereby understand it better. Moreover, it invokes a 
sense of humility as they become aware of the precarious 
quality of their knowledge. (Brocklesby, 1997)
5.3. Meta- and multiparadigm approaches
There is increasing awareness that complex systemic problems are 
best considered multiparadigmatic problems—systems with interre-
lated issues that cross paradigms. The systems community was told 
in 1984 that “the problem solver needs to be aware of different para-
digms in the social sciences, and he must be prepared to view the 
problem context through each of these paradigms” (Jackson and 
Keys, 1984). But how is this actually done? Either… 
• Pick a dominant and a subservient paradigm
• Take a metaparadigmatic stance outside all paradigms
• Create a new paradigm that subsumes the others
• Pragmatism -- downplay the relevance of (obviously in-
adequate, difficult) theory, focus on action in the mo-
ment. (Mingers and Gill, 1997)
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5.4. The evolution of multiparadigm systems theory
5.4.1. Introduction
Critical systems thinkers have launched strong attacks on hard, struc-
turalist and soft systems thinking; advocating instead for the devel-
opment of emancipatory systems approaches. However, they did not 
call for replacing these earlier approaches with emancipatory ap-
proaches, nor do they any longer see critical systems thinking as an 
overarching, or meta-theory subsuming the other approaches under 
an overall emancipatory approach. Instead, critical systems thinking 
is now committed to a pluralist path which recognises the value of all 
systemic approaches in their own right—each dealing with different 
dimensions of problematic situations (Schecter, 1991). The following 
table tracks the historical introduction of theoretical concepts related 
to the development of the contemporary state of critical systems 
thinking and practice—pluralist and multiparadigm theories and mul-
timethodologies.
1984
Jackson & Keys’ A System of Systems Methodologies (SoSM) 
(1984); [coercive added] (Jackson, 1987a)
1987 Jackson introduces methodological pluralism (1987b)
1989 Fuenmayor’s Interpretive Systemology (1985, 1989a, b)
1990 Midgley’s Creative Methodology Design (Midgley, 1989b, 1990)
1990 Flood’s Liberating Systems Theory (1990)
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1991 Jackson’s Critical Systems Thinking [CST] (1991b)
1991 Flood & Jackson’s Total Systems Intervention [TSI] (1991a; Flood, 1995a, b, c)
1992 Gregory’s Critical Appreciation (1992)
1992 Midgley’s Ontological Complexity (1992a) [Habermas’ Com-municative Competence as underpinning for pluralism]
1993 Flood’s Total Quality Management [TSI-2] (1993)
1995
Flood’s [and later, Flood & Romm’s] Diversity Management / 
Triple Loop Learning [TLL or TSI-2] (Flood, 1995b; Flood and 
Romm, 1996b)
1996 Taket & White’s [postmodern] Pragmatic Pluralism (1996)
1996 Mingers and Brocklesby’s Critical Pluralism—Multimethodol-ogy (1996; Mingers, 1997c).
1996
Brocklesby & Cummings’ Foucault plays Habermas [a new 
underpinning for CST] (1996)
1996 Gregory’s Discordant Pluralism (1996a)
1997 Midgley’s Creative Design of Methods (1997a)
1997 Jackson’s Critical Systems Practice [of TSI] (1997)
1999 Jackson’s Coherent Pluralism (1999)
2000 Flood’s Local Systemic Intervention (2000)
2000 Midgley’s Systemic Intervention (1997b, 2000)
2006 Mingers’ Critical Multimethodology (2006)
2008 Bowers’ P–S Ontological Pluralism (2008a, b, 2010a, 2012)
2011 Midgley’s Theoretical Pluralism (2011)
Table 2.  Pluralist, multiparadigm and multimethodological systemic theories.
Several significant theories can now be called multiparadigmatic and/
or pluralistic; all of which followed on from the first systems theory to 
consider the collection of all systems theories as a set—A System of 
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Systems Methodologies, or ‘SoSM’ (Jackson and Keys, 1984) (see 
§5.4.3). 
Early in the course of this project a literature search was undertaken 
to find and catalogue all systems methodologies and theories having 
anything to do with multiple paradigms. In his research published in 
2003 Mingers had catalogued only five (Mingers, 2003). This research 
found eighteen and published a graph which shows them arranged by 
what I consider to be their ideological lineage (Bowers, 2008a).
multiparadigm 
multimethodologies of 
systems thinking
A System of 
Systems 
Methodologies
Creative Methodology Design
Critical 
Systems 
Thinking
Total Systems 
Intervention Coherent Pluralism
Pragmatic Pluralism
Critical Appreciation
Creative Design of Methods
Liberating Systems Theory
Systemic Intervention Theoretical Pluralism
P–S Multiparadigm 
Perspectivity 
(Bowers 2011)Discordant Pluralism
Total Quality 
Management 2
Diversity 
Management / Triple 
Loop Learning
Local Systemic 
Intervention
Critical Pluralism / Multimethodology Critical Multimethodology
Figure 9.  Multiparadigm systems theories (Bowers, 2008b, updated).
5.4.2. The map of development of pluralist systems 
theories
Developments from this research have since informed a new model 
which also includes the theory proffered by this dissertation, P–S 
multiparadigm perspectivity. To display the additional information in-
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
195
cluded in this new model it became necessary to illustrate it four dif-
ferent ways: Figure 10 is the plain view, a graph of theories associ-
ated with the development of multiparadigm, multimethodological (or 
pluralist) theories in critical systems thinking. As before, these theo-
ries are arranged chronologically by what I consider to be their ideo-
logical lineage, but the graph is now complete. It has been arranged 
vertically and parts have been shifted around a bit to fit the page. 
Figure 11, the second view, shows the same graph of theories but 
with additional information—citations to the publications which an-
nounced each new theory. In some cases major revisions are also 
cited. Figure 12 is the third view of the same theories but its addi-
tional information indicates the major theoretical underpinnings or 
the grounding theoretical support attributed to each theory. Figure 13 
conveys additional, philosophical information. [(Jackson and Keys, 
1984; Fuenmayor, 1985; Jackson, 1985; Flood, 1990; Jackson, 1990; 
Midgley, 1990; Flood and Jackson, 1991a, c; Gregory, 1992; Flood, 
1993, 1995b; Flood and Romm, 1995a, 1996b; Mingers and Brock-
lesby, 1996; Taket and White, 1996; Midgley, 1997a; Jackson, 1999; 
Flood, 2000; Midgley, 2000; Mingers, 2006; Bowers, 2008b, 2010a, 
b; Midgley, 2011; Bowers, 2012)].
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A System of Systems 
Methodologies
(Jackson & Keys, 1984)
Creative 
Methodology 
Design
(Midgley 1990)
Critical Systems 
Thinking [+SoSM]
(Jackson, 1985)
Total Quality 
Management 
[TSI-2]
(Flood, 1993)
Diversity Mgt/ 
Triple Loop 
Learning (Flood 
& Romm, 1996)
Local Systemic 
Intervention 
(LSI)
(Flood, 2000)
Creative Design 
of Methods
(Midgley, 1997)
Systemic 
Intervention
(Midgley, 2000)
Total Systems Inter-
vention (TSI) [+CST] 
(Flood & Jackson, 1991)
Critical Systems Practice, 
Coherent Pluralism
(Jackson, 1997-2000)
Pragmatic Pluralism 
[postmodern]
(Taket & White, 
1996)
Critical Appreciation, 
Discordant Pluralism
(Gregory, 1992, 1996)
Interpretive 
Systemology
(Fuenmayor, 1989)
Theoretical Pluralism 
[epistemological]
(Midgley, 2011)
P–S Multiparadigm 
Perspectivity
[ontological]
(Bowers, 2012)
Critical Pluralism, 
Multimethodology
(Mingers & Brock-
lesby, 1996-7)
Liberating 
Systems Theory
(Flood, 1990)
Critical 
Multimethodology 
(Mingers, 2006)
Ontological 
Complexity 
(Midgley, 1992)
What is this thing 
called CST?
(Midgley, 1996)
Figure 10.  Development of MP-MM theory in Systems Thinking.
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1984 Jackson & 
Keys: Towards 
a system of sys‐
tems method‐
ologies
1991 Flood & 
Jackson: Cre‐
ative problem 
solving: total 
systems inter‐
vention
1990 Flood: 
Liberating 
systems 
theory
1990 Midgley: 
Creative 
methodology 
design
1985 Jackson: 
Social systems 
theory & prac‐
tice: the need 
for a coherent 
approach
1993 Flood: 
Beyond 
TQM
1996 Flood & 
Romm: Diver‐
sity manage‐
ment: triple 
loop learning
2000 Flood: Towards an 
adequate epistemology 
for systems practice
1996 Taket & White: 
Pragmatic pluralism
—an explication
1992 Gregory: CST & 
pluralism: a new con‐
stellation; 1996: Dis‐
cordant pluralism:  a 
new strategy for criti‐
cal systems thinking
1996 Mingers & Brocklesby: 
Multimethodology: towards a 
framework for critical 
pluralism; 1997: Multimethod‐
ology: towards a framework 
for mixing methodologies
2008–10 Bowers: Structure–process as 
ontology for critical systems thinking and 
practice; 2011 Towards a Framework for 
Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
1985 Fuenmayor: The ontol‐
ogy and epistemology of a 
systems approach; 1989a,b: 
Interpretive Systemology…
1997 Mingers: 
Towards criti‐
cal pluralism
1997 Jackson: 
Pluralism in sys‐
tems thinking 
and practice; 
1999 Towards 
coherent plural‐
ism in manage‐
ment science; 
2000 Systems 
approaches to 
management
2010 Midgley: Theoreti‐
cal pluralism in systemic 
action research
1997 Midgley: Mixing Methods: Devel‐
oping systemic intervention; 2000: The‐
oretical pluralism; Systemic intervention: 
philosophy, methodology & practice
2006 Mingers: Real‐
ising systems think‐
ing—knowledge and 
action in manage‐
ment science
1992 Midgley: 
Pluralism and 
the legitima‐
tion of sys‐
tems science
1990 Jackson: Beyond a system 
of systems methodologies
1995 Flood: 
Solving prob‐
lem solving
1997: Developing 
the methodology 
of TSI
1996  Midgley: 
What is this thing 
called CST?
A System of Systems 
Methodologies
(Jackson & Keys, 1984)
Creative 
Methodology 
Design
(Midgley 1990)
Critical Systems 
Thinking [+SoSM]
(Jackson, 1985)
Total Quality 
Management 
[TSI-2]
(Flood, 1993)
Diversity Mgt/ 
Triple Loop 
Learning (Flood 
& Romm, 1996)
Local Systemic 
Intervention 
(LSI)
(Flood, 2000)
Creative Design 
of Methods
(Midgley, 1997)
Systemic 
Intervention
(Midgley, 2000)
Total Systems Inter-
vention (TSI) [+CST] 
(Flood & Jackson, 1991)
Critical Systems Practice, 
Coherent Pluralism
(Jackson, 1997-2000)
Pragmatic Pluralism 
[postmodern]
(Taket & White, 
1996)
Critical Appreciation, 
Discordant Pluralism
(Gregory, 1992, 1996)
Interpretive 
Systemology
(Fuenmayor, 1989)
Theoretical Pluralism 
[epistemological]
(Midgley, 2011)
P–S Multiparadigm 
Perspectivity
[ontological]
(Bowers, 2012)
Critical Pluralism, 
Multimethodology
(Mingers & Brock-
lesby, 1996-7)
Liberating 
Systems Theory
(Flood, 1990)
Critical 
Multimethodology 
(Mingers, 2006)
Ontological 
Complexity 
(Midgley, 1992)
What is this thing 
called CST?
(Midgley, 1996)
Figure 11.  Evolution of pluralism with originating publications.
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Habermas'
Knowledge-
Constitutive
Interests
Foucault's 
Interpretive 
Analytics 
[value-laden]
process/structure
–real/abstract
dual dualism
Habermas' 
Communicative 
Competence, 
Three Worlds
Bhaskar's
Critical Realism
dilemmas, 
difference 
& tension
Maturana 
& Varela's 
Autopoiesis
Bernstein's 
Paradigm 
Juxtaposition
Maturana's 
Ontology of 
Observing
Heidegger's
Ontological
Phenomenology
von Glasersfeld's 
Radical 
Constructivism
Searle's 
Construction 
of Social 
Reality
Giddens' 
Structuration
Burrell & Morgan's 
onto-epistemological 
paradigms
Churchman, 
Ulrich replace 
Habermas
process of making 
boundary judgements
–content of analysis 
dualism
A System of Systems 
Methodologies
(Jackson & Keys, 1984)
Creative 
Methodology 
Design
(Midgley 1990)
Critical Systems 
Thinking [+SoSM]
(Jackson, 1985)
Total Quality 
Management 
[TSI-2]
(Flood, 1993)
Diversity Mgt/ 
Triple Loop 
Learning (Flood 
& Romm, 1996)
Local Systemic 
Intervention 
(LSI)
(Flood, 2000)
Creative Design 
of Methods
(Midgley, 1997)
Systemic 
Intervention
(Midgley, 2000)
Total Systems Inter-
vention (TSI) [+CST] 
(Flood & Jackson, 1991)
Critical Systems Practice, 
Coherent Pluralism
(Jackson, 1997-2000)
Pragmatic Pluralism 
[postmodern]
(Taket & White, 
1996)
Critical Appreciation, 
Discordant Pluralism
(Gregory, 1992, 1996)
Interpretive 
Systemology
(Fuenmayor, 1989)
Theoretical Pluralism 
[epistemological]
(Midgley, 2011)
P–S Multiparadigm 
Perspectivity
[ontological]
(Bowers, 2012)
Critical Pluralism, 
Multimethodology
(Mingers & Brock-
lesby, 1996-7)
Liberating 
Systems Theory
(Flood, 1990)
Critical 
Multimethodology 
(Mingers, 2006)
Ontological 
Complexity 
(Midgley, 1992)
What is this thing 
called CST?
(Midgley, 1996)
Figure 12.  Evolution of pluralism in CST with onto-epistemological support.
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202
'constellation' 
metaphor
'conciliatory 
discord', 
'(in)-commen‐
surability'
axiological 
shift to the 
systemist
ontological 
boundaries
meta-paradgmatic 
multi-methodology
'improvement',  
ethical bound‐
ary judge‐
ments replace 
'emancipation'
paradigm
 incommen-
surability is 
valued
'totalizing' theories 
(Habermas) 
abandoned
single paradigm 
selection 
meta-theory
single 
methodology 
selection
CST is a 
[non-meta] 
paradigm
'oblique' use 
of methods
'partitioning' 
methodologies
ontological 
'critical moment'
'detachable' 
methods
creative design 
of methods
CSP is a meta-
methodology
"critical pluralist" 
metaparadigm, 
ontologically sub‐
sumes dualism
'generic' 
methodologies
epistemological
boundaries
A System of Systems 
Methodologies
(Jackson & Keys, 1984)
Creative 
Methodology 
Design
(Midgley 1990)
Critical Systems 
Thinking [+SoSM]
(Jackson, 1985)
Total Quality 
Management 
[TSI-2]
(Flood, 1993)
Diversity Mgt/ 
Triple Loop 
Learning (Flood 
& Romm, 1996)
Local Systemic 
Intervention 
(LSI)
(Flood, 2000)
Creative Design 
of Methods
(Midgley, 1997)
Systemic 
Intervention
(Midgley, 2000)
Total Systems Inter-
vention (TSI) [+CST] 
(Flood & Jackson, 1991)
Critical Systems Practice, 
Coherent Pluralism
(Jackson, 1997-2000)
Pragmatic Pluralism 
[postmodern]
(Taket & White, 
1996)
Critical Appreciation, 
Discordant Pluralism
(Gregory, 1992, 1996)
Interpretive 
Systemology
(Fuenmayor, 1989)
Theoretical Pluralism 
[epistemological]
(Midgley, 2011)
P–S Multiparadigm 
Perspectivity
[ontological]
(Bowers, 2012)
Critical Pluralism, 
Multimethodology
(Mingers & Brock-
lesby, 1996-7)
Liberating 
Systems Theory
(Flood, 1990)
Critical 
Multimethodology 
(Mingers, 2006)
Ontological 
Complexity 
(Midgley, 1992)
What is this thing 
called CST?
(Midgley, 1996)
Figure 13.  Evolution of pluralism in CST with additional, philosophical information.
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5.4.3. A system of systems methodologies (SoSM) 
(Jackson and Keys, 1984)
With Towards a System of Systems Methodologies (SoSM), Jackson 
and Keys (1984) took the first steps towards multimethodology with 
a theory establishing methodological pluralism in the systems sci-
ences (refer again to §4.3.). They developed the first metatheoretical 
framework (Mingers, 1997a), a scheme to classify all systems ap-
proaches by their assumptions about systems using two dimensions 
for categorization (see Table 1). First was the decision makers’ pre-
sumed agreement upon the particulars of the system and the goals of 
the research, design or intervention: unitary (a singular view), plural-
ist (many views) and (later,) coercive (or enforced) (Jackson, 1987a). 
Secondly, the perceived relative complexity of the system itself: me-
chanical or systemic. Into these combinations of ‘problem contexts’ 
they organised the contemporary methodologies according to as-
sumptions made by the approaches themselves, their ‘domain of ap-
propriateness.’ 
Hard systems thinking (classical OR, systems analysis, 
systems engineering) was said to assume that problems 
are set in simple-unitary contexts because it takes as 
given that it is easy to establish objectives for the system 
of concern and that it is possible to model it mathemati-
cally. Sociotechnical, contingency and cybernetic ap-
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proaches were related to complex-unitary contexts vari-
ous soft systems approaches to simple-pluralist and 
complex-pluralist contexts; and no systems methodolo-
gies were available based on coercive assumptions. 
(Jackson, 1997)
Methodologies should be judged on their effectiveness, they said, 
only when they have been applied within the domain of systemic sce-
narios for which they are appropriate. SoSM’s utility, then, called 
‘methodological complementarism,’16 was to help inform the interven-
tionist’s decision as to which methodology to choose to employ in a 
given situation. In other words, to pick the right tool for the job. It 
effectively stopped the debates which saw methodologies in competi-
tion,
…because it presented the different methodologies as be-
ing appropriate for different types of problem context. 
This should encourage mutual respect in management 
science between those proponents of different approaches 
who had previously seen themselves at war with one an-
other. It should also lead analysts to ask, on each occa-
sion the are confronted by a problem, which methodology 
is appropriate to this problem context. Finally, it aids un-
derstanding of exactly what goes wrong when an inap-
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16  ‘Theoretical complementarism’ and the critical approach emerged in the 
next generation, ‘total systems intervention’ (TSI) (Flood and Jackson, 
1991a).
propriate problem-solving approach is employed in a par-
ticular problem context. (Jackson, 1997)
In hindsight, Jackson said the idea of single “methodology selec-
tion”—rather than the use of different methodologies in the same in-
tervention—and its “failure to adequately distinguish methodology 
from methods” were its significant weaknesses (Jackson, 2000). 
5.4.4. Interpretive systemology (Fuenmayor, 1989)
Interpretive systemology (Fuenmayor, 1985, 1989a, b) is not a mul-
timethodology. It is included here because Fuenmayor, in setting out 
to construct a response to Jackson’s observation that at the time 
there were no explicitly interpretive systems methodologies, created 
instead a hybrid critical-interpretivist, multiparadigmatic theory. Jack-
son’s lacunae was formally addressed by Fuenmayor. The groundwork 
was laid in his doctoral thesis, The ontology and epistemology of a 
systems approach: a fundamental study and an application to the 
phenomenon development/underdevelopment (1985) and fully devel-
oped in two papers, Interpretive systemology: a critical approach to 
interpretive systems thinking (1989a), and Interpretive systemology: 
its theoretical and practical development in a university school of sys-
tems in Venezuela (1989b). Here is a report by Schecter.
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Fuenmayor and his colleagues have taken up the task of 
developing the critical kernel in interpretive systems ap-
proaches by providing a rigorous theoretical foundation 
for interpretive systems work [(Fuenmayor, 1985, 
1989a,b)]. Fuenmayor’s work, which he calls interpretive 
systemology, is focused on the construction of basic the-
ory (‘onto-epistemology’ in his terms) that is interpretiv-
ist, critical and also emancipatory. In his view, there is 
not a fundamental contradiction between the interpretive 
view and the critical view. Rather, the reasons for the 
non-critical nature of current soft systems work are its 
lack of an interpretive systems theory and the instrumen-
tal nature of the way it has been used. Fuenmayor de-
scribes the dominant approach to soft systems work as 
‘pragmatic-regulative interpretive management,’ which 
uses learning as a tool for managing human organisa-
tions. In contrast, interpretive systemology considers 
learning itself as the key focus. This leads to a much 
more theoretically grounded, more critical approach. 
(Schecter, 1991)
Support was taken from Heidegger’s (1962) ontological phenomenol-
ogy. Sokolowski explains.
The [Heideggerian] phenomenological method is rooted in 
intentionality, Husserl’s theory of consciousness. Inten-
tionality represents an alternative to the representational 
theory of consciousness which holds that reality cannot 
be grasped directly because it is available only through 
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perceptions of reality which are representations of it in 
the mind. Husserl countered that consciousness is not ‘in’ 
the mind but rather conscious of something other than 
itself (the intentional object), whether the object is a sub-
stance or a figment of imagination… Hence the phenome-
nological method relies on the description of phenomena 
as they are given to consciousness, in their immediacy. 
(Sokolowski, 2000)
What in my terms is the ontology of his phenomenological approach, 
in his terms is “the paradoxical recursive unity in which experience 
takes place.” He describes conscious reality as an emergent proper-
ty—”the phenomenon of holistic transcendence”. I believe my theory 
has a more accessible explanation (Chapter 6). It has a corollary that 
I call “the critical moment of becoming” (§6.11).
What Fuenmayor actually did was to justify the use of interpretivist 
methods within a critical systems approach to intervention. In the 
context of this dissertation, interpretive systemology, then, is multi-
paradigmatic—part interpretivist and part critical-emancipatory. And, 
as it is a multiparadigmatic theory, interpretive systemology is open 
to charges of paradigm (i.e. ontological and epistemological theoreti-
cal) incommensurability and relativism.17
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17  But with respect to the new theory proposed in Chapters 6 and 7 these 
charges could, perhaps, be dropped. 
5.4.5. Critical systems thinking (Jackson, 1985)
Critical systems thinking was designed as a meta-theoretical frame-
work; that is, an overarching theoretical framework intended to direct 
the use of other theories. Jackson’s critical systems thinking is all 
about the consideration of different existing approaches to systemic 
practice with respect to multiple onto-epistemological paradigms. 
Where, in a system of systems methodologies, the concept was 
meta-methodological, to inform the systemist in choosing the proper 
methodology, the object of this theory was to enable the systemist 
first to pick the one, right paradigm for a given real situation. The 
theory improved the earlier organising concept of methodologies 
categorised by SoSM’s scheme which assumes that the world has sys-
tems which are either agreed upon or not (unitary/pluralist/coercive) 
and which are either systemically complex or not (mechanical/
systemic). Jackson adopted and adapted Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) 
onto-epsitemological (and incommensurable) social paradigms to the 
domain of systems thinking. Burrell and Morgan categorized theories 
based on their underlying assumptions as to the deeper nature of the 
‘world’ in which they operate—”What is in this world; what is it made 
of?” (ontology); and “What are its values and what sort of knowledge 
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we can have of it?” (epistemology). The individual paradigms of criti-
cal systems thinking (see Figure 7) are the subject of Chapter 4.
This theory also formally incorporated critical (social) theory into the 
body systems thinking, establishing for it the new ‘emancipatory’ 
paradigm, concerned with the exercise of power and control. The 
word ‘critical’ signified an ethical commitment to critical self-reflection 
and critical systems thinking was established with a mandate to ap-
proach systems critically—probing and questioning the problem sce-
nario looking for situations of power and control, of dominance and 
submission, or coercion. It gave the systemist the ethical responsibil-
ity to (at least) expose such problems. What should the systemist do 
in such situations? Radical emancipatory methodologies were ex-
pected to be developed. First, though, was Ulrich’s critical systems 
heuristics (1989), a methodology to ensure that system boundaries 
(considered to be conceptually dynamic) include all those who would 
be affected by the research, design or intervention (see Critical sys-
tems heuristics, §4.5.4.3).  
To demonstrate a variety of the systemic approaches available to the 
systemist, Jackson explained how metaphor can be used as a concep-
tualisation tool and why he believes it is beneficial to envision sys-
tems (in this case organisations) this way (my emphasis added):
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Are organisations being seen just as machines; or are 
they being thought of as organisms needing to adapt to 
their environments; or as cultures in which different 
value systems and political interests co-exist? … 
Systems thinking, as I have tried to suggest, is able with 
its holistic view to see the broader picture and the true 
complexity of the management task. Systems thinking is 
also holistic in the sense that it entertains the perspec-
tives offered on organisations and their management by 
various sociological paradigms. Its concern is to get the 
greatest benefit from each of these possible theoretical 
positions, adding its own contribution of rigour and rele-
vance in each case. (Jackson, 2000)
To support the theory in terms of its use of multiple, incommensura-
ble paradigms, epistemological support was drawn from the work of 
Laughlin et al. (1981) and Chua et al. (1981) combining Burrell and 
Morgan’s theoretical paradigms with Habermas’ theory of knowledge-
constitutive interests (1971, 1974) (my terminology in brackets).
Laughlin et al. (1981) and Chua et al. (1981) have sought 
to critique and extend the Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
framework by incorporating Habermas’ interest constitu-
tion [knowledge-constitutive interests] theory, in terms of 
which the concerns of social theories are seen as reflect-
ing either a technical interest for prediction and control 
(man-nature interaction), a practical interest for under-
212
standing (human communicative interaction), or an 
emancipatory interest (social relations of power, domina-
tion, and alienation). The technical interest constitutes 
empirical knowledge and parallels Burrell and Morgan’s 
functionalist paradigm [here, the positivist/structural-
functionalist paradigm]. The practical interest constitutes 
historical-hermeneutical knowledge, paralleling the inter-
pretive paradigm. The emancipatory interest constitutes 
critical knowledge, paralleling the radical-humanist and 
-structuralist paradigms [here, the critical-emancipatory 
paradigm].…
[They] argue that the two schemes are parallel, but fun-
damentally different, in that whereas Burrell and Morgan 
merely explain the different paradigmatic categories, 
Habermas explains and reconciles the interest categories 
in terms of their being individually necessary (although 
insufficient) as human species, universal and invariant 
(ontological) forms of activity—namely labor, human in-
teraction, and authority relations (Habermas, 1971; Gid-
dens, 1977; Puxty, Soo, et al., 1980; Keat, 1981). This is 
an important improvement over the interparadigmatic in-
commensurability position of Burrell and Morgan (cf. Bey-
leveld, 1975).
The three different kinds of knowledge imply different 
methodological approaches—namely empiricist [positivist/
structural-functionalist], hermeneutic [interpretive], and 
critical [critical-emancipatory] methodologies. It is these 
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methodologies that constitute metatheoretical founda-
tions for lower-order methods in the form of modes of in-
quiry and problem-solving approaches. (Oliga, 1988)
Later, Jackson described how ‘critical’ and ‘emancipation’ came to be 
separated explicitly in the following six years, and how the grand but 
vague ideas of radical emancipation were toned down.
Critical systems thinking has, since its inception, made 
somewhat vague statements about being dedicated to 
human “emancipation.” Putting this item on the agenda 
by promoting emancipatory systems thinking was a real 
achievement of the approach. … The relationship between 
emancipatory and critical systems thinking was, for some 
time, so close that there was confusion about their sepa-
rate identities. Eventually it becomes clear that “emanci-
pation” was only one of three human interests which, fol-
lowing Habermas, critical systems thinking sought to sup-
port. Critical systems thinking, therefore, still embraced 
emancipation but as part of a much broader dedication to 
human improvement… in terms of bringing about those 
circumstances in which all individuals could realize their 
potential. (Jackson, 2000)
So systemists were released from a moral commitment to emancipate 
others, and instead were asked to accept the much more realistic 
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commitment to help “bring about the circumstances” “in which all in-
dividuals could [if they wished] realize their [own] potential.”
As to the other concept,
Critical systems thinking was seen as a wider approach 
to management science as a whole that was based on 
five “commitments”—critical awareness, social aware-
ness, methodological complementarism, theoretical com-
plementarism, and human emancipation (Jackson, 
1991c). (Mingers, 1997a)
Habermas himself had abandoned knowledge-constitutive interests 
by 1981. Spaul (1997) had said that Habermas no longer found his 
early human interest theory to be defensible.  
5.4.6. Creative methodology design (Midgley, 1990)
In 1989 Midgley had written about the problems of accommodating 
pluralism in critical systems thinking (1989a), and in another paper 
he advanced the term ‘whole methodologies’ and proposed ‘partition-
ing’ methodologies—where parts are taken out and combined with 
others (1989b). Despite the title, the 1990 paper is about the crea-
tive design of methods, not methodologies, and in the 1997 revision  
the theory takes the proper title (see §5.4.16). The 1990 and 1997 
versions are considered separate theories for the purposes of this re-
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search because of their differing philosophical underpinnings. The 
former (but not the latter) was grounded on Habermas’ knowledge-
constitutive interests. It was conceived of as “an improvement to a 
system of systems methodologies (SoSM)” which was thought to be 
necessary because
…the issue of the researcher’s responsibility was not ad-
dressed in earlier descriptions of the use of the system of 
systems methodologies. The system of systems method-
ologies was also criticised for paying insufficient attention 
to the dynamism and complexity of most research situa-
tions. (Midgley, 1990)
Midgley says that “following reflection upon a particularly complex in-
tervention,” the first known to have specifically attempted to employ 
the system of systems methodologies, he had
…problematized the [SoSM’s] notion of simple methodol-
ogy choice, arguing that most research situations are 
perceived as sufficiently complex to warrant the use of a 
variety of methods. Therefore, it is more useful to think in 
terms of the design of methods than simple choice be-
tween “off-the-shelf” methodologies. (Midgley, 1997b)
Creative methodology design 
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…involves understanding the problem situation in terms 
of a series of systematically-interrelated research ques-
tions that express the purposes of the researcher (usually 
in dialogue with others), each of which might need to be 
addressed using a different method, or part of a method. 
These research questions are not necessarily determined 
as a complete set in advance but may evolve as events 
unfold and understandings of the situation develop. 
(Midgley, 1997a)
In the example he provides, the research questions which were asked 
were
…What should we evaluate current practice against? If 
the answer to this is a vision of the ideal service, how do 
we ensure that service users have a meaningful say in its 
production? How do we address the issues of power and 
expertise that arise so frequently when dealing with the 
design and management of mental health services? And 
how do we go beyond the boundaries of the current serv-
ice to address peoples' needs more systemically?
Their decision was to combine methods from Ulrich’s critical systems 
heuristics (the twelve questions) and Ackoff’s interactive planning.
The synthesis of methods drawn from Critical Systems 
Heuristics and Interactive Planning--looks very different 
from Critical Systems Heuristics alone. However, it is also 
very different from Interactive Planning. The latter seeks 
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to "unshackle" the minds of participants in debate, to lib-
erate them from unnecessary assumptions that limit crea-
tivity, but it does not do so with the specific intention of 
addressing power issues. By synthesising the principles 
and methods from the two methodologies into a new 
method… we produced something that was different from 
the sum of its contributory parts.
In retrospect, Midgley explained why Habermas’ knowledge-
constitutive interests proved inadequate as an underpinning to this 
theory. 
A move away from the theory of knowledge-constitutive 
interests was considered to be necessary following two 
critiques: a critique of the use of the theory of 
knowledge-constitutive interests to underpin methodo-
logical pluralism (Midgley, 1989a, b), and a critique of the 
legitimacy of the theory of knowledge-constitutive inter-
ests itself. (Midgley, 1992b)
Interestingly, he did not question the assumption that it somehow 
nullifies the incommensurability problem; instead, he took issue with 
it in the sense that it is imperialistic, “creating a Grand Truth that is 
beyond question, and which seeks to invalidate any ideas that oppose 
it (Jackson and Carter, 1991)” (Midgley, 1997b). And, as to the the-
ory itself, knowledge-constitutive interests
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…describes the relationship that human beings have with 
the nonhuman environment as one of “prediction and 
control”. If this is used to inform the development of sys-
tems science, it is likely to reinforce the humanist as-
sumption that the natural world is a resource for human 
control and consumption. It is far better to view human 
beings as having an interest in preserving and/or building 
a sustainable, interactive relationship with their non-
human environment. (Midgley, 1997b)
In the same paper he goes on to explain that he finds Habermas’ 
“three worlds” theory of communicative competence a better founda-
tion (see §5.4.16).
5.4.7. Liberating systems theory (LST) (Flood, 1990)
The title is deliberately ambiguous. Liberation is a double entendre. It 
stands for the idea of emancipation with respect to both humans and 
to systems theory itself. It is as though systems thinking has escaped 
its bonds and emerged anew, as critical systems thinking. The earlier 
eras saw systems in only ‘hard’ or positivist terms, for example as 
closed, open and autopoietic systems; later in ‘soft’ or interpretivist 
terms. Now critical systems theory sees systems in terms of ‘para-
digms’ (weltanschauungen, or world views) and explicitly combines 
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critical and emancipatory systems thinking together in the third para-
digm. The ideal is rather grand, as Fairtlough’s review reports.
It aims to take into account the interests (sometimes 
concealed even from themselves) of all those involved 
with, and affected by, the problem situation and by any 
proposed solutions. The ideas, the values, and the world-
views of problem solvers, whether they are experts, 
managers, or owners, are not enough; ideally everyone’s 
ideas, values, and worldviews must be considered, 
whether articulated or not. So the Critical Systems ap-
proach is inclusive not elitist, emancipatory not conserva-
tive, popular not expert. (Fairtlough, 1991)
Flood is a complementarist, which means that “he sees different 
theoretical and practical approaches as being potentially helpful to 
each other, rather than always being rivals” (Fairtlough, 1991). Unfor-
tunately, complementarism suffers charges of paradigm incommen-
surability and relativism. Epistemologically, Flood considers the vari-
ety of ideas about knowledge and strategies for inquiry. He presents 
four main approaches to understanding inquiry and knowledge (ibid.).
• The linear sequential approach sees knowledge as cu-
mulative. The more we know, the more the jigsaw be-
comes complete.
• The structuralist approach adds feedback to the se-
quential approach so that new pieces in the jigsaw 
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change the shape of the other pieces. New knowledge 
modifies old knowledge as well as adding to it.
• The worldviewist approach describes the history of 
knowledge in terms of paradigm shifts. New knowledge 
requires a whole new way of looking at things.
• Finally, the genealogical approach adds the notion of 
power to the worldviewist approach. The interests of 
individuals influence what is taken to be valid, and what 
is taken to be invalid, knowledge. The accumulation of 
a huge number of small interest-driven reappraisals re-
sults in a paradigm shift. (Flood, 1990)
To Flood, Foucault’s poststructuralist ideas explain how knowledge de-
rives from personal statements about the way things are in the world, 
and that the describer gains power and influence by the particular 
choices he makes—something that Habermas’ larger view of society 
(in terms of mankind’s knowledge constitutive interests) does not ad-
dress. For Foucault, communication is hopelessly contaminated by 
power-seeking moves. But,
Flood wants to show that the two positions share fea-
tures. It is these common aspects that, despite their dif-
ferences, will enable them to be used within a ‘meta 
unity’ which he terms ‘Liberating Systems Theory.’
“Cooper and Burrell (1988)… [note] that Habermas has 
been vigorous in his criticisms of Foucault and that the 
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groundings [of the two positions] appear to conflict. From 
another angle, however, a commonality that turns out to 
be a linchpin in the following studies, can be found at a 
meta-level, and is characterized as an open and concilia-
tory approach to competing views and traditions. (Flood, 
1990, pp.22-23).”
Flood does not acknowledge that overcoming the contra-
dictions that emerge from the ways in which the two 
theoreticians conceive of power is ‘extremely difficult.’ 
However, this does not prevent him from trying to 
achieve
“an adequate epistemology that is constructed from the 
complementarist ideas of Foucault’s Interpretive Analytics 
and Habermas’ knowledge-constitutive interests (Flood, 
1990, p.50; emphasis added).” (Gregory, 1996b)
Flood tries but does not succeed in reconciling these two approaches 
to power, agrees Fairtlough. Why? Because the two ways of under-
standing are different ontologically and epistemologically; that is, 
they are incommensurable. Flood and others who see the great value 
in his ideas would go on to establish a postmodern-poststructural 
paradigm to accommodate Foucault’s ideology.
Midgley points out Flood’s apparently contradictory logic theoretical 
claims.
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Flood (1990) accepts the incommensurability argument: 
he suggests that it is possible to have methodological 
commensurability while acknowledging theoretical in-
commensurability. However, it would seem to me that 
this stands in opposition to his claim that critical systems 
thinking is “meta-paradigmatic”: it means that, if critical 
systems thinking is theoretical in nature, we must recog-
nise that it is incommensurable with other perspectives 
based on different theoretical assumptions. (Midgley, 
1997b)
5.4.8. Total systems intervention (TSI) (Flood and 
Jackson, 1991)
Flood and Jackson’s total systems intervention (TSI) relies upon Jack-
son’s critical systems thinking (1985) for its onto-epistemological 
paradigms and on complementarism (as in SoSM). But, rather than 
generally using just one methodology (as in SoSM) or possibly multi-
ple methods, but from just one paradigm for a particular intervention 
(as in critical systems thinking), TSI describes the meta-
methodological use of multiple methodologies to deal with different 
situations in the same intervention. It sought to “operationalize plu-
ralism in each of its three phases—creativity, choice, and implemen-
tation.” (Jackson, 2000).
Here is how Flood summarized TSI.
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The problem solving system TSI has been developed to 
provide managers with a practical and useful systems-
based approach to problem solving. It offers procedures 
to integrate all methods for problem-solving in a process 
which ensures that they are employed to tackle only the 
issues they are best suited to. (Flood, 1995a)
What are the rules for this new way of practicing systemic research, 
design and intervention?
Following worries that this might be interpreted as a call 
for a "rule book" for the application of systems method-
ologies, Jackson (1990) made it clear that the diagnosis 
of a problem situation should not replace critical thinking 
about the reasons for intervention. It should simply be 
used as information so that the researcher can remain 
aware of the limitations of the methodology s/he is using 
and act appropriately. (Midgley, 1997a)
Like SoSM, TSI is complementarist. This is the major criticism of 
Gregory (1996a) who says that the main tool, complementarism, 
“hinders the approach in its efforts to provide an adequate foundation 
for Critical Systems Thinking.” She has developed a radically altered 
view of complementarism’s harmonious perspective, ‘discordant plu-
ralism’ (see §5.4.10).
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Jackson’s own rejection of the theoretical basis for TSI were ex-
plained in the three publications that introduced his next two schol-
arly theories, coherent pluralism and critical systems practice (Jack-
son, 1997; 1999, 2000) (see §5.4.14).
Attempted improvements by Flood (1993) are never followed up or 
‘ratified’. This where TSI-2 starts. Flood (1995b) abandons SoSM (but 
not TSI) as an underpinning for his theory, diversity management 
(DM). DM takes TSI, now dubbed ‘TSI-2’ into the postmodern. Flood 
and Jackson do not publish together from this point forward.
5.4.9. Ontological complexity (Midgley, 1992)
Because I acknowledge that statements about ontology 
are discursive rather than “true” in an absolute sense, I 
regard the perspective I am developing as useful in rela-
tion to other discourses we are currently dealing with, 
i.e., those surrounding the notions of pluralism, complex-
ity, interdependence, and the future of systems science. 
It therefore has a "local" significance (in both time and 
space), even when our discourses are about "global" is-
sues! (Midgley, 1992a) 
I agree with Midgley that the sources of the problems presented by 
pluralism are ontological, but where I imagine their resolution lies 
somehow ‘beneath’ or at a more base level than their incommensura-
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ble ontologies, in this paper Midgley imagines the solution is some-
where ‘above’ them in a metatheoretical level. In this paper he is re-
sponding to “a strong call for a pluralist approach which recognizes 
the strengths and weaknesses of all working methods through the 
use of a meta-theory that allows their complementarity.” This paper 
imagines the sort of ontology that would support such a metatheo-
retical framework for critical-systemic pluralism. 
Midgley’s theory details three systemically-interdependent “complexi-
ties”: natural world complexities of object relations, complexities of 
moral decision making and complexities of subjectivity. Different 
methods, he finds, “have evolved to handle the different forms of 
complexity.” “Therefore, if systems science is going to tackle some of 
the major issues of today in an adequate manner, it must embrace 
methodological pluralism” (Midgley, 1992a).
Building on his idea for partitioning methodologies into essential parts 
and combining them with others (1989b), “all working methods” 
would be “adapted” to serve in a new meta-paradigm; unplugged 
from their own onto-epistemologies and plugged into this new meta- 
one, I believe. Of course, Jackson has held that this must not be 
done, ‘denaturing’ them from their true philosophies; it smacks of 
pragmatism. 
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Later in the same year, Gregory published a paper which explains 
that any meta- approach is necessarily corrupting to the nature of the 
thing subsumed, replacing its motives with new, overarching ones; 
and she rightly declares that a meta- approach is an imperialist ap-
proach which assumes it is the right approach and that all others are 
wrong (see §5.4.10)—a position which is antithetical to ideological 
critique, one of the foundational tenets of critical systems thinking. 
5.4.10. Critical appreciation, Discordant pluralism 
(Gregory, 1992, 1996)
The problem at this time in the mainstream of critical systems theory 
is that it sees pluralism with respect to paradigm incommensurability 
as a problem of commensurability. Mingers and Brocklesby (1997) 
also wrote that “appealing to a higher level of reasoning, or meta-
theory, allows methods to be combined without destroying the integ-
rity of the paradigms from which they originate.” It is known that a 
meta-methodological framework merely concentrates the problem as 
if to say, “Look. This is a model of paradigm incommensurability.” 
Jackson’s critical systems thinking, a meta-theoretical framework is 
the same, except at a higher theoretical level. Midgley’s ontological 
complexity shows that a meta-epistemological theory must ‘unplug’ 
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
227
methodologies from their original onto-epistemologies and ‘adapt’ 
them, denaturing them, to serve a new, grand vision.
It is difficult to comprehend how a theoretical integration 
of the different methodologies can be achieved, given the 
conflicting assumptions an which they are based. (Greg-
ory, 1996b)
Gregory’s Ph.D. dissertation presents a different perspective on the 
issue of pluralism in critical systems thinking that she calls critical 
appreciation. It is underpinned by an epistemology she developed as 
well, discordant pluralism. As was said earlier, Gregory is critical of 
the “open and conciliatory complementarism” of SoSM and TSI, and 
goes about explaining why it is not an adequate foundation for critical 
systems thinking: “it lacks the ability to provide for consideration of 
radically alien perspectives…” “because it is inherently consensus ori-
ented.” Importantly for pluralism, she says, complementarism brings 
with it problems of paradigm incommensurability. She exposes TSI’s 
meta-theoretical ‘complementarist’ pluralism as a form of imperialism 
in disguise. Instead, her model, critical appreciation, specifies what I 
consider to be basic qualities of modern (i.e. pluralist) critical systems 
thinking, critical reflexivity and multiparadigm multimethodology. 
First, critical reflexivity, or “critical self-reflection and the explicit cri-
tique of ideology” (my emphasis),
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…incorporates two crucial components advocated by 
Habermas and endorsed by Bernstein [(1983)]: critical 
self-reflection based upon an analogy of Freud’s model of 
dream-analysis, and an explicit critique of ideology. …
And secondly, multiparadigm multimethodology.
It is suggested that any social inquiry must contain ele-
ments of `reflexive’ (philosophical) and `scientific’ (prac-
tical) inquiry together with ideology-critique and critical 
self-reflection in order to bring about the emancipation of 
individuals and groups. A model of self-society dynamics 
reveals the need for reflexive inquiry, discourse and ac-
tion (as exemplified in the critical appreciation process) in 
any efforts to transform ’self’ or ’society’. (Gregory, 1992)
After identifying and separating these various components of critical 
systems inquiry and action, she leads the field in a new direction. 
Rather than attempting to circumscribe all of systems thinking with 
critical systems thinking which would require that we ‘adapt’ the vari-
ous systemic approaches to fit within an overarching approach guided 
by critical-emancipatory principles, Gregory is among those who 
rightly point out that such subordination would necessarily corrupt 
those other approaches. She speaks instead of a new “relationship 
between critical thinking and pluralism” (my emphasis), and calls for 
“an a priori commitment to a new, discordant pluralism”. Rather than 
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
229
trying to see a problem as either a this or that type of situation, in 
the systemist’s “problematique” it can be many or all of them at 
once. Each view is “juxtaposed” within a “constellation” (or web) style 
of conceptual organisation where the nature of the differences be-
tween these views supplies the tension which keeps them apart. 
She prefers “multidimensional evaluation” where method-
ologies are used together but in parallel, in order to pro-
tect the different contributions they can offer according to 
their distinctive theoretical underpinnings. (Jackson, 
1997)
Rather than trying to reconcile differences between ways of concep-
tualizing problem scenarios (as with complementarism), discordant 
pluralism celebrates them. The differences between paradigms are no 
longer seen as problematic, but as distinctions which represent their 
value with respect to the others.
Discordant pluralism thus has three main features. The 
first of these is its local, contingent, and historically situ-
ated nature. Second, discordant pluralism promotes 
communication with other, radically different and alien 
perspectives. Here, the emphasis is on communication 
which can help us ‘come to a deeper understanding of 
ourselves precisely in and through the study of others’ 
(Bernstein, 1983, p.96). The third feature concerns the 
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use of insights gained through such communication to 
provide for ethical decision making. This is achieved 
through the juxtapositioning of oppositional view-points 
within a constellation that supports both one perspective 
and the other. Issues need no longer be framed in an 
“either/or” manner. (Gregory, 1996b)
“Gregory insists that it is impossible to transcend the paradigm de-
bate: each attempt to do so must inevitably involve researchers in 
making new paradigmatic assumptions” (Midgley, 1997b). Discordant 
pluralism puts critical systems thinking back into agreement with Bur-
rell and Morgan (1979), at last—paradigms are incommensurable. 
Gregory has produced our first theory which explicitly calls for accep-
tance of paradigm incommensurability. It is not a resolution to the 
problem itself, but it is a critically important step forward for critical 
systems theory. (My proposal is also based on the acceptance of 
paradigm incommensurability; see Chapters 6 and 7.)
5.4.11. Diversity management (triple loop learning) 
(Flood and Romm, 1995)
Flood and Romm (1995a) get right to the point of the issue of theo-
retical incommensurability, explaining it quite well. The solution as 
they see it is a form of postmodern freedom from grand ‘truths’. Now, 
decisions are made and actions taken based on the conciliation be-
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tween argumentors; that is, on Habermas’ (1981) theory of commu-
nicative competence (which had been proposed in 1992 as a better 
grounding theory for pluralism than Habermas’ theory of knowledge-
constitutive interests by Midgley (1992a)). Where Gregory (1992, 
1996b) has “discordant pluralism”, Flood & Romm have “conciliatory 
discord”. In their paper, the section on theory (5.3) is quite difficult to 
understand but, in my opinion, comes to nothing that either resolves 
or delegitimises incommensurability, yet it is used to justify their ap-
proach to judgement and action. The attempt is made to blend the 
intentions, but not the actual theories of Habermas and Foucault. I 
believe it steps over the problem without resolving it—as if they are 
saying that we have to learn to live with paradigm incommensurabil-
ity, and Habermas’ theory is just a cover for a pragmatic resolve to 
‘keep buggering on’. It seems to me that “conciliatory discord” is a 
methodological solution to epistemological concerns. Truth is then too 
unstable. Also, how legitimate is it to argue from different points of 
view which are incommensurable?
From this epistemology they derive and develop the idea of the 
‘oblique’ use of methodology—in which a method is used to serve a 
purpose very different than that for which it was originally intended. 
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“The key… is to operate them using the principles of a different per-
spective” (Midgley, 1997b). For example, 
…a system dynamics model, usually associated with the 
functionalist approach, being used as a detailed cognitive 
map for the purposes of enhancing debate in an interpre-
tive framework. (Jackson, 2000)
The main philosophical problem, said Mingers and Brocklesby, “is the 
[theoretical] legitimacy of transferring a technique developed within 
one paradigm to another” (1996). By 1997 Jackson, writing about 
Flood and Romm’s ideas, had concluded that “pluralists must learn to 
live with and manage a degree” of paradigm incommensurability. 
The great merit of unrestricted multi-method use, as 
practised by some in OR [operations research] and some 
who embrace postmodernism, is that it allows practitio-
ners the flexibility to cleave closely to what is appropriate 
in the problem situation and to the twists and turns taken 
by the intervention. 
The next sentence, though, carries a consistent charge—mind that 
you remain theoretically conscientious!
The weaknesses, however, must also be recognized and 
are associated with an almost inevitable relapse into 
pragmatism or an unreflective imperialism. The use of 
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methods, tools and techniques, without reference to the 
methodology and paradigm supporting their use, means 
that we cannot learn about the effectiveness of these in 
supporting interventions conducted under the governance 
of a particular rationality. (Jackson, 2000)
5.4.12. Pragmatic pluralism (Taket and White, 1996)
With respect to pluralism, it’s “mix and match”, not a solution to 
theoretical incommensurability, said Jackson in 1997. He offers some 
of his harshest criticisms for this theory. 
Taket and White (1995) argue that the degree of com-
plexity and heterogeneity encountered in most evaluation 
situations prevents the adoption of the kind of contin-
gency logic underpinning… [TSI’s] complementarism. 
They also advocate a pluralist strategy for evaluation but 
based on a more eclectic approach. This approach must 
recognise the heterogeneity within the group concerned 
with an evaluation and recognise evaluation as a social 
process. It can be thought of a a kind of “pragmatic plu-
ralism” in which parts of different OR/systems methods 
are combined, “in a process that might be labelled ‘judi-
cious mix and match’”, according to the requirements of 
the situation and the changing responses of the evalua-
tion party. Taket and White allow that their strategy lays 
them open to the charge of combining methods based on 
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incompatible theoretical assumptions, but make little pro-
gress in resolving this problem. (Jackson, 1997)
We must protect paradigm diversity, said Jackson. If paradigm diver-
sity is to be protected, then incommensurability “cannot simply be ig-
nored in the way that Taket and White (2000) propose in their prag-
matic pluralism.” He warned,
The eclectic use of different methods, without reference 
to methodology or paradigm, means that we cannot en-
sure paradigm diversity. All the methods and models em-
ployed may be used according to one implicit paradigm. 
(ibid.)
5.4.13. Critical pluralism, Multi-paradigm multimethod-
ology (Mingers and Brocklesby, 1996-7; Min-
gers 1997)
Mingers and Brocklesby’s ideas are collected from a series of two pa-
pers and two book chapters published in the space of two years, each 
with a substantial overlap (Mingers and Brocklesby, 1996, 1997; Min-
gers 1997a, c). Mingers and Brocklesby’s “multi-paradigm multimeth-
odology” accepts Midgley’s theories regarding: philosophical support 
for multiparadigm pluralism based on Habermas’ newer theory of 
communicative competence, specifically in its ‘three worlds’; the de-
tachability of ‘techniques’ (which are essentially methods not yet de-
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ployed) from their onto-epistemological origins and combining them 
to create mixed methods in a multimethodological approach. And like 
Midgley they declare that critical pluralism is for a new “pluralist” 
metaparadigm. 
There is a new term for the first paradigm in the first paper, 
“empirical-analytic”, and the third paradigm is “critical-realist”. 
Multimethodology should be used on all occasions, they say.
It is necessary to go beyond using a single (or on occa-
sions more than one) methodology to always combining 
several methodologies, in whole or in part, and possibly 
from different paradigms, to make the most effective con-
tribution in dealing with the richness of the real world. 
(Mingers and Brocklesby, 1996)
But they acknowledge there is still the matter of paradigm incom-
mensurability.
However, mixing methodologies, particularly from differ-
ent paradigms, does present serious problems—philo-
sophically in terms of paradigm incommensurability, … 
(ibid.)
They separate technique (the production of methods) from methodol-
ogy and say that either whole methodologies are used or parts are 
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taken out and combined with others—what Midgley (1989b) called 
‘partitioning’. They discuss varieties of multimethodologies such as a 
multiparadigm version of “methodology enhancement” where, for ex-
ample SSM plus parts of VSM are combined; or where “parts of 
methodologies from different paradigms are brought together to con-
struct an ad doc multimethodology [mixed method] suitable for a 
particular problematic situation.” 
Their new framework for mixing methodologies takes a critical realist 
perspective (from Bhaskar, 1989, 1994) in order to investigate meth-
odologies themselves so that ‘detachable’ elements and their func-
tions might be identified for such purposes. The framework deals with 
the problem of methodological mapping in two dimensions in order to 
identify the characteristics of different methodologies according to 
their ability to assist with various aspects of systemic enquiry, design, 
or intervention. Their ‘map’ considers three ontological positions, ver-
tically: ‘material’, ‘personal’ and ‘social’ (Habermas’ ‘three worlds’); 
and splits epistemological concerns into four “stages” horizontally: 
‘appreciation of’ (what), ‘analysis of’ (what), ‘exploration of’ (what), 
and ‘action to’ (what effect) (as with Midgley’s (1990) creative meth-
odology design). These two dimensions form twelve concerns for the 
stages that they say any “fully comprehensive intervention needs to 
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undertake”, each box having some sort of “activities” to cover. “Thus, 
each box then generates questions about particular aspects of the 
situation/intervention that need to be addressed” methodologically. 
Jackson faults this method of mapping the various components of 
methodologies to the four “stages” of an intervention, saying that 
Under pluralism there is no justification for such a proce-
dure. To functionalists, for example, the ‘appreciation’ 
stage of an intervention, carried out according to an in-
terpretive logic, is not ‘richer’, it is simply misguided. 
(Jackson, 1999)
Like Mingers and Brocklesby’s multimethodology, TSI’s three phases 
(creativity, choice and implementation) were each supposed to be 
pluralist, as well, said Jackson. The problem was that insufficient em-
phasis was placed on it being an iterative process “continually cy-
cl[ing] around creativity, choice and implementation, changing as ap-
propriate which methodologies are ‘dominant’ and ‘dependent’” 
(ibid.).
To justify these types of practices in terms of theory is of course the 
most difficult and unresolved issue. Mingers and Brocklesby said they 
have “reflected on the mandate that methods from different philo-
sophical traditions should not be combined.” They said that Jackson 
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appeals to Habermas’ knowledge-constitutive interests (1971, 1974) 
“to circumvent paradigm incommensurability” and that Midgley “ap-
peals to Habermas’ ‘three worlds’ theory of communicative compe-
tence (1981) to justify methodological pluralism,” but neither Jackson 
nor Midgley had sought “to question the veracity of the incommen-
surability thesis itself.” 
As I see it, the solution they found an “all of the above” strategy. 
They put together the grandest of the grand meta-paradigms and 
throw in everything to support it. In one paper they are “decidedly 
modernist” because they “wish to make a reasoned argument” and in 
another they adopt postmodern positions. They chose to keep 
Habermas’ newer (1981) theory of communicative competence and 
buttress it with extra ontological support from Bhaskar’s (1989) criti-
cal realism, and epistemological support from Giddens’ (1984) struc-
turation theory and Searle’s (1995) construction of social reality. Both 
Giddens and Bhaskar, they say, deemphasize the distinctions between 
the various ontological and epistemological concerns. Both “dispute 
the claim that we must choose between the competing realities of-
fered by realist or nominalist thinking” and both are capable of onto-
logically “subsuming subject/object dualism” (Mingers and Brock-
lesby, 1996).
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Deemphasizing theoretical concerns is as pragmatist’s strategy, I 
would say. Deemphasizing differences between what is real (or not) 
and what is true, or good, right or proper (or not) is what psychiatry 
calls schizophrenia. I believe it is better to respect each paradigm’s 
ontological and epistemological determinations rather than pretend 
that the differences between them are negligible. As to Bhaskar’s 
critical realism, I have deconstructed Mingers’ summary of critical re-
alism to point to certain relativisms in its ontology (my emphasis 
added):
Ontologically, the strongly held claim that there does ex-
ist a world independent, to differing degrees, of human 
beings and that the underlying mechanisms generate the 
events we observe and experience. (Mingers, 2006)
and its epistemology…
Epistemologically, the fact that we do not have pure, un-
mediated access to this world but that our knowledge 
must always be locally and historically relative. But in ac-
cepting epistemic relativism we do not hereby accept 
judgemental relativism—there are grounds for choosing 
between competing views. (ibid.)
which leads to the validity claim for critical multimethodology in 
terms of pluralism…
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Methodologically, the retroductive approach of hypothe-
sising generative mechanisms that would explain our ex-
periences and then trying to confirm or deny their exis-
tence. This underwrites a pluralist view of research and 
intervention methods… (ibid.) 
I find faults with the philosophical underpinnings, not just with its 
schizophrenia and other relativisms, but also with respect to para-
digm incommensurability. First, I believe that the foundation of criti-
cal realism recognises and relies upon but does not adequately ex-
plain the fuzzy boundary, or “differing degrees”, between ontology 
and epistemology—between what is real and what is abstract—that 
we find varies between the paradigms; something that I feel my the-
ory explicates very well (see Chapter 6). Secondly, I believe that with 
critical realism the concept that knowledge is historically relative (i.e. 
that truth depends upon the times) except that there are grounds for 
choosing between competing views (i.e. that truth is a matter for 
judgement) makes what is then considered to be ‘true’, true at this 
moment, to us; but not at some other time or to some other peo-
ple—whether you call this ‘relativism’ or not—it is epistemologically 
incompatible with the understanding of the same word and concept in 
the positivist/structural-functionalist paradigm (which considers 
‘truth’ to be enduring and independent of the knower). It is a form of 
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rationality which distinguishes itself from the rationalist tradition “by 
locating rationality in structures of interpersonal linguistic communi-
cation rather than in the structure of the cosmos” (Habermas, 1989). 
My theory, on the other hand, considers epistemologies as valid 
within their paradigmatic context, not across those contexts (see 
Chapter 7). With relativism in terms of what is ‘real’, and incompati-
ble rationalities in terms of what is ‘true’, I believe that this and other 
frameworks which rely on support from Bhaskar’s critical realism 
(e.g. systemic intervention and the creative design of methods) suffer 
problems of ontological and epistemological relativisms and paradigm 
incommensurability. 
Although they did say that “multimethodology has the potential to 
capture the spirit of postmodernism,” their earlier theory, critical plu-
ralism, did not support it.
We do not pursue this [postmodernist] line of thinking in 
detail here because our case hinges upon constructing a 
reasoned and rational argument in support of multimeth-
odology. Our position is therefore decidedly modernist. 
(Mingers and Brocklesby, 1996, p.111)
In the 1997 adaptation of the paper just mentioned they reversed 
themselves and proposed a new, postmodern “pluralist paradigm” 
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with a new framework for mixing methodologies . Actually, they said, 
it is natural to practice postmodernism multimethodologically (Min-
gers and Brocklesby, 1997).
In rejecting the theory himself, Jackson cautioned systemists against 
it, fearing relapses into pragmatism.
We cannot afford to allow the theoretically uncontrolled 
employment of diverse methods, tools, models and tech-
niques that appears to occur in management consultancy. 
One reason for this is that we want to learn the value and 
usefulness of the tools and techniques we use; we want 
to do research so that we can improve them. Only by us-
ing the methods and tools under the control of a method-
ology which clearly serves one paradigm can we test 
them and discover how to improve their effectiveness in 
supporting an intervention conducted according to that 
rationality. … This consideration rules out, for me, the op-
tion of ’multiparadigm multimethodology' apparently pro-
posed by Mingers and Brocklesby. (Jackson, 1999)
5.4.13.1.What is this thing called Critical Systems 
Thinking? (Midgley, 1996)
This paper is a critique of the contemporary state of critical systems 
thinking and, importantly, proposed and brought about three major 
changes: First, critical systems thinking, rather than being a meta-
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paradigmatic theory, has instead developed a distinct onto-
epistemology; it is therefore better understood as a (non-meta) 
paradigm. Second, the commitment to critical awareness is better 
understood as an ethical critique of boundaries, à la Ulrich and 
Churchman. Because of these two changes, the “totalizing” theories 
of Habermas are no longer required. Third, the commitment to hu-
man emancipation is more thoughtfully considered a commitment to 
“improvement”. 
In 1991, TSI described the meta-methodological use of multiple 
methodologies from different paradigms, supported by Habermas’ 
theory of knowledge-constitutive interests. Gregory criticised its har-
monious philosophy of complementarism and questioned the legiti-
macy of Habermas’ theory to overcome incommensurability. Midgley 
said that a metatheory like TSI would have to “unplug” and “adapt” 
existing methodologies to serve its own onto-epistemology. Gregory 
saw this co-opting as corrupting and “denaturing” and rightly pointed 
to it being a form of imperialism—anathema to theoretical pluralism. 
She saw methodologies “used together, but in parallel… according to 
their distinctive theoretical underpinnings.” The paradigms must be 
allowed to stand apart from one another and their theories and 
methodologies to remain incommensurable. We must protect theo-
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retical diversity. Midgley, then Flood and Romm adopted Habermas’ 
“three worlds” theory of communicative competence, but this position 
was dismissed as utopian (later, even by Habermas, himself). Logi-
cally, then  
… if CST is indeed theoretical in nature, we must recog-
nize that it is incommensurable with other perspectives 
based on different theoretical assumptions. … CST is try-
ing to establish the foundations for a new paradigm. 
(Midgley, 1996)
In lieu of Habermas, the paradigm needs a critical systems philoso-
phy. 
My proposal for a first step to correct this problem is to 
support Ulrich’s (1993) argument that methods to sup-
port critical reflection on making boundary judgements 
should be used to enhance critical thinking up-front—both 
when we enter into interventions, and periodically after 
that. 
Why the primacy of critical boundary judgements?
Failure to realize the full implications of this will inevitably 
result in some of the most important boundary judg-
ments—those that determine who the researcher will talk 
to and how the initial remit of the work will be defin-
ed—being made in an uncritical manner. (Midgley, 1996)  
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Research around the central theme, the boundary of a system, was 
pioneered by Churchman (1968), says Midgley.
Prior to the work of Churchman, many people assumed 
that the boundaries of a system are “given” by the struc-
ture of reality. In contrast, Churchman made it clear that 
boundaries are constructs that define the limits of the 
knowledge that is to be taken as pertinent. There is also 
another important element of Churchman’s understanding 
of “system.” When it comes to human systems, pushing 
out the boundaries of analysis may also involve pushing 
out the boundaries of who may legitimately be considered 
a decision maker (1970). Thus, the business of setting 
boundaries defines both the knowledge to be considered 
pertinent and the people who generate that knowledge 
(and who also have a stake in the results of any attempts 
to improve the system). …
Not only did Churchman introduce this fundamental 
change in our understanding of “system,” but he also 
made clear the importance of critique. When discussing 
“improvement” [which Midgley prefers to the term 
“emancipation”], Churchman (e.g., 1979) followed Hegel, 
who stressed the need to expose our most cherished as-
sumptions to the possibility of overthrow. (Midgley, 1996)
Here is Midgley’s (1997) review of Ulrich’s critical systems heuristics.
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Critical Systems Heuristics gives a list of 12 questions 
that can be used to generate debate during planning. 
These focus on various issues such as whose interests 
ought to be served by the development of a system, 
whose "expertise" should be accepted, what criteria of 
evaluation should be used, and who should participate in 
planning and management. In terms of its principles, Ul-
rich claims that there is a need to challenge the powerful 
when they do not take account of others affected by their 
activities. He suggests that Critical Systems Heuristics 
can have a useful role in confronting "pseudo-dialogue" 
(insincere communication). Indeed, this challenge to 
power is the "emancipatory principle" that Flood and 
Romm (1995b) emphasise when describing Ulrich's work. 
However, Ulrich also suggests that his 12 questions, if 
answered in meaningful dialogue with stakeholders, can 
help establish boundaries within which further systems 
interventions can take place that allow for the transcen-
dence of narrow self-interest so that everybody can bene-
fit. There are therefore two principles lying behind Critical 
Systems Heuristics: the "emancipatory principle," which 
assumes that there is sometimes a need to challenge 
those with power because they pursue their own interests 
with little regard for the interests of others, and the "par-
ticipative principle," which (in Ulrich's view) assumes that 
people can be supported by the use of boundary ques-
tions in gaining the competence needed to enter rational 
debate with others, using a common language, and reach 
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accommodations so as to transcend narrowly defined in-
terests. (Midgley, 1997a)
Midgley’s considered critique of Ulrich’s methodology is not all posi-
tive, however.
…Critical Systems Heuristics is not really that effective in 
directly challenging coercion. This is because coercion is 
usually characterised by closure of debate. The pseudo-
dialogue Critical Systems Heuristics can allow people to 
challenge is a very mild form of coercion indeed. How-
ever, this is not to say that the methodology does not 
embody emancipatory principles: the 12 questions it of-
fers can help facilitate consciousness raising within an in-
terest group, thereby allowing for the identification of 
forms of coercion that might otherwise have gone unno-
ticed or unmentioned. These forms of coercion can then 
be dealt with at a later date. (ibid.)
The third major change was to reinterpret the commitment to “hu-
man emancipation”. 
The term “human emancipation” will often be interpreted 
as the promotion of human well-being separate from con-
sideration of the “environment.” Certainly, the ethical cri-
tique of boundary judgments will, to an extent, address 
this, but I would also suggest a change of terminology. 
Instead of talking about a commitment to human eman-
cipation, why not call it a commitment to improvement? 
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This deemphasizes the “human,” and brings CST more in 
line with Churchman (1970), for whom “improvement” 
(especially sustainable improvement) is a concept of cen-
tral importance. (Midgley, 1996)
5.4.14. Critical systems practice, Coherent pluralism  
(Jackson, 1997, 1999, 2000)
In 1997 Jackson proposed a new, pluralist “critical systems practice.” 
Unlike TSI, critical systems practice (CSP) would not be meta-
theoretically ‘above’ the paradigms, but would “manage between the 
paradigms.” It would nevertheless call itself a meta-methodology 
which would remain committed to the practice of choosing one ‘domi-
nant’ methodology at a time to run an intervention, “with ‘dependent’ 
methodologies reflecting alternative paradigms in the background.” It 
would keep its critical commitments which he named “critical aware-
ness”, “social awareness”, and “ethical alertness”. It would “loosen 
the link between methodology and method.”
He did not give specifics as to its ontology or epistemology in 1997 
(there was no mention of Habermas) but, nevertheless, he made 
radical changes from past positions which would require them: 
First, critical systems practice would not “aspire to metaparadigmatic 
status.” 
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Pluralism… must accept and manage a degree of incom-
patibility between paradigms at the theoretical level.
This new position is one which is antithetical to the so-called “totaliz-
ing discourses” of Habermas’ theories; in Jackson’s case, Habermas’ 
knowledge-constitutive interests had, up to this point, been the cen-
terpiece of the validity claims for that stance. In 2000, he referred to 
it as a “theoretical prop”. This represents an epistemological break.
Next, what did not change is that it remained a metamethodology.
A metamethodology is required which protects paradigm 
diversity and handles the relationships between the di-
vergent paradigms. 
No methodology may stand without its supporting onto-epistemology. 
To what paradigm does this now belong?
The meta-methodology accepts that paradigms are based 
upon incompatible philosophical assumptions and that 
they cannot, therefore, be integrated without something 
being lost. 
This implies that the new epistemology understands and accepts 
paradigm incommensurability.
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It seeks to manage the paradigms not by aspiring to 
meta-paradigmatic status and allocating them to their re-
spective tasks, but by mediating between the paradigms. 
Paradigms are allowed to confront one another on the ba-
sis of “reflective conversation” (Morgan, 1983). Critique is 
therefore managed between the paradigms and not con-
trolled from above the paradigms. No paradigm is allowed 
to escape unquestioned because it is continually con-
fronted by the alternative rationales offered by other 
paradigms. (Jackson, 1997) 
This the first time that I am aware of that Jackson indicated an ac-
ceptance of paradigm incommensurability as inescapable, theoreti-
cally. This implies that complementarism is out; discordant pluralism 
(Gregory, 1992, 1996b) is in. In 2000, he explicitly acknowledges 
Gregory’s contributions as an improvement. The acceptance of para-
digm incommensurability is of course, in my opinion, the only logical 
conclusion if we accept two main tenets which can be derived from 
developments through 1997 in this line of thought: 
• Critical systemic practice must be theoretically informed plu-
ralism (it is anti-pragmatist), by which I mean that methods 
are critically-reflexively derived from (or adopted by) meth-
odologies (from different paradigms), each one operated 
from within its own proper paradigmatic perspective. In 
other words, methods but not methodologies can be used to 
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serve foreign paradigms. Paradigm diversity is to be pre-
served.
• Critical systemic practice is based on critical reflexivity, 
which obligates the systemist to ideological self-critique and 
the ongoing consideration of the developing situation 
through alternative paradigms. Paradigm diversity is to be 
appreciated. 
“There is a clamour for pluralism in methodology use in the applied 
disciplines,” Jackson wrote in 1999. “They do not have time to wait 
for theoreticians to iron out all the problems associated with plural-
ism.” Coherent pluralism, “the use of different methodologies in com-
bination”, is intended to explain “the form that pluralism needs to 
take if it is to be both theoretically defensible and provide the great-
est benefit to practitioners” (Jackson, 1999).
One weakness of TSI is that it grounds its pluralism, or 
`complementarism', uncritically on Habermas' early the-
ory of human interests. It tends to suggest that it can, on 
the basis of Habermas' work, stand `above the para-
digms', picking out appropriate methodologies according 
to the particular human interest to be served. As Tsoukas 
(1993) noted, however: `Different paradigms constitute 
different realities and, as such, they provide answers, ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly, to all three human interests'. 
If TSI claims to stand `above the paradigms' how can this 
claim be grounded? If it has to abandon this claim does it 
252
mean that TSI constitutes a new paradigm in its own 
right? If this is the case, what has happened to pluralism? 
Equally worrying, as Spaul (1997) recounts, is that 
Habermas himself no longer finds his early human inter-
est theory to be defensible. (Jackson, 1999)
A year later he criticized TSI as well for
 …its lack of attention to “agents” and the process of in-
tervention. Another serious flaw, noted by Mingers and 
Brocklesby, is that TSI emphasizes the use of “whole” 
methodologies. It is, in their terms, an example of “whole 
methodology management.” Because it seemed impossi-
ble, from the way TSI was described, to detach methods, 
models and techniques from the methodologies with 
which they were most closely associated, TSI lacked a 
degree of responsiveness in addressing complex, dynamic 
problem situations. (Jackson, 2000)
In 2000 he again renounced his belief in what others have called “to-
talizing” meta-theories (i.e. complementarism, Habermas’ 
knowledge-constitutive interests, Habermas’ “three worlds” and the-
ory of communicative competence).
Pluralists must learn to live with and manage a degree of 
paradigm incompatibility. It is no longer tenable to be-
lieve, in the manner of TSI, that paradigm incommensur-
ability can be resolved by reference to some meta-theory 
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such as Habermas’ account of different anthropologically 
based human interests. Or, for that matter, on the basis 
of his later work (dealing with communicative rationality) 
on the “three-worlds”—as Midgley [(1992, 1997)] and 
Mingers and Brocklesby [(1996)] have occasionally 
sought to suggest. (Jackson, 2000)
Jackson then wrote and published “generic” systems methodologies: 
“a generic positivist-functionalist systems methodology” (§4.5.2.5), 
“a generic interpretivist systems methodology” (§4.5.3.2), “a generic 
critical systems methodology” (§4.5.4.1), “a generic emancipatory 
systems methodology” (§4.5.4.2) and “a generic postmodernist sys-
tems methodology” (§4.5.5.3)—which I assert are epistemological 
statements, supporting, motivating, indeed directing methodologies. 
My own methodology suggests these can be used to guide and inform 
systemic practice (see §7.3). Here is an excerpt from the critical sys-
tems metamethodology.
A critical systems metamethodology is a structured way 
of thinking which understands and respects the unique-
ness of the functionalist, interpretive, emancipatory and 
postmodern theoretical rationales, and draws upon them 
to improve real-world problem situations.
A critical systems metamethodology makes use of a vari-
ety of creativity-enhancing methods and techniques to 
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examine the problem situation while ensuring, minimally, 
that it is viewed from the functionalist, interpretive, 
emancipatory and postmodern perspectives.
A critical systems metamethodology uses generic systems 
methodologies [see §4.5.2.5, §4.5.3.2, §4.5.4.2, 
§4.5.5.3] which can be clearly related back to the four 
theoretical rationales as the basis for its intervention 
strategy—often employing the tactic of naming one 
methodological approach as dominant and others as de-
pendent, with the possibility of this relationship changing 
during the course of the intervention. 
But there is as yet no theoretical framework for critical systems prac-
tice that would make coherent pluralism ‘coherent’. “In the light of 
the abandonment of Habermas’ solution to the issue of paradigm in-
commensurability,” he says, we must look elsewhere for “other pro-
posals as to how theoretical pluralism should be handled” (ibid.). And 
that is as far as it goes.
Critical systems practice was also designed to loosen “the link be-
tween methodology and method,” to overcome “a significant weak-
ness of TSI” and “provide the necessary flexibility in intervention 
without losing the ability to learn and without endangering paradigm 
diversity” (Jackson, 1997). By 1999 he called this idea essential:
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The flexibility that can be gained by using methods, mod-
els, tools and techniques (from different methodologies) 
in combination, now seems to me to be so essential that 
its gradual acceptance should be seen as a third land- 
mark [after SoSM and TSI] in the establishment of plural-
ism in management science. (Jackson, 1999)
In use, he added that interpretivism should be the first approach 
taken to begin a systemic investigation because 
Experience tends to suggest that interventions carried out 
using interpretive systems thinking, for example SSM, 
proceed more smoothly than those governed by function-
alist or emancipatory rationales. The involvement of par-
ticipants in the process of change gives them a feeling of 
ownership of solutions. The participative emphasis of in-
terpretive approaches tends therefore to ensure imple-
mentation in a wider range of cases than expert-driven 
approaches resting on functionalism. Further, since those 
likely to be involved in many systems interventions will 
be senior managers, emancipatory concerns are often dif-
ficult to introduce. (Jackson, 1999)
This conflicts with what I believe was the better advice Midgley gave 
in 1996 that “methods to support critical reflection on making bound-
ary judgements should be used to enhance critical thinking up-front.”
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5.4.15. Creative design of methods (Midgley, 1997)
What Flood and Romm (1995a) call their "oblique" use of methods 
(the use of methods for purposes other than those they were origi-
nally designed for), Midgley argues is better explained by his theory 
of creative design, introduced in 1990. In this update to the earlier 
work (see Creative methodology design, §5.4.6), he describes how 
the methodology was used effectively in an intervention in which an 
ad hoc methodology was synthesized to combine the use of Ulrich’s 
critical systems heuristics’ twelve questions with methods of Ackoff’s 
interactive planning. Midgley reports a result which is more than the 
additive effect one would have expected from the Flood-and-Romm-
style of oblique use of these methods; rather there was a synergistic 
result from his creative design. Midgley also reinterprets two inter-
ventions reported in Flood and Romm (1995b), to demonstrate his 
contention that the creative design of methods better explains their 
results than those given by the authors themselves.
5.4.16. Systemic intervention (Midgley, 2000)
Midgley says paradigm incommensurability is dealt with because we 
learn and integrate new ideas from different paradigms and we add 
them to our own understanding (what I call our virtual paradigm). 
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Importantly, he says that this occurs at the individual, group and re-
search community level. (Midgley, 2000). 
Midgley had, in 1992, recommended Habermas’ (1981) ‘three worlds’ 
theory of communicative competence as a more substantial and fit-
ting epistemology for CST than it had at the time—Habermas’ (1971, 
1974) theory of knowledge-constitutive interests. By 1996 Midgley 
rejects it and by 2000 he favoured Bhaskar’s critical realism. In 
“What is this thing called CST?” (Midgley, 1996), Chapter two of Flood 
and Romm (1996a), Midgley reports that Heidegger’s phenomenology 
had also been rejected in favour of Bhaskar’s critical realism (cf. Col-
lier, 1994). See my critique of critical realism, above (§5.4.14).
5.4.17. Critical multimethodology (Mingers, 2006)
See (Mingers, 2000, 2006). Support is from his previous paper, “The 
contribution of critical realism as an underpinning philosophy for OR/
MS and systems” (2000) which is based on Bhaskar’s critical realism 
(1994). See my critique of critical realism, above (§5.4.14).
5.4.18. Georgiou’s systems epistemology (2007)
Ion Georgiou (Georgiou, 2007) leads to a proposed systems episte-
mology as being stimulated by the need for effective systems meth-
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odologies. Methodologies are informed by epistemologies which are 
situated between ontology and ethics (the three branches of philoso-
phy). Systems theory must be constituted with systemic principles, 
systemically, he says, and calls for a return to its ‘lost’ roots from 
general systems theory: principally holism and boundary critique, and 
for establishing emergence as its fundamental isomorphy. Emergent 
properties cannot be explained as being traceable to any cause or 
causes–we must accept that–he says, but they do depend upon the 
dualistic structure from whence they occur and the interconnections 
of component parts. Apparently, he sees ‘system-ness’, ontologically.
Eventually, Georgiou leaves it at this: “We are holistic thinkers con-
demned to critically engage with, and within, only dogmatism and 
bounded rationality.” Apparently, his epistemology is defeatist.
How this provides methodological guidelines for the practice of sys-
tems thinking is not satisfactorily addressed.
5.4.19. Midgley’s theoretical pluralism (2011)
In this paper the systemist is a practitioner of action research, and 
the theoretical perspective shifts to that of the researcher. This shift 
can be seen to have been derived from the earlier 
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…turn to participative practice when the value of explor-
ing different stakeholder perspectives came to be highly 
valued (e.g. Churchman, 1970; Ackoff, 1981; Checkland, 
1981; Argyris and Schön, 1985; Reason, 1988; Fals-
Borda and Rahman, 1991; Whyte, 1991; Rahman, 1993). 
… Given that different stakeholders can use different 
theoretical framings. [my emphasis] (Midgley, 2011)
Now, though, it is the researcher’s perspective that becomes the cen-
tre of philosophical concern. By “drawing upon more than one theo-
retical ‘lens’ to inform practice,” Midgley says, the researcher gains 
“greater flexibility than adherence to a single theoretical perspective.” 
The case for theoretical pluralism is that
…when multiple theories are used as a resource for the 
comparison of different ways of seeing the phenomenon 
of concern, critique is enhanced (Morgan, 1986; Flood 
and Jackson, 1991b; Flood and Romm, 1996a). Implicit 
within different theories are contrasting themes, narra-
tives and metaphors, which (when made explicit) can cast 
new light on a problematic situation. (Midgley, 2011)
Midgley returns again to the roots of critical systems thinking for 
support for theoretical pluralism.
Rather than seeing systems as bounded physical entities, 
Churchman realized that a system is bounded conceptu-
ally by the researcher as s/he chooses what to include 
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and exclude in observation and analysis. All knowledge is 
dependent on boundary judgments, whether these are 
implicit or explicit (Churchman, 1970; Ulrich, 1983). If we 
recognize this, then [my emphasis:] both knowledge 
generating systems [e.g. the systemist] and the world it-
self come to be defined in exactly the same manner: 
[original emphasis:] through the process of making 
boundary judgments. (Midgley, 2011)
In terms of the focus of this research, what is new (see my emphasis 
in the citation above) is that he intimates that the systemist con-
structs himself or herself and the world this way, as well. Whereas my 
own theory considers this generative process to be ontologically 
based (see Chapter 6 and Bowers, 2008a, b; Bowers, 2009a, b), 
Midgley sees it in terms of knowledge generation, epistemologically. 
The process of boundary making occurs locally (with respect to the 
here and now), he says, “so even epistemological theories can be 
viewed as contextually useful or not, just like any other kinds of the-
ory”. I agree. But without deeper theoretical support this is epistemo-
logical relativism. 
To justify multiple theoretical perspectives Midgley frames the argu-
ment in terms of the issue of subject-object dualism. In describing 
my own theory in Chapter 6, dualism as it is commonly called, is 
given its own section, §6.4. As I see it, if I am the subject (the sys-
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temist in this case), it follows from the quote above that I define my-
self as well as what it is I see as existing in the external world (its ob-
jects). But where, in my theory, everything (with respect to me) is 
constructed by me, Midgley’s theoretical pluralism is slightly differ-
ent—”all knowledge is dependent on boundary judgments”. It specifi-
cally omits ontological concerns. What we have, he says, is 
…a dualism “between the process of making boundary 
judgments and the content of any analysis. Whether it’s 
an analysis concerning the world, or an analysis concern-
ing knowledge generating systems that give rise to un-
derstandings of the world. This actually means that it is 
possible to accept any number of theories about either 
knowledge generating systems or the wider world. 
(Midgley, 2011)
Yes, I agree we can accept any number of theories (and the research 
helps us to understand why), but there is nevertheless still paradigm 
incommensurability between different theoretical positions. 
He says it would be a mistake to give “ontological primacy to the 
process of making boundary judgments” because “we would indeed 
be saying that they somehow magically come into being prior to the 
agents who generate them. But my theory does grant ontological 
primacy to boundary making judgements and does not describe an 
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ontology with ‘ready made’ boundaries. In it, ‘becoming’ is a local 
emergent process that involves us, observing, from a particular epis-
temological perspective. As Midgley explains how we can (and 
should) observe and create knowledge from multiple perspectives, 
my theory explains the multiplicity of ontologies, of onto-
epistemologies, and of incommensurable theoretical perspectives. My 
theory is needed to explain why they exist and why they are incom-
mensurable. Epistemological relativism, as well, is not solved, but it is 
properly resolved. I believe my ontology could be used to augment 
Midgley’s theoretical pluralism should he choose to adapt it for such a 
purpose. It seems that each theory is deficient in areas which are the 
other’s strengths.
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Chapter
6. Process–Structure ontology, relativism, pluralism, 
the critical moment of becoming
6.1. Introduction
Observation is done by observers, and knowing is done 
by knowers. (Glanville, n.d.)
The diagram below is an overview showing how the components of 
the proposed theory, p–s multiparadigm perspectivity, align structur-
ally. P–S multiparadigm perspectivity is a new approach to systemic 
research, design and intervention. The ontology and the critical mo-
ment, new theoretical constructs developed for this research project, 
are described in this chapter. The following chapter (Chapter 7) cov-
ers the other components, the epistemology and methodology, and 
how they come together as an approach or a framework for multi-
paradigm multimethodology meant for the systemist who would en-
gage with the world through multiple perspectives. Lastly, how this 
new approach represents a resolution to the problem of paradigm in-
commensurability and avoids charges of relativism are the subjects of 
§6.10.
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Figure 14.  The structure of P–S multiparadigm perspectivity.
The research question is:
Is it possible to create a theoretical framework for sys-
tems thinking and practice which resolves the long stand-
ing problem of paradigm incommensurability and enables 
a new, coherently-informed multiparadigm multimethodo-
logical approach to systemic research, design and inter-
vention? [TB].
This chapter defines and argues for a new ontology which is designed 
to enable a resolution to the problem of paradigm incommensurability 
and provide support for multiparadigmatic multimethodological ap-
proaches to systems for the systemist. Again, as in Chapter three, 
266
ontology is the study of what can be said to exist and about categori-
sation of those things; epistemology is the study of knowledge and 
knowledge making, about how logic is applied and used, and about 
the validity of statements expressing knowledge claims, truth or fact. 
An ontology populates a worldview with the things which may exist, 
and an epistemology gives the worldview meaning and values. On-
tologies and epistemologies work together in philosophical partner-
ships. Indeed, according to Bhaskar (1989),
Ontological and epistemological questions are interrelated 
in the sense that the way we gain knowledge about the 
world, what comprises an adequate explanation, depends 
on the sort of beings that exist in the world. To put it an-
other way, the object we are studying determines the 
knowledge we can have of it. (Craib, 1992)
In the following sections I discuss:
• The parts and definition of the p–s ontology
• The philosophical issue of subject/object dualism
• How sense making happens in the brain
• The ‘critical moment of becoming’
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6.2. Reality space
6.2.1. External reality space
Systemists may not agree on what is ‘out there’ in the ‘real’ world, 
but we do believe that there is some external (vis the mind) world. It 
is our environment and within it we are born, live and are engaged, 
are effected by and affect. 
That the external world includes entities having an independent, so-
called ‘objective’ or ‘real’ existence as-they-are-in-themselves is also 
taken as fact and rarely seriously disputed. However, confusion has 
been generated by obtuse quotes such as ‘various types of construc-
tivism, interpretive or post-modern stances… to a greater or lesser 
extent deny the possibility of an observer-independent reality’ (Min-
gers, 2000). Such a statement should have been more carefully con-
sidered. A deeper read exposes a personal frustration with the con-
clusion that it is impossible for humans to ‘know’ external reality as-
it-is-in-itself (which does exist). Sometimes ‘reality’ is denied as in 
the postmodernist sense—because the term itself is a label too over-
loaded with human bias to be of any practical use. In extreme subjec-
tivism it is questioned ‘whether there exists an external world worthy 
of study’ [emphasis added] (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Critical real-
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ists most cleverly say that if an independent reality did not exist then 
we would have to invent one. 
6.2.2. Internal reality space
We also acknowledge a second domain of existence, an intra-personal 
(mentally internal) ‘world’ of consciousness; each one’s own internal, 
experiential or ‘subjective’ world. Ontologically speaking, one can 
only access one’s own. This world is ignored by the functionalist 
paradigm except to stress its own requirement that the researcher be 
‘objective’. See the discussion on objectivity vs. subjectivity for more.
6.2.3. Intersubjective and social reality space
The situation gets a bit more complicated when we consider human 
(social) and person-to-person (intersubjective) relationships. Here 
our theory must acknowledge onto-epistemological relativism be-
tween the conventional non-functionalist paradigms. The epistemolo-
gies, depending upon their own philosophical and methodological 
concerns, declare whether or not a social realm exists and, if so, 
whether it is in whole or in part of the external world (i.e., it is pre-
existing and into which one is subsumed) or exists in whole or in part 
within the internal world (i.e., it is contrived, of one’s own making). 
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The same relativism applies to the intersubjective—a realm of negoti-
ated understanding between ourselves. This framework defers to the 
conventional paradigms as to the ontological status of both. In this 
reality space we may encounter notions of influence which are the 
principal concern of theories of the critical-emancipatory paradigm.
6.2.4. Summary
The three kinds of reality space closely parallel the ‘three worlds’ 
Habermas claims are inferred in any validity claim: ‘natural’, ‘subjec-
tive’,  and ‘normative’ (Habermas, 1981). See the section on 
Midgley’s Systemic Intervention theory for more. 
6.3. Two ontic types
Because each paradigm is self contained, each requires its own defi-
nitions for concepts such as ‘reality’ and ‘world’, and in so doing each 
assigns more or less importance to either of the two sides of the on-
tological partition between an ‘inner world’ and an ‘external world’.  
Each approach declares, assumes or implies its own ontological 
memberships and the epistemological significance of the objective 
and subjective worlds (and, if they should exist, the social and inter-
subjective realms within either of them). In relative terms it could be 
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said that the ontological partition moves back and forth, or more or 
less inclusive, depending upon the epistemology. Of course there are 
many ways to consider being, existence and meaning, and the man-
agement of any divisions between them, but this interpretation does 
furnish some justification of the need to define and populate our on-
tology with two ontic types: 
• Type 1:  Of the physical, natural, tangible or ‘real’ world in 
the sense of its being as-it-is-in-itself. The transcendental 
characteristic of entities of an ‘external world’, independent 
of an observer. 
• Type 2:  Of and dependent upon one’s mind. The transcen-
dental characteristic of mental phenomena and disposition 
(conscious, pre- or post-conscious, subconscious, or uncon-
scious).
• Both definitions apply to the base disaggregates of the their 
constituents having only extrinsic (human-given) macro-
attributes such as: meaning, function or purpose, structure 
or form, type or name, association or membership. 
Ontology is not a science but a branch of metaphysical philosophy. To 
‘start up’ an ontological theory, claims are made about the a priori 
existence of elementals such as those defined above. Statements of 
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or inferences to fundamental ‘first causes’ are permitted, too. It is all 
then taken for granted by the epistemologies and methodologies.18 
6.4. Subject-Object dualism
Although “we can, if we take the trouble, use language to make infi-
nitely refined distinctions in context” (Collier, 1994), it is generally 
too tedious and difficult to do. Everyday language is replete with reifi-
cations, or what Bhaskar (1986) describes as an epistemic fallacy fol-
lowed by an ontic fallacy. That is, a projection of the external world 
onto one’s subjective, phenomenal map followed by a projection of 
the subjective onto the external world. This behaviour is possibly 
(and I propose it is) owing to the physio-electro-chemical workings of 
the brain and its structures; consequently embodied in the mind and 
reflecting in the structural limitations of discourse. Simply put, per-
haps it is physically impossible for the brain–mind combination to ac-
commodate subjects without meaning and association so that reifica-
tion and projection are necessary and natural functions of human 
thought and its internal dialectic processes. This brain–mind relation-
ship is of central importance to the ontology. It has determined the 
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18  Not always. Epistemology affords the means by which we question our 
ideas of ontology.
requirement of our two ontic types and sets their definitional charac-
teristics (which will, by the way, improve as the theory matures). 
Rejecting classical realist assumptions that our faculties of observa-
tion afford us direct and correct knowledge of the world, it is more 
likely as Kant said in the 18th Century that the human experience of 
things consists of how they appear to us (Kant, 1956). (Think of how 
five witnesses are likely to give five different accounts of the same 
crime.) Midgley mentions the “impossibility of comprehensive under-
standing” and says that “the complexities of the world slip the grasp 
of the human observer” (2003, p.78). Why must this be so?
Systems researchers Maturana and Varela (1987) describe a brain-
based evolutionary model of human sense and experience. Basically, 
as their theory which is well accepted in the field of systems thinking 
goes, the nervous system evolved over many successive generations 
as a perceiving faculty in the Darwinian sense—it improved surviv-
ability and reproduction. As the brain developed the mind emerged as 
a complex sense-making system. Also with Darwinian roots are emo-
tions which accompany the senses and make up the embodied ‘sen-
sations’. Although we are not typically conscious of it, our perceptual 
data is severely limited because, out of all that exists that could be 
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sensed, the body has only particular types of sensors or ‘senses’, 
mainly: sight, sound, taste, smell and touch. 
Our ability to affect the world is also limited by other constraints of 
the body. For example, a human body has a certain range of size and 
mass, can move at a certain speed, can reach or run only so far, is 
only so strong and has a limited lifespan. The brain, our senses and 
body are co-evolved, so we are not specialised to ‘know’ of things 
outside those constraints. Consequently these constraints largely de-
termine how we come to ‘know’ our world; and what we see, believe 
and thus act in the world. 
Our experience comes to us mediated by our sensory and 
mental apparatus. What we can experience depends on 
the nature of our faculties, what our faculties can handle, 
and what they do to what they handle. (Maturana, 
1988a)
This is a fundamental concept for understanding the new framework 
so it is important to explore it further. 
It is the brain’s job, moment to moment, to make sense of sensations 
and with the mind infer a great deal more from our past experiences 
and learned constructs. We seem to do this by constructing mental 
‘scenes’ of an ongoing ‘drama’ that correlates—however weakly or 
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strongly—to an external world which can be only be partially sensed; 
all the while maintaining a sense of self and continuity, filling gaps 
with assumptions and compensating as learning occurs (Bhaskar, 
1989; Collier, 1994)—what Husserl refers to as the ‘lifeworld’. Matur-
ana, similarly claims that 
Cognition is not a matter of transforming external data of 
a transcendental [objective] reality—a universe—captured 
through our senses into mirror images in the brain. In-
stead, what we know of as “reality” is an active projection 
of our own cognitive structure. (Brocklesby, 1997)
It is from this loose association, or ‘coupling’ with an external world 
that our inescapable conflation of what is ‘real’ with what is mental-
with-associations comes. This transitory ‘mess’ is what we call ‘real-
ity’. Differing assertions as to what is, what is external and what is 
internal, or what is objective and what is subjective distinguish the 
paradigmatic onto-epistemologies and sets them apart from one an-
other. 
When Maturana and Varela set out to answer the question, “What dis-
tinguishes entities or systems that we would call living from other 
systems, apparently equally complex, which we would not”, they 
found the answer involves the fact that living systems are self pro-
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ducing. They studied this and coined the term autopoiesis (self pro-
ducing). With respect to the evolution of brain and the autopoietic 
emergence of human consciousness, they said,
The linguistic domain, the observer, and self-
consciousness are each possible because they result as 
different domains of interactions of the nervous system 
with its own states in circumstances in which these states 
represent different modalities of interactions of the or-
ganism. (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p.29)
According to Husserl (1965), ‘awareness’ is a more physical, ontologi-
cal process; ‘consciousness’ or the ‘Conscious continuity of situational 
self-awareness’ and the longterm ‘lifeworld’ is an epistemological 
process. 
The main concern is objective vs. brain-based realities and how they 
are involved with the split between ontology and epistemology. 
This endeavour is not solipsistic. Solipsism, at the extreme end of 
subjectivism, assumes reality lies in the consciousness of an individ-
ual (Cunliffe, n.d.). Solipsism denies that we can establish the exis-
tence of an objective world at all since our own mental world is the 
only thing of which we have immediate knowledge. But in the pro-
posed new ontology we do not require ‘immediate knowledge’ of an 
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objective world; we say that—whatever it is—it exists. As stated ear-
lier, the objective existence of so-called ‘real’ things must be granted 
because their existence can be proved by their affects. 
The dissertation derives its ideas from the systems research and OR/
MS literature, and from various schools of philosophical thought, e.g. 
phenomenology (Hegel and Baillie, 1931; Merleau-Ponty, 1962), tran-
scendental idealism (Ingarden, 1975; Allison, 1983), Piaget’s con-
structivism (Wadsworth, 1996), radical constructivism (Glasersfeld, 
1995, 1999; Cunliffe, 2008a), critical realism (Bhaskar, 1986, 1989; 
Collier, 1994; Mingers, 2000, 2006), post-structuralism (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, 1982; Tilley, 1990), postmodernism (White and Taket, 
1994, 1996), process ontological theory (Wood, 2005) and personal 
construct theory (Kelly, 1970).
6.5. Process–Structure ontology
The new ontology designed to support these concepts consists of just 
one elemental member called ‘process–structure’, a dualism of proc-
ess and structure that is isomorphic across ontic manifesta-
tions—physical and abstract. In the next chapter the theory’s episte-
mology explains why such an ontology is both necessary and suffi-
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cient and how, in practical terms, it serves the systemists’ endeav-
ours. 
Here the defining features and forms of process–structures are listed:
• Process–structures, or p–s’s (pronounced pee esses) are dy-
namic, contain other p–s’s recursively, combine, separate 
and interact amongst themselves in terms that we think of 
systemically as: networks, hierarchies, dependencies, etc.; 
and when they do they generate what we think of as emer-
gent properties which constitute the objects of reality. P–S’s 
ontologically populate our various ‘worlds’ . Troncale (2006) 
has shown there are dozens of fundamental configurations 
(of what I call complex p–s’s and he calls isomorphies) used 
throughout nature, isomorphically. Consequently, says Tron-
cale, a recognised configuration of structure (e.g. a loop as 
in a feedback loop) can be indicative of its process (e.g. 
feedback), and vice versa. 
• Process–Structure, as the name suggests, is a duality (as in 
sameness and unity) in and of itself. ‘Process’ and ‘structure’ 
are affects or aspects of the same inseparable unity. In rela-
tive terms, ‘structure’ is slow ‘process’ and ‘process’ is fast 
‘structure’ (Troncale, 2004–2007). Note that in our everyday 
discourse we often ignore (or fail to see) this duality and 
speak naively of just one aspect or the other. Also note that 
process, as I use the word, has nothing to do with function 
or purpose. Both words here have the simplest possible 
meaning.
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• P–S’s are coupled transforms—as structure changes, process 
changes and vice versa (Troncale, 2006). In a system, the 
disposition of a p–s is codetermined by other p–s’s.
• There are two types of p–s’s: physical p–s’s are manifesta-
tions of the physical ontic type, and abstract p–s’s are phe-
nomena of the abstract ontic type (defined above). We say 
that (with respect to the mind) the former exists only exter-
nally; the latter, only internally.
• Physical type p–s’s exist in space–time, independent of an 
observer. We say that they are the ultimate constituents of 
matter, energy, gravity, etc.; and as such, are thought to 
have an ultimate origin in the ‘big bang’ and are explained 
by the laws of physics.19 Generally, configurations in the 
scales encountered by the systemist are well understood in 
terms of mathematics and engineering. 
• Abstract type p–s’s are the ultimate non-physical constitu-
ents of active mental constructs. They are emergent, gener-
ated from physio-electro-chemical (physical) p–s’s of the 
brain. They are known to compel structural changes to the 
brain, as well—a necessary reciprocity between mind and 
brain that is not well understood. This may be considered a 
cycle in ‘physical’ terms coupled (somehow) with a more-or-
less continuous process in experiential or abstract terms.
• To the mind, abstract p–s’s are emergent experiences in the 
present ‘moment’—becoming, within the context of the sub-
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19  Einstein showed that matter and energy are transforms—matter is ‘slow’ 
energy and energy is ‘fast’ matter. ‘Forces,’ including gravity are extra-
dimensional affects of matter–energy. Thermodynamics (and entropy) ap-
ply.
jective moment passing. The future cannot be experienced 
but can be anticipated; the past merely recalled (Wood, 
2005).
• The two types do not combine, mix or interact in any direct 
or deterministic fashion, but dubious phenomenological as-
sociations between them made by the workings of the brain 
just doing its job are unavoidable (Maturana, 1988b). Reifi-
cation, as previously mentioned, confuses the abstract type 
with the physical type (Wood, 2005); indeed, the brain–mind 
may be built for this and handles it quite easily. Bhaskar’s 
two epistemic fallacies (above) involve both types of p–s’s as 
well. Other ‘loose’ associations between ‘physical’ and ‘ab-
stract’ types include wilful motion, communication, and the 
learning process accompanying structural changes in the 
brain.20
Conceptually, ‘process–structure’ is meant to be isomorphic over the 
two ontic types. A ‘physical’-to-‘abstract’-to-‘physical’ isomorphism is 
exemplified in the brain-to-mind-to-brain coupling (described above) 
where ‘physical’ p–s’s involving neurons somehow evoke the emer-
gence of ‘abstract’ p–s’s (thoughts), and those ‘abstract’ p–s’s some-
how induce physical changes in the brain. For the practitioner, the 
concept of isomorphism is also useful as a tool to facilitate an appre-
ciation of the mental ‘shifts’ and changes of perspective that have to 
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20  The term ‘loose’ is used to indicate that these mechanisms are not di-
rect, perfect or deterministic.
happen when an intentional change of paradigm is made (as is called 
for in the new methodology explained in the next chapter) or if we 
are to reflexively follow, question, project, imagine or reflect upon the 
‘dubious’ associations, unavoidable reifications and projections we 
ourselves continually make—a primary concern for the postmodern 
paradigm.
6.6. The p–s ontology
A complete theoretical framework is composed of ontology, episte-
mology and methodology. Ontology in the sense I mean here is a 
branch of metaphysics which operates at the fundamental base or 
root level, conforming to the philosophy and supporting the episte-
mology. An ontology is a collection of ontological statements which 
concern the essence of being. An ontological theory addresses the 
basic issues of existence and of reality itself, asking questions such 
as, ‘What entities exist or can be said to exist?’ and ‘How are such 
entities naturally categorised or grouped?’ 
The ontology I wish to establish here is intended for inclusion in a 
framework designed for the needs of the human systemist (systems 
designers, theorists, practitioners, interventionists and researchers. 
That framework operates in the subjective realm of the systemist. It 
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is not considered ‘objective’ because it lives in the mind of the sys-
temist. It is not meant to be a theory of everything or for everyone. 
It does not subsume, make obsolete or hierarchically dominate any 
other theoretical framework. It respectfully leaves to the other para-
digms that which is theirs and it co-exists. Rather than being a theory 
of everything, it is intentionally minimalist; as minimalist as possible 
so as not to violate the declarations above. 
6.7. Physical process–structures
Imagine a world without living, conscious beings. No consciousness 
and no thought; no abstractions. Things are just what they are—just 
things-as-they-are-in-themselves. Nothing has been observed. There 
is no meaning because meaning does not exist. (This concept is al-
most unthinkable!) Nothing means anything, it just is what it is as-it-
is-in-itself. There are no feelings and no people and there is no soci-
ety. There is no language and there is no discourse. From our world, 
we have called that sort of world ‘objective’. Postmodernists would 
say that even this word, ‘objective’, is an intrusion into that world and 
gives it meaning, whatever it is, that is not there. To repeat, as it is in 
itself, that world does not and cannot even have this or any other la-
bel. This is a deep but worthy thought—a postmodern thought—which 
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causes us to notice our human condition; a condition from which we 
cannot escape. As I am a human I must impose myself upon the 
world, lest for me there is no world. But, as a postmodernist as well, 
I remain aware (indeed vigilant) that I am doing so.
In proposing a new ontology I state that such an objective world does 
have a manifest existence which is not dependent on us. It is physical 
(existing in space and time, of matter and energy). It is our objective 
world and humans just happen to live ‘upon’ it. This is also the stan-
dard, non-controversial and well-understood (in their terms) world of 
the modernist physicist and so I need not go into it further except 
where I see implications for the systemist, which follow. 
As a positivist systemist21 I say that we observe physical processes 
and physical structures; processes and structures which co-exist and 
co-operate very intimately; so intimately, in fact, that differentiating 
between process and structure has proven to be relativistic, arbitrary, 
even artificial. Mingers (2006, p.67) observes that “the systemic dif-
ferentiation of structure and process is always relative to time and 
the level of resolution.” l would say instead that it is always relative to 
the observer’s time and scope perspectives. Slow down a process 
enough or look closely enough and it will show you its structure. 
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21  I wear many hats.
Speed up a structure or look at it from further away and it will show 
you its process. I claim that the intimacy between process and struc-
ture is complete and that they are actually the same—process and 
structure are descriptive of different aspects of the same duality as-
it-is-in-itself. We find it convenient, though, to label this (which is 
relatively stable) a structure, and that (which is not so stable) a proc-
ess; but I say that in this world there is only one basic kind of thing 
‘out there’ (cf. e.g. Foucault).
Einstein (1905a, b) discovered and proved that time and space are 
transforms of one another; that is, ‘time’ and ‘space’ are also descrip-
tive of different aspects of an underlying duality, space–time. Later, 
he also discovered that matter and energy are also transforms of one 
another (ibid.); that is, ‘matter’ and ‘energy’ are different descrip-
tions of an underlying duality. What we ‘see’ as either time or space 
or as matter or energy, happens when we notice different qualities 
(or aspects or indicators). Questioning our terminology helps us im-
prove our underlying concepts. Further still, Einstein proved that 
there is no matter-energy where there is not also space-time, and 
vice versa—the fabric of the universe. I say that (from the perspec-
tive of the systemist, at least) space-time and matter-energy are 
bound together as one kind of ‘stuff’ which I call process–structure, 
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or (p–s), of the physical variety. The plural form and aggregates are 
called physical process–structures, or physical p–s’s (pronounced 
“pee esses”). You could call it a space-time/matter-energy double du-
ality type of thing, but if you see that my terminology is not incom-
patible with physics then it is not necessarily illegitimate to change 
the terminology so that we appreciate it in terms of other attributes. 
New terminology also has the advantage that it breaks free from pre-
vious associations. 
The p-s ontology simply declares that this is the way things are; that 
this is all that exists (well, almost, as we will see next). It is a mini-
malist ontology. 
6.8. Abstract process–structures
Remember that we are imposing the labels ‘objective’ or ‘physical’ on 
the world as-it-is-in itself and that we have admitted to having a lim-
ited, fluid, subjective understanding of the world via those labels. It is 
the human way. That is, here there is no direct link between our 
‘knowing’ and the world as-it-is-in-itself, as claimed by the philosophy 
of direct realism. To illustrate, how many types of snow are there? I 
hear that "the Sami recognise about 300 different qualities of snow 
and winter pasture—each defined by a separate word in their lan-
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guage" (2005). The point is that my understanding of ‘snow’ is very 
different from that of the Sami people. Which is correct? Neither? 
Both? What is this snow as-it-is-unto-itself? I do not know. My under-
standing is subjective. I can make objective measurements and ob-
servations, but measurements and observations are not ‘understand-
ings’. They contribute to my subjective understanding. Importantly, 
when I notice that my understanding does not correspond to what I 
observe, I have the opportunity and the need to learn (Spencer, 
2000). As Maturana (1988a) says, the world we experience (i.e. our 
reality) is a subject-dependent creation and a result of our lived ex-
periences. Cognition is a human activity which produces what I call in 
my ontology abstract process–structures, or abstract p–s’s.
What about the correlation between abstract and physical p–s’s? 
Think of snow-as-it-is-in-itself (which is in these terms some physical 
p–s) versus ‘snow’ (which is some abstract p–s). Do these physical 
and abstract process–structures exist independently of one another, 
is one dependent on the other, or do they co-exist and co-operate? 
Physical process–structures are certainly fine as-they-are-in-
themselves in a world without thought. But this is not a world without 
thought. There are no systemists who do not think. So, for the sys-
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temist, this is a world in which there are both physical and abstract 
process–structures. So they do co-exist. Do they co-operate? 
We have now got to the philosophical quagmire of ‘subject–object du-
alism’, or as it is known to philosophers—‘dualism’. It has been de-
bated for centuries. The most appropriate and contemporary descrip-
tion I have found of this difficult issue in terms closely related to 
those we are using is by Winograd and Flores:
There is a long history within philosophy of viewing men-
tal and physical descriptions as applying in incommensu-
rate domains. In approaches based on this 'dualism' it is 
taken for granted that mental predications (such as "X 
knows that Y…" or "X perceives a Y") are not expressible 
in terms of physical descriptions of a nervous system. 
Having made this assumption, it becomes a confusion of 
levels to ask whether a particular physical activity of the 
nervous system is a 'perception' or whether a certain 
state is one in which the organism 'knows' some 'fact'. 
Among the scientists who work in areas such as neuro-
physiology [e.g. Maturana] and artificial intelligence, 
however, it is a strongly held working hypothesis that 
there is a systematic and recurrent relationship between 
the two domains [emphasis added]. It is assumed that "X 
sees a red spot" can be correlated with a particular pat-
tern of activity in the retina and visual cortex, or that 
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“John believes that Brutus killed Caesar” can be associ-
ated with a particular pattern of data in John's brain, 
viewed as a computer with appropriate software and 
storage devices. Few researchers adopt the naive ap-
proach [my emphasis] of looking for immediate correla-
tions between the mental and the physical except in pe-
ripheral functions like the image manipulation done by 
the retina. Usually the argument is based on an analogy 
to computer programs, in which the organization of the 
software provides a level of 'functional description' that is 
abstracted away from the specifics of the physical imple-
mentation. An entity counts as being explained when its 
behavior can be described in terms of a compositional 
analysis that postulates parts that are functionally identi-
fied—that play functionally defined roles in its operation. 
(Winograd and Flores, 1986)
So there is a relationship between neurons and sensation, but the link 
with abstraction still has not been made. in the physical and com-
puter sciences. Maturana and Varela say that brain evolution and ab-
straction are intimately related. Thought is an emergent property, say 
the systemists, and in this ontology that is assumed. Importantly, 
thought processes are rightly considered epistemological, but the 
emergence of thought is something that happens a priori with respect 
to the systemist. With respect to the systemist, abstract p–s’s are 
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what this world is made of. They enable us to discover that an ‘objec-
tive’ world exists. 
Maturana’s work shows that (in my terms) abstract process–struc-
tures are dependent upon physical (i.e. neural) process–structures for 
their emergent existence. It is in this way that the two types, physical 
and abstract, are inseparably bound together and inter-dependent. 
Maturana and Varela’s work is important, too, because it clarifies our 
understanding that humans have no direct access to an ‘objective’ 
world; beliefs notwithstanding.
6.9. Complex process–structures, society, et cetera
What about Habermas’ third world, society? Regarding this theory, is 
society and by extension, culture real unto itself? Many say yes, 
many say no. The epistemology of this theory says that, if it does, it 
is a complex process–structure of both ontic types, physical and ab-
stract. If society does exist, one way to see that it has a physical 
component is to observe its artefacts: structures such as those called 
churches, schools, contracts, laws, courts, etc.; processes such as all 
forms of participation: marriage, military service, graduation, baby 
showers and funerals. And society, if it does exist, is of course ab-
stract because there would be no society without the collection of citi-
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zens from whom it is an emergent property. It is not in the domain of 
the proposed theory to explain society and/or whether it exists. Noth-
ing needs to change in the ontology to support (or preclude) the exis-
tence of society.
The same can be said of power and control as it is understood in the 
critical-emancipatory paradigm; and of language, aesthetics and the 
various other concerns of postmodernism. And so, too for “other di-
chotomies such as structure versus agency, determinism versus vol-
untarism, causation versus meaning [Astley and van der Ven 
(1983)]” (Gioia and Pitre, 1990).
In general, this can be said for the other paradigms: The p–s ontol-
ogy does not declare or predict the existence of anything… but any-
thing that exists (with respect to the systemist) according to this the-
ory can be understood as existing, ultimately, of abstract and/or 
physical p–s’s, or more accurately, emergent from them. It declares 
that there are complex forms of both types and that emergence does 
occur, but the p–s ontology is not concerned with their particular 
forms nor whether any particular ‘thing’ is composed of one or the 
other or both types. 
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What about the transcendental or spiritual realms? We defer to the 
believer. History? We defer to the historian. All these are the concerns 
of other theories. This theory does not preclude them.
In summary, what does the p–s ontology have to say about [insert 
your favourite concern here]? On that, the p–s ontology is indetermi-
nate and intentionally under-defined. With respect to the p–s ontol-
ogy and the systemist those concepts refer to what would be in the 
realm of the emergent properties of p–s’s and, as such, could never 
be traced back to the state of their origination. From this p-s onto-
logical perspective the question is not answerable. The epistemology 
and methodology of this new framework is similarly minimalist.
6.10. Relativism, ontological relativism, ontological plural-
ism
6.10.1. Relativism
Relativism is a relationship of some sort between something and 
something else, regarding or depending on or with respect to… what? 
From Mosteller (2008), 
“Definitions of the term relativism can be too narrow, as 
in ‘Relativism is the denial that there are certain kinds of 
universal truths’ (from Pojman, 1995, p.690); or too 
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broad, as in ‘Any doctrine could be called relativism which 
holds that something exists, or has certain properties or 
features, or is true or in some sense obtains, not simply 
but only in relation to something else’ (from Lacey, 1986, 
p.206).” 
Pojman is criticised on the grounds that his definition restricts relativ-
ism to one domain—universal truths—which in fact is not part of the 
discussion here. Lacey, he says, admits too much to be useful. In-
deed, “Everything is relative” and “anything goes” are the often-
heard criticisms of general or generic relativism, or relativism by de-
fault—which is not part of the discussion here, either. Mosteller’s own 
definition is that:
Relativism asserts that a particular instance, Y, exists 
only in combination with or as a by-product of a particular 
framework or viewpoint, X; and that no framework or 
standpoint is uniquely privileged over all others. That is, a 
non-universal trait Y (e.g., a particular practice, behav-
iour, custom, convention, concept, belief, perception, eth-
ics, truth, or conceptual framework) is a dependent vari-
able influenced by the independent variable X (e.g., a 
particular language, culture, historical epoch, a priori 
cognitive architecture, scientific framework, gender, eth-
nicity, status, individuality) (Mosteller, 2008)
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Most commonly, the word relativism is associated with epistemologi-
cal or moral concerns. It is sometimes (though not always) inter-
preted as saying that all points of view are equally valid, in contrast 
to an absolutism which argues there is but one true and correct view,  
According to the results of a US national survey published by Barna 
Research (Barna Group, 2002): 64% of adults agree with the state-
ment that “the truth is always relative to the person and their situa-
tion,” 83% of teenagers agreed that moral truth depends on the cir-
cumstances, whilst only 6% said that moral truth is absolute (from 
Mosteller, 2008). This data lends support to the idea that, regardless 
of the efficacy of their opinions, epistemological or ethical relativism 
as a concept is generally accepted by the public. Mosteller’s working 
definition of philosophical relativism is more carefully thought out:
The nature and existence of items of knowledge, quali-
ties, values or logical entities non-trivially obtain their na-
tures and/or existence from certain aspects of human ac-
tivity, including, but not limited to, beliefs, cultures, lan-
guages, etc. (ibid.)
Though this definition can be applied to philosophical inquiries in on-
tology, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, etc., it is not exactly fit for 
purpose here. 
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6.10.2. Ontological relativism
In this dissertation the new philosophy is based around a new ontol-
ogy defined in such a way that, from it and with respect to the sys-
temist, the paradigmatic ontologies can be seen to be emergent 
properties. This opens up the philosophy to the charge of ontological 
relativism, but I argue that charges of other forms of relativism are 
not relevant. Epistemological and moral relativism are avoided be-
cause the systemist will be working in only one paradigm at a time 
(see epistemology and the new framework in the next chapter).
Ontological inquiry has nothing to do with truth or morality which are 
epistemological concerns; it is more basic. It is concerned with what 
it means to be, with the being-ness of this or that. Although conven-
tionally, the adjective ontic refers to “the real as opposed to the phe-
nomenal”, Heidegger (1962) flips the very idea of the term “real” and 
calls ontology “the phenomenology of being”, referring to the view 
that whatever comes into being comes “to be” in the observer.
Ontological relativism has to do with things or entities with regard to 
their being-ness in one ontology as opposed to another. Mosteller 
writes, 
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Ontological (or metaphysical) relativism is a version of 
relativism where the very nature of reality or specific 
things that are real are thought to derive their existence 
or their natures from some activity of the human mind or 
beliefs or practices from within a particular culture 
(Mosteller, 2008). 
I would clarify this by adding that different cultures have their own 
culturally-derived ontologies, so the ontological relativism then is be-
tween them—in this case, cultures. In other words, what is depends 
on who you are, culturally. In another way, he continues, what is de-
pends on how you look at it:
One way of illustrating this type of relativism about what 
is real can be shown by an examination of various draw-
ings or sketches which are, ambiguous (or reversible or 
bistable). One example is of a picture, the famous 'duck-
rabbit'. This first sketch of the duck-rabbit was originally 
published by Hoseph Jastrow and is similar to a simplified 
version presented by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philo-
sophical Investigations (1953). An additional type of Ge-
stalt drawing was referred to by Edwin G. Boring (1930), 
an American psychologist early in the 20th century. It is 
ambiguous between a young and and old woman (ibid.). 
The idea that is often inferred from such ambiguous 
drawings is that human cognition functions as a construc-
tive tool to create a visual reality of our own making. The 
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inference then is something like this: if it is possible to do 
such constructing in simple cases, perhaps much of what 
we think is objective reality is nothing more than the 
mind's construction. 
Thus, says Baghramian (2004), “what is real, what exists (either in 
part or whole), is [also] relative to human interests.” 
Meanwhile, the P–S ontology fits with the postmodernist foundation 
upon non-determinism, acknowledging that a level of ‘unknowable’ 
supports the level of unknowns which lies beneath the known.
6.10.3. P-S ontological pluralism
Ontological pluralism simply acknowledges the variety of ontologies 
and their validity in themselves, with respect to the systemist. The p–
s ontology proposed in this thesis claims to support the emergence of 
the various ontologies of the critical systems paradigms with respect 
to the systemist deploying them. The term “with respect to the sys-
temist” is essential to provide a context for this carefully circum-
scribed form of ontological relativism which I now call p–s ontological 
pluralism:
• Of and unto itself, the p–s ontology is intended to be consistent 
and whole. As the conventional paradigmatic ontologies of critical 
systems thinking are considered to be emergent from the p–s on-
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tology, there can be no relativism between the p–s ontology and 
that which is emergent. 
• Neither is there a relativism between the conventional ontologies 
with the p–s ontology in place because we are no longer moving 
between them. We do not translate one reality into another. We 
therefore do not face any sort of reconciliation. Instead, to shift 
from the current paradigm to another we simply refer back to the 
p–s ontology (remember it is formless and free from meaning with 
respect to the systemist) and from there ‘deploy’ the other para-
digm. The ontologies of the conventional paradigms have a com-
mon source, but they emerge in the moment of becoming in their 
own internally-consistent paradigmatic forms. 
It may help to remember that there are a variety of ‘infinities’. We 
know from mathematics that there are disjoint infinite sets (sets 
which have an infinite number of elements, none of which are in the 
others). There is not just one ‘infinite’ set; in fact the set of infinite 
sets is itself an infinite set. For example: the set of even integers (0, 
±2, ±4, ±6, …), the set of odd integers (±1, ±3, ± 5, …), the set of 
rational numbers (those equal to one whole number divided by an-
other whole non-zero number) and the set of irrational numbers 
(non-rational numbers, e.g. pi and the square root of 2). Infinities 
come in different sizes, as well. For example, the set of rational num-
bers is a larger infinite set than the set of whole numbers because it 
contains the former set and more. The set of all numbers is larger, 
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still. But this is not how we consider ontologies—we typically think of 
the elements of one ontological set as simply all there is. Why? It is 
the context that matters. The p–s ontology is a different, null context.
6.11. The critical moment of becoming
The linguistic domain, the observer, and self-
consciousness are each possible because they result as 
different domains of interactions of the nervous system 
with its own states in circumstances in which these states 
represent different modalities of interactions of the or-
ganism. (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p.29)
Maturana’s ontology of observing is centred in the observer and has 
several qualities: Cognition is a biological phenomenon and reality is 
a consequence of the praxis of living in the world. Self-consciousness 
is a consequence of the distinction of self from other. Making distinc-
tions is languaging. Language allows us to form the stuff of the world. 
Without language we are incapable of distinguishing or making sense 
of phenomena. Objects do not preexist language. 
Our living takes place in structural coupling with the world 
that we bring forth, and the world that we bring forth is 
our doing as observers in language as we operate in 
structural coupling in it in the praxis of living. (Maturana, 
1988a)
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And we must remember that the objective world as-it-is-in-itself is 
becoming, too.
“Nothing is, everything is becoming” —Heraclitus. (Gare, 
1996)
In terms of p–s ontology, I say that objective reality has no distinc-
tions, it simply is. It takes a human to assign distinctions and to 
make meaning. And that is the reason why I cleave the universe 
here, between the physical and the mental. In Maturana’s terminol-
ogy there is the objective (without quotes) and the “objective” (in 
quotes). He describes the relationship between the thing and its dis-
tinction as structural coupling, a process which takes place physically 
in the brain. Maturana points to the complete inability of the human 
mind to distinguish between perception, illusion and hallucination. He 
adds that later on there are self-correcting mechanisms. Let me illus-
trate with an example of my own.
I once fell from a great height. I had stepped off the 
edge, surprised that I had not noticed the gap. The expe-
rience of free fall was terrifying. I will never forget it. I 
gasped and sat up in bed, confused. The sensation of fal-
ling had gone, yet I had not hit bottom. I scanned my 
surroundings with all my senses, reevaluating the danger. 
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With some effort I came to believe that I was actually in 
bed, safe, and that I had not fallen. [TB]
Mingers has said that “all descriptions and explanations are made by 
observers who distinguish an entity or phenomenon from the general 
background” (1997b). Maturana and Bunnell (Bunnell, 2004b) remind 
us that ‘the general background’ is also our own creation; the result 
of ‘cleaving’ the universe that determines what in my terms is a 
paradigm. 
George Kelly (1970), the creator of Personal Construct Theory, explic-
itly stated that
Each individual's psychological task is to put in order the 
facts of his or her own experience. Then each of us, like 
the scientist, is to test the accuracy of that constructed 
knowledge by performing those actions the constructs 
suggest. If the results of our actions are in line with what 
the knowledge predicted then we have done a good job of 
finding the order in our personal experience. If not, then 
we must be willing to change something: our interpreta-
tions or our predictions or both. (Kelly, 1970)
Participant 2 said in her interview with me, “Basically what he is say-
ing is that everybody is a personal scientist who tries to make sense 
of their world with whatever tools they have at hand.”
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Mingers (2006, p.56) on Maturana said: 
Organisms have arisen that can make complex and recur-
sive descriptions of their descriptions and thus they be-
come observers. Moreover, within this linguistic domain a 
description of the self is possible, and thus descriptions of 
the self describing the self and so on. So is born the self-
observer and self-consciousness. …
At each stage emerges a domain of new and different in-
teractions—interactions with relations, with internal nerv-
ous activity, with descriptions, with descriptions of de-
scriptions, and finally with self-descriptions. All are made 
possible by the underlying biology, but none are reducible 
to it. 
That is, the self-observer and self-consciousness are emergent prop-
erties and phenomena. 
Morgan and Smircich (1980), in The Case for Qualitative Research 
produced what academia considers to be version two of Burrell and 
Morgan’s (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis. 
As it applies to systems theory, the onto-epistemological assumptions 
held by the four conventional paradigms of critical systemic theory  
(positivist/structural-functionalist, interpretivist, critical-emancipatory 
and postmodern-poststructural) position each of them somewhere on 
the continuum between objectivism and subjectivism. As was already 
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mentioned, this is by no means the only metric with which to com-
pare theoretical approaches, but it is certainly one of the one most 
widely accepted (Deetz, 1996). 
Objectivism, at one end of the scale, incorporates ontological realism 
and epistemological positivism which see reality as external. The phi-
losophy gets its name from its axiology, which separates the re-
searcher from the researched so that ‘objective’ results are obtained 
‘independently’. Positivism—the epistemological meaning-making in-
vestigation of that reality—is, however, a mental enquiry. Therefore, 
in terms of process–structure, objectivism may focus on the ‘physi-
cal’, but in practice requires both ‘physical’ (type 1) and ‘abstract’ 
(type 2) ontic types to satisfy its onto-epistemological requirements. 
At the continuum’s other end, subjectivism’s ontology, nominalism, 
sees reality as an internal product of the mind. At the extreme there 
is nothing but the mind, solipsism. A mind, however defined, implies 
the existence of a physical brain. Then in our terms the practice of 
subjectivism also requires both ontic types. 
The other two paradigms take intermediate positions on the objectiv-
ism–subjectivism continuum. The critical-emancipatory paradigm is 
concerned with power relationships and their effects on human ac-
tion. This implies that both physical and abstract ontic types exist. 
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The postmodern paradigm views external and internal ‘realities’ so 
complex and interrelated as to be unknowable and questions the va-
lidity of even the terms ‘reality’ and ‘truth’. The terms ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ imply the need for both ontic types. 
Altogether, this means that any paradigmatic theory, if it can be posi-
tioned somewhere along the objective–subjective continuum, makes 
onto-epistemological and methodological assumptions which employ 
and rely upon both the ‘physical’ and ‘abstract’ ontic types. The ar-
gument, therefore, is that process-structure’s two types are neces-
sary… but are they sufficient?
Critical systemic thinking holds that its four paradigms (which I call 
the ‘traditional’ or ‘conventional’ paradigms) are each valid and that 
they are complementary in their comprehensiveness. No one para-
digm subsumes another (nor could it, says paradigm incommensur-
ability). There is no hierarchy among them. Since their domains are 
separated (but not disjoint), it is illogical to accept that any paradigm 
could legitimately prohibit the existence of another. It follows, then, 
that no ontology may legitimately prohibit another’s. Since, it is pro-
posed, we use paradigms to better understand various different as-
pects of what is roughly the same, or co-located, ‘problem situation’, 
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their ontologies must be considered relativistic;22 that is, alternative 
references of some kind to some same-inclusive reality-as-it-is-in-
itself ‘problem situation space’.
Viewing these traditional ontologies as each referring somehow to 
some relative pool of the ‘stuff’ of the problem situation space as-it-
is-in-itself supports this basic assumption: that reality as-it-is-in-itself 
is capable, somehow, of supporting the emergence of the ontological 
memberships of each of the conventional paradigms. Then, in terms 
of the ontology of this new framework and to fulfil the greater prom-
ise of its design, one more stipulation is necessary to complete its on-
tological definition: the ‘pool’ of ‘stuff’ in the problem space consists 
of process–structures.
Referring once again to Burrell and Morgan’s objective–subjective 
continuum, the dissertation will support arguments about both ends, 
that: by emphasising the structural qualities of the ‘physical’ type of 
process–structure, (1) a deconstruction of ontological realism can be 
made which lends support to the idea of process–structure as an ul-
timate ontology; and inversely, (2) that realism can be considered an 
emergent property of an indeterminate configuration of process–s-
tructures. In a similar manner but by emphasising the processual 
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22  Ontological relativism, §6.10.2
qualities of the ‘abstract’ type of process–structure (3) ontological 
nominalism can be deconstructed to lend support to the idea of 
process–structure as an ultimate ontology; and inversely, that (4) 
nominalism can be considered an emergent property of an indetermi-
nate configuration of process–structures. Finally, because process–s-
tructure is holistically constituted from both aspects of both types, 
this covers the area between the extremes. Altogether, what these 
ideas yield is shown here in tabular form where the diagonal repre-
sents the objective–subjective continuum.
Process–
Structure’s structure aspect duality [sameness] process aspect
‘physical’ type objectiveontologies
both types
partially objective, 
partially subjective 
ontologies
‘abstract’ type subjective ontologies
Table 3.  Map of ontologies onto aspects of process–structure.
Other onto-epistemological dimensions can be explored as well, such 
as regulation vs. change (Burrell and Morgan, 1979), local/emergent 
vs. elite/a priori (Deetz, 1996), relativism vs. realism (Cunliffe, n.d.) 
to determine their fit and feasibility with the philosophy of the new 
ontology, but that is beyond the scope of this research.
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6.12. What p–s ontology is not
What this ontology is not is important, also. (Insofar as what has al-
ready been stated about the mind making associations, unsuitable 
assumptions about it can be pruned this way.) (1) It takes a distinc-
tive stand on the debate as to whether reality is objective or subjec-
tive—it is both and they are of different ontic types. External exis-
tence as-it-is-in-itself is objectively real but unknowable as-it-is-in-
itself to the human. Internal existence is a different type of existence, 
virtually independent but perhaps loosely associated (or ‘coupled’) 
with the external, as a subjective experience. (2) Process–Structure 
ontology cannot be called ‘yet another’ participant in the structure 
versus agency debate. Here, neither structure or process is separable 
from its dual aspect. Moreover, p–s’s operate only in the ontology and 
(as we shall see later) are unknowable as-they-are-in-themselves to 
the epistemology. 
There are four phases in Critical Systems Practice (Jackson, 2003, 
p.308): creativity, choice, implementation, reflection. It lacks a spe-
cific call for reflexivity. There must be reflexivity in any critical sys-
temic approach. Also different is “the strategy of alternating dominant 
and dependent methodologies” (ibid. p.314), whereas my theory 
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would have us regularly and fluidly ‘shift’ paradigmatic points of view 
as a form of critical awareness.  
Bhaskar’s critical realism, says Craib, uses the concept of a ‘form and 
function’ dependency in epistemology. P–S uses the simpler terms 
‘process’ and ‘structure’ and this dependency occurs at the level of 
ontology. And ‘dependency’ is instead understood as duality in the p–
s ontology (aspects of the same unity).
Also distinctive to my theory is that the concept of process–structure 
is explicitly isomorphic over its two ontic types (physical and abstract) 
just as the mind is fluidly relativistic in what it considers to be ‘real’  
and external and what it considers to be ‘real’ and internal. This 
unique ‘ontological feature’ is key.
6.13. Conclusion
We must not sidestep the issue of the nature of consciousness, but 
we must admit that, even after centuries of thought it is still not well 
understood. The debates about consciousness continue in the realms 
of pure philosophy. It seems as though what is currently best under-
stood is that one’s approach is determined by one’s intent. In other 
words, the way you approach the question of the nature of con-
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sciousness depends upon the nature of your questioning. Today, it 
can be argued that there are many valid ways of questioning and 
therefore many answers; including some which are, like our para-
digms, incommensurable. If we are to rule out solipsism, then, the 
matter must be handled pragmatically unless and until a consensus is 
reached. Perhaps in this regard this new theory can help us move 
forward. 
This theory takes just the essence of what it is that is “not well un-
derstood” and teleologically calls it the critical moment. I have tried 
to surround this small bit with as much of the latest thinking I could 
find in my research which makes sense to me. These ideas are a syn-
thesis from a variety of ideas taken for the most part from the sys-
tems literature.
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Chapter
7. The framework to support multiparadigm mul-
timethodologies
7.1. Introduction
Making sense of experience involves “placing stimuli into some kind 
of framework” (Weick, 1995). The well-known phrase “frame of refer-
ence” has traditionally meant a generalised point of view that directs 
interpretations. When people put stimuli into frameworks, this en-
ables them “to comprehend, understand, explain, attribute, extrapo-
late, and predict” (ibid.).
A theoretical framework is an approach to research and practice.  It is 
a logically and philosophically coherent linked set of ontology, epis-
temology and methodology. This one is aimed at the systemist-
interventionist. Addressing the issues of beingness and becoming-
ness, the new framework defines a simple ontology of process–struc-
ture which occur in both physical and abstract ontic types (see §6.7, 
6.8). 
The philosophy of contemporary systems thinking is a loose, eclectic 
collection of theories, reflecting the divergence of systems practice. A 
taxonomic map of the systems theories pertinent to the purposes of 
this study helps to clarify:
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The branch of systems thinking called critical systems thinking in-
cludes a special group of theories which, in one way or another, in-
volve the other paradigms in a collective way with the intent to ac-
complish either or both of two things: to deal with the problem of 
paradigm incommensurability at the theoretical level, or to offer theo-
retical support for (or to simply sanction) the multimethodological 
generation and use of methods from more than one paradigm in sys-
temic research, design or intervention. The theory developed in this 
research project is one of these, as well.
Systemists who adopt this new theory and practice it would accept 
the validity as well as the utility of having four conventional systems 
paradigms. We know that there is no standpoint of human under-
standing which is entirely a-paradigmatic; that is, without a frame-
work of onto-epistemological assumptions. Although one may be un-
aware of it, in fact everyone has a ‘worldview’. This includes the 
pragmatist. Those who accept and practice this new theory would 
recognise and respect such paradigms as worldviews which are in-
commensurable with respect to one another. To make proper use of 
them, however, the critical systemist must be educated in this regard 
and be able to question the relative appropriateness of his or her own 
habitual worldview. Further, this approach expects the systemist to 
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‘immerse’ himself or herself in other paradigms and perform a thor-
ough investigation whilst in each one as defined and directed by its 
own onto-epistemology, methodologies and best practices. The new 
epistemology reflects the understanding that the problem situation 
itself and any information we can obtain it is only available to us 
paradigmatically. In this framework those paradigms are the 
positivist/structural-functionalist, interpretivist, critical-emancipatory 
and postmodern-poststructural. This theory understands that each of 
the four paradigms offers a distinct and indeed very different world to 
appreciate, with different concepts and configurations of ‘the system’ 
itself and its boundaries, membership and environment; and different 
understandings of the state and inertia of the system, its embedded-
ness, etc. 
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Figure 15.  A multiparadigm multimethodology process diagram.
A critical systems paradigm with P–S (process–structure) ontology, 
critical moment, ethics, methods and mixed methods:
Figure 16.  Process flow diagram of the new framework in use.
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The figure shows the structure of the framework in action. Specific 
products of any one of the conventional paradigms of critical systems 
thinking (see the selection of onto-epistemologies) are pulled through 
the process that is the critical moment of becoming, from “all-that-is” 
in p–s form and take shape as they are then perceived to be. 
What contemporary critical systems thinking regards as a multidi-
mensional or multiparadigmatic reality to all that is, I assert that it is 
the opposite, that the underlying support for our multiparadigm per-
spectives as actually a-paradigmatic. And that it is because the mind 
is required to make sense of the world, that is, its job is sense mak-
ing, that it appears as though reality may come in all the multipara-
digm, multidimensional forms of constructed experience. It is perhaps 
the critical hermeneutics of John Thompson (1981) which most 
clearly understands this, but contemporary systems theorists: Jack-
son, Flood, Mingers, Midgley, Taket & White, Gregory, Fuenmayor, and 
others have also contributed pieces of these ideas. Maturana, a sys-
tems neurologist, brilliantly explains the implications of experience 
shaped by consciousness emergent from the functioning brain, itself a 
product of biological evolution (Maturana, 1988a, 2002; Bunnell, 
2004a).
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7.2. The epistemology
Ontology as concerns human understanding can only be artificially 
separated from epistemology because, as previously noted, the 
brain–mind requires meaningful associations; what something is is 
integrated with its meaning. 
For example, it would make no sense to simply accept the statement: 
“ontology is process–structure in two ontic types” without knowing 
what those terms mean and why it is believed to be so. The reason 
for assigning ontological status to process–structures is explained by 
the needs of the framework’s epistemology (philosophy which deals 
with meanings and associations). Why not simply declare that the 
world is made of cheese? Because the epistemology has to make 
sense of the world specified in the ontology (and there is only so 
much you can do with cheese). 
Here, an epistemology is developed to explain how the process–struc-
ture ontology works to support our (i.e. systemists’) internal and ex-
ternal worlds (as previously described); and, as in all other para-
digms, what in these worlds concerns us, what is of value, and how 
we understand what we discover in them, as follows:
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Process–Structure is proposed as a new ontology into which, working 
backwards, the membership of the four conventional paradigmatic 
ontologies could be deconstructed. That is, if you deconstruct a thing, 
say foo, you get a bunch of p–s’s no matter which ontology foo  
comes from. As in the arrow of time, however, the operation runs 
only forward, in the con-structive direction because those ontological 
con-structions are emergent in the systemic sense, by which it means 
that a cause cannot be determined—there are an infinite number of 
possible sources. (The process of emergence is well understood in 
this respect. For example, water is wet is an emergent property of a 
collection of H2O molecules.) Ontological members of one of the tradi-
tional ontologies emerge from the ‘formlessness’ of process–struc-
tures into their familiar in-paradigmatic forms. I call this constructive 
process the “critical moment of becoming.” It can also be described 
symbolically as   cmi(ps)  ≡  O(i)    where the index i is an onto-
epistemology. That is to say, the result of the critical moment of be-
coming of an onto-epistemology upon process–structure is equivalent 
to the function of Ontology (i.e. ontic membership, or becoming) over 
that onto-epistemology. It is an epistemological conceptualisation of 
an event positioned between process–structure and another ontology 
as it is conceived. It works for any onto-epistemology. 
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Teleologically, the critical moment of becoming is the philosophical 
‘glue’ which adapts process–structure to the onto-epistemologies of 
the conventional paradigms. I would say that it can be understood as 
a mechanism of translation (i.e. movement) between them yet it re-
mains separate and apart from both and affects no change to either. 
Again, ontologies are metaphysical theories about what simply is. I 
speculate that in humans the mechanism of the moment of becoming 
first appeared somewhere in our evolutionary past with the develop-
ment of the nervous system; it is physiological with ancient roots tied 
to the viability of the species (Bunnell, 2004a, b). 
It is not well understood but I believe we must not sidestep the na-
ture of consciousness. We can say in terms of systems thinking that 
thought is an emergent property of a brain which we see as a com-
plex system. Then if we accept the premises of this theory already 
put forward, then what is plausible? What possibly useful knowledge 
can we create if we focus on the smallest part of what it is that is not 
well understood? We cannot say that the critical moment of becoming 
is a collection of only abstract p–s’s. There is no doubt that there is a 
dependence on the physical brain. Where and when a thought is cre-
ated—there is a coupling of physical and abstract p–s’s… This is why I 
say that physical and abstract p–s’s are isomorphisms. Somehow, in 
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the instant of its emergence thought is simultaneously physical and 
abstract. Perhaps thought begins in the physical form and changes, 
somehow becoming abstract. But in Maturana’s terms the structural 
coupling works both ways—thought causes physical changes and the 
physical brain somehow embodies the thought. The reciprocity is 
critical. It is how we learn. This explains how it is we can keep a 
stream of consciousness. This means that the isomorphism works 
both ways: abstract thought is an isomorphism of brain activity, and 
brain activity is an isomorphism of abstract thought. And this recipro-
cal isomorphism operates more or less continuously—it is coupled—it 
exhibits a duality.
Now we can look again at problems with multiparadigmatic theo-
ry—paradigm incommensurability and relativism. First, a review of 
the problem. There is epistemological relativism between different 
paradigms; that is, what you see depends on how you look at it. This 
is by definition logically inconsistent; that is, that cannot be true. 
Hence, the problem. 
Therefore the new epistemology should recognise, accept and admit 
to both ontological and epistemological relativisms between the para-
digms. However, and most importantly, there is no relativism be-
tween the p–s ontology and any one of the paradigmatic ontologies. 
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Remember, the paradigmatic ontologies are locally emergent. Be-
tween the paradigmatic onto-epistemologies, yes, there are relativ-
isms. Between the p–s ontology and any one of the paradigmatic on-
tologies there is not. The paradigms remain incommensurable with 
respect to each other. Their epistemologies each have their different 
ways in which we may come to know the world. None can claim to 
have access to all that is. 
One of the great triumphs of systems science has to be the knowl-
edge it has developed regarding the behaviour of ‘holons’. Perhaps 
one of the most important aspects of holons is emergence. Society 
emerges from people, for example. Wet emerges from water mole-
cules. What is most important and most difficult to accept, though, is 
that emergence is a one-way process. Let me explain how I under-
stand emergence: That which is emergent can only be said to have 
come from indefinite, rather than specific causes. This is like revers-
ing the integration process in calculus—the derivative is not the same 
as what you integrated—in the integration process (the emergence, if 
you will) information is lost. And it must be lost so that we can see 
the ‘forest’ for the ‘trees’. The loss and emergence are coupled, I be-
lieve. In this sense that which is emergent is no longer contained 
within its source. 
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The irreversibility of emergence is what precludes ontological relativ-
ism between the conventional ontologies via the p–s ontology.
Epistemology is the theoretical level of logic and explanation, of val-
ues and experience and reason. In the new theory, however, the 
world has no form or meaning or values or reasoning or reasons—it 
just is. But there are the conventional paradigms. The new episte-
mology must hold that the conventional paradigms are built for those 
things. It ‘knows’ that the systemist can from this theoretical place 
‘switch’ or ‘jump’ or, as the methodology says, ‘deploy’ any conven-
tional paradigm. From another paradigm a systemist may ‘switch’ to 
this theoretical pseudo-‘a-paradigmatic’ place, but there is nothing 
here except the ability to ‘switch’ to any other paradigmatic stance. It 
is merely a pivot point between the conventional, meaningful para-
digms (or micro-paradigms of the systemist). And that is the only 
thing it does, methodologically. Epistemologically it ‘knows’ that other 
paradigms are known to be valid, consistent, and meaningful with re-
spect to themselves.
The process–structure ontology is designed to prevent us from im-
posing associations, objectifying or reifying anything within it, an idea 
informed by poststructuralism. It is in fact designed so that, out of 
the infinite number of possibilities (a-paradigmatically) which could 
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be ascribed to ‘reality’ at any one time (paradigmatically), no one 
possible form or aspect is privileged over any other. In that sense it is 
hierarchically flat. It is either determinate (from God’s eye view) or 
infinitely indeterminate (from the systemist’s point of view); which-
ever you prefer is correct. This theory has nothing to say about God. 
At the same time, it may provide us with a theoretical place of retreat 
to, allowing us to dump and re-imagine the ‘reality space’ of a prob-
lem situation, such as you would do with Ulrich’s boundaries in critical 
systems heuristics (Ulrich, 1983), or in the critical moment (§6.11), 
or in reflexivity (§2.5.4), or as in postmodernism questioning the 
terminology in our thoughts (§4.5.5).
Let us look again at the collection of theories. When we look at the 
onto-epistemological assumptions made by a variety of theories it 
appears that what is epistemological to one theory may be ontological 
to another. (That is, ontological membership is a function relative to 
the paradigm and its epistemology.) For example, compare structural 
functionalism (which considers reality to be ‘external’ and may in-
clude social structures) with interpretivism (which sees reality as a 
product of the mind). To the systemist (our domain of applicability) 
‘systems’, in turn, are either ‘in the world’ or [as in SSM] ‘a process of 
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enquiry into the world’ (Checkland and Scholes, 1990). It depends on 
the paradigm. 
(See also “What p–s ontology is not”, §6.12). Consider how this 
thinking differs from that of Bhaskar’s critical realism (1989; Collier, 
1994): 
Critical realism demonstrates that ideas, concepts, mean-
ings and categories… exist in the world, independent of 
human beings,… are equally as real as physical objects. 
They are emergent from, but irreducible to, the physical 
world, and have causal effect both on the physical world 
(eg in the generation of technology) and the social and 
ideational world. … Ideas once expressed are no longer 
wholly subjective—they become intransitive and available 
for investigation, debate and judgement by others. (Min-
gers, 2000).
Unlike critical realism, the p–s ontology does not include objects with 
pre-constituted boundaries that we can access, nor does its episte-
mology have ideas, concepts, meanings and categories—what I would 
call already aggregated (or constructed) abstracts. To consider a 
thought ‘real’, I believe, is an act of observing (Maturana, 1988a; 
Bunnell, 2004b). Thoughts are constructed in the moment of becom-
ing and meaning depends upon the local, or micro-paradigm of the 
observer.
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Bhaskar’s onto-epistemology makes an epistemological break with 
the tradition of the critical-emancipatory paradigm. But, in my opin-
ion it  of systems thinking. But this new theory acknowledges relativ-
isms between ontological and epistemological membership from the-
ory to theory. An epistemic fallacy in one may be perfectly consistent 
in another. One can also find the same kind of relativism between 
process and structure. Effectively, this is an acknowledgement and 
acceptance of paradigm incommensurability, but it reflects the human 
disposition and would allow each established paradigm to remain 
whole and useful as it is. 
I believe that what is needed is a minimalist epistemology, one that 
does no more than say, as this theory does, that we already have 
four epistemologies that are proven and well understood. Refer to 
them for that. Leave to them that which is theirs. How that is done in 
this framework is the subject of its methodology.
In this new framework, different paradigms are respected as to what 
is understood within them to be real and internal vs. external with re-
spect to the mind. Its epistemology accepts the paradigmatic relativ-
ism of knowledge and the contextual dependencies of their method-
ologies. Substantial aspects of conventional epistemologies and 
methodologies are intentionally absent from this framework because 
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(a) they are not essential to the complete elaboration of this para-
digm (built as it is to independently employ the four conventional 
critical systems’ paradigms) and (b) they are well-supported and 
properly used only in context, whilst immersed in it. There should be 
no call to refer to this framework as relativist as in-paradigmatic 
processes are consistent within their self-containment.
7.2.1. On ethics
I would like to see the separating out of ethical considerations which 
are typically ill-defined and distributed throughout the current con-
ceptual frameworks of critical systems thinking, and the reestablish-
ment of ethics as the third branch of philosophy, along with ontology 
and epistemology. The philosophy of ethics is concerned with pur-
poseful action and how such action ought to be exercised, both in 
general and particular circumstances (Audi, 1999). It not only seeks 
normative guidelines but, as meta-ethics, uncovers the higher-order 
assumptions, arguments or structures which make such guidelines 
possible. Involved as it is with human questions of action, ethics em-
bodies political philosophy, indeed may be understood as the political 
science of being (Georgiou, 2007) and responsibility. It is currently 
fashionable to bury the word ‘ethics’ in the literature of systems the-
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ory and practice. This, it seems to me, smacks of some sort of im-
plied objectivity or enlightenment. 
We claim an ethical justification for ‘emancipation’ in critical systems 
thinking, and also for the commitment to ‘improvement’. If there 
were a specific ethics component in our theoretical frameworks this is 
where specific commitments would be spelled out. Nonetheless, the 
absolute priority given to the processes we call ‘critical’ in ‘critical 
systems thinking’ ultimately requires the practitioner to judge be-
tween alternatives, and even make judgements as to which alterna-
tives are to be considered. Consideration should therefore be given to 
raising the importance of ethics to to the level of ontology and epis-
temology, including it among the fundamental components of our 
theoretical frameworks. Exposed at this structural level, assumption 
making and decision making then must come clean in a process of 
transparent, reflexive communication. There, ethical assumptions are 
subject to ‘critical’ examination by those involved with the project at 
hand, thereby submitting them to the processes whereby they can be 
adjusted and realigned as need be by the situation, the participants 
and those otherwise affected by any subsequent action (Ulrich, 1983; 
Midgley, 2000). Ethics, as its own area for systemic study, can 
evolve, and policy guidelines can emerge to encourage the develop-
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ment of methodologies and methods that are ethically informed and 
inclusive.
7.3. The methodology
Methodologies, aligned as they are with their epistemologies, are 
used to put philosophy into action in the world. Methods are the ac-
tual actions to be taken in situ. Referring to its methodology, the 
framework developed here directs a multiparadigmatic investigative 
procedure, reflectively compiling and organising what is discovered 
and making critically-reflexive assessments of the knowledge pooled 
from those paradigmatic views in the manner of best practice. 
The new methodology prescribes an investigation which entails ‘de-
ploying’ the various paradigms in a serial manner for the purpose of 
exploring and appreciating the ‘world’ and the embedded historical 
situation as it is revealed to the systemist whilst immersed in each. 
In conjunction with the critical oversight functions described above, a 
critically-reflexive evaluation of the collective ‘big picture’ is otherwise 
ongoing. It leads to deliberations and decision making guided in spirit 
by ethical and aesthetic considerations (transparently disclosed as 
part of the oversight function for a critique-and-improvement dis-
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course). Regardless of the choice of multimethodology, before a 
method can be deployed the methodology directs a reflective, para-
digmatic look back to ensure it remains true to its theoretical heri-
tage.
The overall philosophy will take a fresh look at the notion of a critical 
systems paradigm. It envisions a theoretically cohesive approach to 
critical systems thinking and practice combining a multiparadigmatic 
investigation and a general multimethodology which uses—in their 
proper theoretical contexts—the dozens of epistemologically-specific 
systemic methodologies developed over the past fifty plus years. 
Jackson and Keys (Jackson and Keys, 1984) took the first step with 
their system of systems methodologies where the problem context 
(later, paradigm) rightly became the driving force for considering 
which would be appropriate choices for the methodology to be used 
in a particular situation (Jackson and Keys, 1984; Flood and Jackson, 
1991a; Jackson, 1997; Jackson, 1999). Multimethodology, or meth-
odological pluralism supports a more sophisticated understanding of 
the problem situation and allows for the deployment of more than 
one method in a single intervention; multiparadigmatic multimethod-
ologies are those which, in addition, make use of methodological 
thoughts from across the paradigms (Flood, 1990; Gregory, 1992; 
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Flood and Romm, 1996c; Gregory, 1996b; Taket and White, 1996; 
Jackson, 1997; Mingers, 1997c; Jackson, 1999; Midgley, 2000).
This new methodology informed the experiment (the subject of the 
next chapter) designed to test basic assumptions of the framework. 
Several lessons were learned and an improved methodology is called 
for, one which will involve further research. It is described in the Con-
clusions chapter.
7.4. The axiology
The theory only specifies that the system of concern is axiologically 
considered through the perspective of the observer who is a system-
ist. That is, all epistemological concerns of the theory (such as there 
are) are addressed from the point of view of the systemist. This is in 
keeping with the p–s ontology, the epistemology and the methodol-
ogy. Similarly, the axiology is minimalist, as well. It is intentionally 
devoid of other axiological concerns such as values and aesthetics 
which cannot be supported by the p–s ontology and the epistemology 
already discussed. For those we defer to the conventional paradigms.
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7.5. How to use the new framework
This chapter has allowed me to develop my ideas for a new critical-
pluralist systemic framework which, by deferring to the conventional 
paradigms’ onto-epistemological approaches (in their own terms), we 
are able to leverage comprehensiveness with the perspectivity made 
available via their deployment; and, by deferring to their epistemolo-
gies and methodologies, we are able to leverage our effectiveness in 
systemic research, intervention and design projects. The new meth-
odology calls on the systemist to readily detach from this, the current 
paradigmatic stand, and transition to another. ‘Deploying the para-
digm’ means assuming (taking upon oneself) the paradigm’s concepts 
of internal and external realities, knowledge, ethics, aesthetics, 
methods, etc. to conduct some part of the research. As I have shown, 
our minds are already accustomed to the subjective relativity of ‘be-
ing’ and ‘knowledge’ and well versed in reification. With some initial 
coaching and practice, our paradigm shifting skills should develop. We 
then return to this, the critical paradigm, for a critical reflexive 
evaluation of the information gathered from each deployment—a de-
briefing, if you will—reflecting upon our in-paradigmatic experiences. 
Actions to be taken to intervene are decisions also reflectively consid-
ered in the same way.
328
Multimethodological approaches (like this one) which would employ 
more than one methodology from more than one paradigm in the 
same intervention have been orphaned from the collection of proper, 
widely accepted approaches to research and practice ever since the 
concept of ‘paradigm’ was first adopted by systems theory. The new 
theory proposed in this dissertation accepts incommensurability and 
defines an ontology of process–structure which is shown to support 
an epistemology and methodology calling for the serial deployment of 
each of the established critical systems’ paradigms and engagement 
with their ‘world’ views for a critical, reflexive evaluation of the in-
sights gained and the subsequent employment of any of their meth-
odologies. By engaging process–structure in the moment of becoming 
with each of the four traditional systems ontologies, the practitioner 
allows each paradigm to complement or compete with the others in 
terms of ontological, as well as epistemological and methodological 
relativism—a relativism dependent upon facets of the specific prob-
lem situation of concern. In this way, p–s and its framework extend 
the concepts of complementarism, critical appreciation and pluralism 
beyond methodologies to paradigms.
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Chapter
8. Testing the idea of multi-paradigm deployment
8.1. Introduction
Can we imagine ourselves shifting paradigms? Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) argued that because each paradigm was radically different 
and incommensurable with the others, that changing paradigms was 
rare—akin to a religious conversion (Cunliffe, 2010). But despite what 
much of the literature says, perhaps making a paradigm shift is prac-
tically effortless, as easy as putting down one book or magazine and 
picking up another. Or changing the television channel. We are talking 
about having human experiences from different points of worldview. I 
think it is not unlike reading a work of fiction in which the author 
speaks from the first-person point of view of one of the characters, as 
Samuel Clemens famously did with Huckleberry Finn. It is an effective 
literary tool employed to have us identify with or to ‘walk in the 
shoes’ of that character. The author does not have to teach the 
reader how to do this beforehand, it is a capability we have already 
and are able to use without much, or better, any conscious effort at 
all (because, say Maturana and Varela (1980), as a species we are 
adapted to it). What we are talking about is not at all the same as 
having empathy for another; this is much more direct; the author 
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hopes for us to become that character. As to the reader, those mo-
ments of being someone else somewhere else can be compelling ex-
periences. 
In the same spirit, I believe that another paradigmatic stance can be 
evoked. First its worldview might be described in general terms as an 
overview, then more specific examples of the sort of experiences one 
would have in that paradigm could be described, like storybook ad-
ventures. This is, in fact how I designed the methodology for the in-
terviews (Chapter 8). Jackson's generic methodologies (2000; 2003b) 
could be used as a solid starting point to guide this sort of project. 
The experiment was designed to be learned from. It afforded me the 
opportunity to try out my idea that paradigms can be evoked and ob-
serve what happens when systemists are presented with the chal-
lenges that paradigm switching presents. I sought, specifically to test 
two very basic assumptions made by the new framework. First, would 
the experienced practitioner be both willing and able to do this? The 
primary issue is whether or not a practitioner can switch from one 
paradigmatic stance—principally, one’s own ‘natural’ paradigmatic 
perspective—into another which might feel artificial or academic in 
the sense that it is not the ‘natural’ way in which the systemist ap-
proaches his or her world of practice. The second was whether or not 
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they would discover or uncover important new facets of a situation 
when they re-imagined and re-examined it from within different 
paradigmatic perspectives; and, if so, whether or not they would con-
sider those discoveries to be of any value.
The method chosen leveraged my acquaintanceships with members 
of the International Society for the Systems Sciences (ISSS), casual 
friendships built in previous years whilst attending and presenting at 
the ISSS annual conferences in Cancun Mexico (2005), Sonoma Cali-
fornia (2006), Tokyo Japan (2007), and Madison Wisconsin (2008). 
None of the interviewees had prior knowledge of the research strat-
egy or the nature of the data to be collected. The plan was to elicit 
experiences with the ISSS, first in their own words; then to explain a 
little bit about the philosophy and methodologies of first, the func-
tionalist paradigm, then the interpretivist, then the critical or emanci-
patory, and finally the postmodern paradigm. After each description I 
would ask them to give it a try—to ‘assume’ the position themselves 
and re-examine the same situation through that different paradig-
matic lens. It turns out that the first five were asked to imagine a hy-
pothetical situation—that they had been hired by the ISSS as a sys-
tems practitioner in order to examine and analyse the ISSS and to 
make recommendations and possibly implement them. In this sce-
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nario, the ISSS was supposedly concerned that it was in decline in 
terms of membership, etc. and wanted the systems practitioner to 
help them to understand, if it was occurring, why it was occurring and 
what they thought were the possibilities for turning it around. In 
other words, they were to imagine planning a systemic intervention 
on the ISSS.
My expectations had been influenced by the opinions and reports of 
various theorists who have spoken and written on the matter of para-
digm shifting. The consensus is that a person cannot be expected to 
make such a paradigm shift without a great deal of difficulty and per-
haps a great deal of training (Mingers and Brocklesby, 1996; Brock-
lesby, 1997; Mingers and Brocklesby, 1997). 
The process of transforming an agent who works within a 
single paradigm into someone who is multi-methodology 
literate is perhaps an unlikely, although by no means im-
possible, proposition (Brocklesby, 1997).
This supposed difficulty may have had a chilling effect on further re-
search into the matter. 
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8.2. Research methodology
8.2.1. Semistructured interview
The semistructured interview was chosen over other data collection 
methods for several reasons. Qualitative data from the systemists’ 
point of view was needed, in other words it was necessary that the 
participants speak for themselves. They were invited to tell their own 
stories. A plan was thought through that would first give us an im-
pression as to their own worldview which I call their ‘natural’ para-
digm and recognise as a fluid, evolving, learning and adapting ‘micro-
paradigm’ (see §3.2.3, ‘Virtual-’ or ‘micro-’paradigms). Data from this 
part of the method would then serve to establish a basis against 
which data collected in the remaining stages would be compared. 
I wanted to establish and maintain a relaxed and open rapport with 
the interviewee. A structured approach might be perceived as more 
formal, challenging and perhaps a bit threatening, as if they were be-
ing evaluated or judged. Indeed, when first asked whether or not 
they would like to participate in an interview for this research project, 
most expressed some hesitancy having to do with the quality of their 
qualifications; but they were each assured that I just wanted to chat 
about what they already knew. “It is about how you come up with 
ideas,” I said. I sought to leverage the rapport I felt I had established 
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in our earlier casual, friendly encounters. I thought that the level of 
compliance with what they would be asked to do (first to open up to 
me to tell their own story and then to explore four paradigmatically 
incommensurable worlds) would depend upon their level of trust and 
comfort with the approach. 
A more structured interview would have had one benefit that the very 
casual approach I chose did not have, though. I was not always well 
prepared and clear, not always thorough and articulate. With a proper 
script I could have simply read through it, having the additional bene-
fit of consistency as well. Consequently, there are inconsistencies, er-
rors and omissions on my part as the interviewer. With a script I 
would not have skipped over the interpretive paradigm as I did with 
Participant 4, or forgotten to ask the question about value as I did 
with both Participants 8 and 10. Upon reflection I know that I should 
have been better prepared, and in the future I will remember that. 
Rather than blame the method I had better blame myself for a flawed 
implementation. 
If time and circumstance had permitted I would like to have run the 
whole experiment again with other participants, using lessons learned 
from the first experiment to improve the practice.
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8.2.2. Thought experiment
Within each interview the systemist was guided through a series of 
thought experiments. Information on the philosophy and methodol-
ogy of the thought experiment comes from a recent dissertation by 
Luis Sambo (2009):
Denscombe (2007) defines an experiment as an empirical 
investigation under controlled conditions designed to ex-
amine the properties of, and relationship between specific 
factors; while Sorensen (1992) defines an experiment as 
a procedure for answering or raising a question about the 
relationship between variables by varying one (or more) 
of them and tracking any response by the other or others. 
For both definitions it implies the execution of experience 
with appropriate equipment, tools and material. The aim 
of any experiment is to answer or raise its question ra-
tionally. Sorensen (1992) considers thought experiment 
as an experiment that claims to achieve its aim without 
the benefit of execution. What makes an experimental 
design a thought experiment is the way it is presented to 
the audience – as a design that aims to convince or puz-
zle in its own right. … The difference is that the aim of a 
thought experiment is enlightenment. Many of the heuris-
tics used to identify procedures as experiments, are also 
used to identify thought experiments. Thus the typical 
thought experiment scores high on scientific content, hy-
pothesis testing and manipulation (Sorensen 1992). 
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Denscombe (2007) raises the issue of reflexivity concern-
ing the relationship between the researcher and the social 
world; this is an anti-positivist view according to which, 
there is no prospect of the social researcher achieving an 
entirely objective position from which to study the social 
world. The argument is that the researcher can never 
stand outside the social world they are studying in order 
to gain ground from which to view things from a perspec-
tive that is not contaminated by contact with that social 
world. According to reflexivity concept, our sense making 
about the social world and the meaning we give to events 
and situations are shaped by our experience as social be-
ings and the legacy of the values, norms and concepts we 
have assimilated during our lifetime (Denscombe 2007)” 
(Sambo, 2009).
There were ten interviews. Each interview was recorded and later 
transcribed. The participants had agreed to this and were told that 
their words would only be used for my own research purposes. Five 
were asked to consider a specific hypothetical scenario—an interven-
tion with the ISSS organisation. The others were allowed to choose 
any intervention with which they had recent experience. The inter-
viewee was asked to tell me about that intervention in their own 
words. Then each interviewee was asked to re-examine that same 
situation as though they were a positivist-functionalist. I repeated 
this step, taking them through interpretivism, critical-emancipatory, 
338
and postmodern paradigms. I consider each of these five explorations 
thought experiments. Finally, each interviewee was asked to reflect 
on what had just taken place and to report whether or not they found 
the experience to be of any value to them. 
8.2.3. Introduction
The study was designed to collect data which might indicate to what 
degree systems practitioners might accept and adopt ideas advanced 
by the thesis, principally that skilful employment of a multiparadig-
matic perspective:
• enables a more comprehensive appreciation; and that 
• that appreciation may uncover significant aspects of the 
situation which might have been otherwise overlooked or 
under appreciated and transform the practitioner’s concep-
tualisation; and that 
• a transformed conceptualisation could mean a new more in-
formed approach would be considered; that
• those new aspects, associated epistemologically as they are 
with a set of their own distinct methodologies, represent ad-
ditional tools and opportunities for engagement which might 
not otherwise be considered; and
• if thoughtfully brought to bear, the use of these additional 
methodologies could impact positively on these situations 
and thus contribute towards improved outcomes.
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It might indicate the efficacy of such a practice and tell whether or 
not practitioners would engage in a pluralist practice when it was oth-
erwise indicated. The interviews would gather feedback from each 
participant by asking at the end of the interview, first, whether or not 
the experience succeeded in helping them to discover anything new 
or significant; secondly, it would solicit their opinion as to whether or 
not the experience had been worthwhile or of value to them, person-
ally.
8.2.4. Data collection and analysis
Altogether, ten interviews were secured and conducted. The inter-
viewees were selected casually—all were participants in these two 
gatherings of systemists, they were available, they responded posi-
tively to the request to interview them for 30–45 minutes for the data 
collection phase of my Ph.D. research. Some were suggested by oth-
ers as persons with diverse backgrounds and interests; some for be-
ing wise; others for being ‘different’, somehow, from the others. My 
Ph.D. supervisor approved of the selection in terms of diversity and 
‘fair play’. There was a balance of men and women and a wide scope 
of age and experience from academics, researchers, and practitio-
ners. 
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8.3. Findings from interviews of ten systems practitioners
8.3.1. Interview with ‘Participant 1’
“Where you’re going to have problems is if you don’t have 
some coherence in the system itself. In this case, some 
coherence in the society. So in its current state it’s 
probably easier to downscale the activities like confer-
ences and whatever you do than it is to grow and expand 
it upscale to other things. Where you end up with irrecon-
cilable differences is when you have a lot of people who 
really aren’t there for the same reason.” —Participant 1
This was my first interview. Participant 1 and I are acquainted and he 
was aware I was working on my dissertation in the area of systems 
thinking. To start the conversation I explained: “My thesis and this 
interview has to do with how ideas are generated, how problems are 
perceived. Problem situations, you know, that we deal with in inter-
ventions and possible solutions to that, you know, we come up with. 
Because as systems people I think we’re different… because we pro-
pose to intervene and fix or correct or ‘improve’ somehow. We try to 
act in the world.” I asked him to imagine himself hired by the ISSS as 
a systems consultant-interventionist because the Board perceives 
that they are on a path of diminishing sustainability. What they have 
tried before has failed to revitalise the Society. As the person hired to 
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do the intervention, I asked him to tell me what he perceives to be 
the main issues and problems, and what plan he might propose to 
the Board of Directors as a way forward. 
Participant 1 first laid out his understanding of the problem scenario 
from his ‘natural’ paradigm with a historical perspective. He traced 
the Society’s organisational development from its inception and initial 
growth, into maturity, and more recent decline in terms of ideas, 
membership and funding. He spoke of the disenfranchisement of its 
traditional sources of funding from once upon a time when academics 
with big names came with big budgets and academic conferences 
were funded liberally. He described the Society’s failure to attract and 
keep other sources of funding; a failure largely attributed to the Soci-
ety’s “inward focus” and a persistent dearth of real-world results. The 
membership is of two minds, he said. One is interested in philosophy 
and theory, expecting others will adapt them to their own real-world 
problems; the other is put off by the philosophy and theory and fo-
cuses on the applications of systems thinking, typically employing 
one method in the area in which they specialise; e.g. transportation, 
environment, business, teaching. Funding opportunities are diminish-
ing for the former type and improving for the latter. He said the ISSS 
needs “to begin to connect the kind of professionals that the Society 
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is designed for with the kind of activities that the Society does.” Ap-
peals to more specialised targets such as environmentalists or health 
care professionals might bring more to the conferences. 
The Society’s identity is an organisation which dared to go its own 
way: “So you’ve got some history of the hard and soft people, you’ve 
got the history of the split from AAAS [American Society for the Ad-
vancement of Science, est. 1848, which currently has 127,000 mem-
bers!]. If it were still a part of the AAAS it would be a different kind of 
society in a lot of ways because it would probably have followed the 
tracks of science more… simply because of that affiliation over time. 
In and of itself might have become either split up into other parts of 
the way those disciplines have evolved or it would have become a bit 
more of its own discipline… more focused and specialized in its own 
way, I would assume. And since it didn’t do any of those things it now 
really is kind of a stand-alone… a lot of it is just a legacy association.” 
The path, he said, has always been difficult and where it is going re-
mains unclear. “We’ve been trying to swim upstream against all the 
other paths that most things have taken. We’ve been working against 
specialization, we’ve been kind of working against reductionism. A big 
part of the issues is going to be finding what to work with not what to 
work against. … You can trace a lot of different luminaries and presi-
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dents of the organization over the 50 years of history that have had 
very different ideas about what it should be, what direction it should 
go.” Without a clarity of focus a purposeful system will tend to de-
cohere, he warned. “The difficulty of… where you’re going to have 
problems is if you don’t have some coherence in the system itself; in 
this case, some coherence in the Society. So in it’s current state it’s 
probably easier to downscale the activities like conferences and 
whatever you do than it is to grow and expand it upscale to other 
things,” which is risky because, “You end up with irreconcilable differ-
ences… when you have a lot of people who really aren’t there for the 
same reason.” 
Participant 1’s ‘natural’ paradigm was identified as critical-
emancipatory. See results table, Table 4, §9.2.
Positivism-Functionalism
Next, I described the positivist-functionalist paradigm and asked him 
to investigate the same situation, this time as a positivist-
functionalist: “Okay, let’s shift to the next phase. First we have the 
functionalist paradigm. Functionalist is the world of science, general 
systems theory, measurables… You can say it gets quite complex 
there… calculus and multivariates and you have physical laws that 
you can count on and determine. Production of factories measured by 
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how much output per hour. People think of very solid terms. The 
world is external, measurable and knowable. And we can make cer-
tain determinations about that. Now, if you can shift into this mode of 
thinking that way… And you know people who will only think in those 
terms. If you can put yourself in that hat right now [gesture: putting 
on a hat]… I’m calling it… say… deploy the paradigm… upon yourself 
to your external projection of the world. Then can you then, with that 
color of vision on you, can you please explain in this same idea… 
ISSS issues, you know. Through that mechanism there.”
He immediately understood what I was on about. He told me about 
the early systems thinkers who started and established the ISSS. At 
that time there were only what came to be known later as positivist-
functionalist, or ‘hard’ systems, and ‘hard’ systems theories.
In the analysis of this section of the interview I discovered several 
positivist-functionalist thoughts he had not raised in his ‘natural’ 
story: He mentioned that “science was very much connected with a 
lot of the original people in the Society.” He said these men and 
women had reached a level of mastery so that “they had enough in-
sight to see the limitations of their own disciplines.” (The concept that 
mastery is a prerequisite for an epistemological break-through is an 
issue that Participant 7 also raises in his interview.) The interpretiv-
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ists, or ‘soft’ systems people as they became known, thought the 
positivist-functionalist approach was overly reductive. It did not in-
clude the human issues, primarily ethics. But their new epistemology 
was opposed rather than accepted. Its ways did not fit within the ex-
isting domain or expectations in terms of what were considered ac-
ceptable solutions. He sees this resistance as “just an evolutional 
stage, maybe, that people and ideas tend to go through.” He criti-
cised the Society for not really “producing things that were very 
clearly thought out to an endpoint as opposed to just interesting and 
conceptual.” It is the engineers and hard science researchers who get 
funding, he said. I note that he did not propose any solutions. 
Interpretivism
I told my story about interpretivism in the first person: “The interpre-
tive paradigm recognises that I see the world differently than you see 
the world. We come with our own experiences that, when we have 
new experiences they have to integrate into it, right? Maturana and 
Varela were saying we come biologically predisposed to only under-
standing a world in a limited way, perceptually. So our world seems to 
be actually, not there [I gesture outwards], [but] in here [gesturing 
to my head]. Because that’s the only world that matters to me, in 
here. Because if I don’t have it here, right? If it’s there I don’t know. 
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Right? So there may be an objective world but the subjective world is 
the only one that concerns me.” My notes say, “Boom! He immedi-
ately understands me and shifts into this paradigm quite naturally.” 
He added, “Well, it’s not just the only one that concerns most people, 
it’s the only one you truly have access to.” I asked him if he thinks 
this is closest to his ‘natural’ paradigm and he told me that he uses 
both positivist-functionalist and interpretivist paradigms and that both 
are necessary.
I asked if that was easy to do or difficult and he said, “Well, it’s al-
ways difficult because you… they really are separate… um… separate 
areas of the world. Separate ways of understanding in a lot of ways. 
And there are people who do… who can span those quite well. But 
they tend to be people who have really been able to cross over and 
explain and write about those things at a different level.” Perhaps I 
can infer that he was talking about the paradigms and incommensur-
ability. He did not mix these worldviews. He switched between one 
and the other “separate ways of understanding.” Did he take a meta-
theoretical perspective? No, I believe he consciously switched be-
tween them depending on the context. He said, “It works well as long 
as the subject matter fits.”
Other ‘interpretivist’ issues he found included: 
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• A schism between the ISSS and the more exclusively positiv-
ist Societies. 
• A system can be defined “in just about any [way] depending 
on who’s looking at it because it’s only subjective, anyway.” 
• Using consensus-seeking methods. 
• On subjectivity: “You change the group and the information’s 
different. You change the group and it’s a different system. 
You change the group and it doesn’t exist anymore because 
they don’t see it that way.” 
They have found, he said, that remaining in the subjective, 
consensus-seeking mode can and has undermined objective needs. 
One such need which has been undermined is the need to be selec-
tive in terms of which papers to accept for publication and presenta-
tion; affecting a “deterioration of the quality of the presentations”.  
The negative effect from this is an appearance that anything goes. 
And that “creates some real problems if you’re trying to say we are a 
professional society or we’re working towards a science.”
To add to his thoughts on the deterioration of quality he said, “Be-
cause people felt like inclusion— or diversity— or, you know, some 
ethical principle was more important than the quality of the ideas and 
the information.” I think that this comment is perhaps a critical-
emancipatory concern. Participant 1 seems to suggest that the ISSS 
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needs to attend to and act more on its objective concerns. But how? 
This was left unresolved. And according to the other interviewees who 
have gone to this issue, it remains unresolved. Later in the interview 
he suggests that, despite its problems, there are members of the 
ISSS who are acting, nevertheless, in ways I see as pragmatic. 
Critical-emancipatory
To explain the critical-emancipatory paradigm to Participant 1, I said, 
“Well, um, let’s shift to emancipatory or ‘critical’ systems thinking. 
And in this area we are talking about the voices that are not heard. 
Perhaps dominance and suppression. Or perhaps thinking about fos-
tering the environment where little grass roots bloom or whatever 
you want to say. A thousand blooms or whatever. And critical in the 
sense that we need to remove ourselves from ourselves and look 
down [gestures] on how are we doing what we’re doing? Not just re-
flective with what’s going on here and how can I make it better, but 
what am I doing and can I make myself and make the process I’m 
doing better. Okay, so reflexive in that sense. And then constant re-
evaluation as you, uh, an ongoing thing, the ability about the thing 
that brings in ethics… as you were saying, the ethics comes in here. 
Uh, who am I to presume, perhaps, that this is better and this [ges-
ture] is not. It opens up that idea. You have the boundaries issue, 
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once again, and… I have set boundaries. Are those good ones? Does 
this need to be fuzzy and reset [eraser gesture]? Critical in the fact 
that you must always help yourself understand you set these bounda-
ries without, [perhaps], knowing you have done it. And so break and 
try to reevaluate that. Critical Systems Heuristics comes into my head 
in there. So in this sense can you see, can you put the critical atti-
tude in your head, be in that paradigm and look again at the ISSS 
and tell me, through this lens, what it is that you see.”
He said that the critical-emancipatory paradigm has come from Hull 
University and is not generally known in the society. “There is some 
understanding and appreciation of those ideas… [but not] to the de-
gree that they are the operating principle by which lots of people 
truly operate.” There are those who would bring it in and have the 
ISSS “keep questioning things about itself” but “it tends to fall into 
solipsism… where people find themselves arguing just for its own 
sake without any particular goal or boundary to work from.” Reinforc-
ing that is the Society’s tradition of inclusion. 
Postmodernist
I describe my thoughts about postmodernism: “All this is nice but so 
many points of view and so many old theories and… who are we to 
know it’s the end of it? Actually, reality is far beyond what humans 
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could ever perceive. Situations, if you think of terms of interconnec-
tions of things and synchronicities in time are so far beyond what the 
human brain, according to Maturana and Varela, was ever designed 
for. It’s beyond our capacity.  So, the real situation, if we could even 
have any idea of perhaps even imagining there is one—is completely 
inaccessible. Far, far deeper… You would have to go far, far deeper in 
granularity than any of us could ever get and you will fall into solip-
sism. Postmodern really did fall into this solipsism.”  He says that re-
minds him of deconstruction. I continue: “Exactly. What’s the use? 
The world can go to hell and we can never really figure it out and if 
we did it would be like being… trying to impose our will and we’re not 
willing to do this.”
“So. I think postmodern phase two was: There’s something to be said 
about this infinite, like, complexity and the fact that there’s so many 
voices, who could ever hear them [all]? Boundaries are so perfused, 
you know, there’s so much multiplicity to what real life is. There’s 
something to be said about that. But can we deal with understanding 
it, anyway? There’s that pragmatic [being practical] side emerging, I 
think, from the postmodern, I think. There are postmodern people 
that, er, would… say, critical realism or something. But really it takes 
this postmodern ideas a little bit further and pragmatically tries to 
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make that function somehow to fit some purpose.  Rather, move for-
ward and take action in the spirit of what Jackson calls ‘improve-
ment’.  Right? If it is possible, we are called upon as humans to try to 
improve. You know. Okay. Um… Can you look then at the ISSS in that 
lens? Re-describe it again to me. Re-imagine and re-describe it again 
to me. Tell me what you see.”
He starts by saying that he doesn’t necessarily see it the same way I 
do. He throws in aspects not heretofore mentioned. The ISSS is “an 
ongoing, evolving thing. It’s the morass of individuals and ideas and 
connected with all kinds of other organisations and affiliations and 
desires, you know?… People want to become recognised as experts. 
People want to take ideas and turn them into books. People want to… 
In it’s own way it’s kind of the organic, ongoing, market[place].” 
“…And there is at the same time a bank account and there are actual 
functions that happen. And at some point either there will be people 
who are willing to put the amount of time it takes in doing the actual 
things that have to be done to keep an organisation going.” It is a 
problem that needs to be managed at the same time it must remain 
unmanaged!
“…And people will either bring enough resources to make a confer-
ence happen and put their time in… or not.” Put another way, “That’s 
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a real basic reality. So you can look at it in lots and lots of different 
ways. And there are lots of reasonable ways to describe it in terms of 
what it is that keeps people coming to it and, you know, it doesn’t 
make any sense to try to somehow confine it to a particular thing.”
Experiment’s value
Did he find any value in doing this experiment? He said it is always 
useful to look at a problem from multiple perspectives and that he is 
quite used to doing it “as a regular repertoire”. I ask if that means 
that what I am trying to formalise he does just as a matter of fact. 
He said, “Yes.” For Participant 1, “It’s helpful, it’s not different or 
new.”
8.3.2. Interview with ‘Participant 2’
“…everybody is a personal scientist that tries to make 
sense of their world with whatever tools they have at 
hand. And that uh, the difference between people who 
are labeled ‘crazy’ and people who are labeled ‘sane’… the 
big difference between them is that the constructs they 
had of their world were more suitable and more func-
tional.” —Participant 2
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Introduction and her ‘natural’ paradigm
I asked participant 2 to describe the situation as she sees it and what 
her own approach to this situation might be. She assumed an histori-
cal perspective to tell how the Society came to be and why the situa-
tion later came to be problematic. Systems’ early days, she said, saw 
the convergence of new ideas and brilliant people who addressed 
them. Not true of today. Big names established themselves but have 
since retired and to a certain extent the Society is still running on the 
brilliance of its early days. What can we do? “My best guess is that 
our best strategy is basically to roll along as best we can and wait to 
catch the next wave.” We have seen “techniques and knowledge that 
have been developed in the systems community and then applied to a 
discipline—the discipline runs off with it and uses it as a basic tool,” 
and we don’t necessarily get the credit. The publishing industry is 
partly to blame for that. We need to become better known, but we 
cannot expect too many people to connect with such advanced 
thought nor keep up with the pace of the growth in knowledge and 
information. Similarly, there is too much demand on today’s CEOs 
and decision makers who may have great responsibilities but cannot 
be intellectually prepared with all that they need to consider. A sys-
temist is a rare type of person and the education system is not set up 
to increase our numbers, nor set up for us to teach. We could edu-
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cate if we had funds. [5 of the 10 interviewees were or have been 
educators.] [All interviewees mentioned funding problems.] More 
people should be able to earn a living in Systems. We haven’t broken 
through so that people see our work as valuable. When we do work 
(if we can find the right clients and settings), people see it. She im-
plies we need to seek clients rather than waiting for them to find us. 
Some of our methods, however, are not quick, easy and cheap. With 
funds we could do projects ourselves; for example, community work, 
that could serve as demonstrations. 
I asked “What about internal factors?” There is progress with the 
ISSS website, she said, but we need to do more with its social as-
pects. We may need to switch to meeting online instead of at annual 
conferences due to constraints of money and ecology. ISSS should 
offer more scholarships and coordinate with other Societies.
Participant 2’s ‘natural’ paradigm was identified as positivist-
functionalist. See results table, Table 4, §9.2.
Positivism-Functionalism
She has friends, she says, “who would be saying things like, you 
know, you have to focus on marketing, marketing, marketing. Brand-
ing, marketing, public relations; doing something that would put you 
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out there, somehow. Umm, some of these things I think we do to 
some extent… They would be saying, ‘Can you quantify the benefits 
of some of the projects that you’ve done?’” and then tells stories 
about good interventions that went wrong for external reasons.
Interpretivism
I describe interpretivism and ask her to look at the ISSS once more 
using the interpretive paradigm. “Okay,” I said, “I have three other 
hats for you.”
She said “Okay!” and smiled. Her comments began with the thought 
that we should be made aware that our actions have consequences in 
the external world affecting people’s perceptions of who we are, and 
that we should question our means. I scored this as critical thinking. 
She adds that interpretivists have always been included in the ISSS—
which I scored as a positivist-functionalist comment about interpretiv-
ists.
Critical-emancipatory
Among her thoughts: The ISSS exercises little power over its mem-
bers. Academics may have power in their own institutions to direct 
students’ studies. The ISSS tries to facilitate its people but has little 
money. It is not involved in politics. Members do have the power to 
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circulate their own opinions. Lack of money is a constraint that dis-
empowers everyone. Our own view of self can entrap us or incapaci-
tate us. When times are hard, as they are now, people may have to 
tolerate what they otherwise could be free from. We are more con-
strained externally, we don’t constrain internally. The ISSS welcomes 
new students.
Postmodernist
Once again, I give my ‘customised’ version of postmodernism and in-
vite her to look at the ISSS that way.
“Postmodernism,” she said, “is about language; and our language 
[systems thinking] should be simplified and more normalised in order 
for us to understand each other and be understood by others as well.” 
“A time of change, such as we have now,” she said, “is turbulent and 
unsettled, making it seem complex.” Complexity theory is “really, 
really good at dealing with the usual situations. The advantage of that 
is to have energy and resources left for the unusual situations that 
don’t fit to the usual categories… With normal science… you find more 
and more people and more and more situations don’t fit. When too 
many things don’t fit you have to change the category.” 
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Experiment’s value
Did she see any value in doing this? 
“Well, I think the main thing that surfaced towards the end was the 
uh, perhaps a stronger appreciation of how important it is to find a 
way to communicate about how we see things. The patterns and lan-
guage being very key, here.”
8.3.3. Interview with ‘Participant 3’
“I like Mike Jackson’s framework. A lot. Um, it is, [sigh] it 
helps actually to shift from one point of view to another. 
But I don’t know how useful it is, how different some of 
these perspectives are.” —Participant 3.
Introduction and her ‘natural’ paradigm
Participant 3 is distinctive by taking a customer-centric point of view, 
asking what type of person would attend an ISSS convention (which 
she considers to be an academic organisation) and what other types 
would find that it was not for them. 
She would rather have told me about her own work and starts to do 
so, but I pushed back and brought the ISSS scenario back to the 
fore. (Later I realised this was a mistake. From the fifth interview on, 
I allowed the interviewee to pick the topic of their own intervention. 
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It added a new dimension of variety to the experiment and yielded 
much more insightful and interesting information for the experiment. 
It also lends support to the applicability of the method to a variety of 
problem scenarios.)
Participant 3 sees the Society as a service to academics and by ex-
tension, the wider world. She would ask the conference organisers to 
tell her what its purpose is. What is its greater good? “What’s the 
purpose of a professional organisation that is supposedly doing inte-
gration across the social and natural sciences? What are we trying to 
achieve?” She said that because the service is not being very well 
used, then “one should look at the environment and the people it 
could be serving.”  Since the conference location is moved each year, 
could it become a service to the ‘local’ community each year? That 
would be one way of providing service. “We could look at it in terms 
of users, providers, and the wider community.” We bring “resources” 
and we could connect and work with the communities’ “resources”.
Participant 3’s ‘natural’ paradigm was identified as critical-
emancipatory. See results table, Table 4, §9.2.
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
359
Positivism-Functionalism
I had asked the first interviewee to “shift into” another paradigm, “to 
do what I call ‘deploy’ the paradigm”, to “analyse it in that way”; and 
I asked the second to “put the [paradigm] attitude in your head”, “be 
in that paradigm” and “tell me what you see”. With Participant 3 I be-
gan by saying, “I need to shut you down”:
“Now I’m going to have to, sort of, perhaps shut you down a bit. Now, 
can you imagine a person who thinks in the um, the, you probably 
have colleagues or friends who think only in the functionalist para-
digm. “How much does this cost?” “When can it be done?” “How 
many people do you need?” “How much improvement, can you get 
3% reduction out of this?” or, or whatever. And they’re, they’re into 
everything that can be measured and if it’s, if it’s not fact it doesn’t 
exist. It’s not true. So. First of all, if you would just uh, sort of, shut 
yourself down into imagining you’re like this type of person— Could 
you re-imagine the ISSS for a moment, thinking in just those terms, 
how you would see the world differently. And, and, sort of possible 
um, solutions you might be able to come up with within that particu-
lar paradigmatic view.”
“How many registrations have we got this year?” she said. “And can 
we afford to advertise? We could make use of university websites.” 
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There are the practical aspects of running a conference and fiscal 
concerns. She praised Jennifer Wilby and others who give so much of 
themselves. 
Interpretivism
“Okay. Perfect,” I say. “Switch to um, uh interpretive paradigm. …”
She remarks about the fact that how differently people see the world 
and the fact that they come together is “actually quite special.” 
“There is, to a large extent a tolerance of, of, diversity, of viewpoint… 
There are debates, but they are done fairly.”
In terms of the ISSS and its basis in various paradigms, “when the 
dialogue actually closes down,” she says, it is usually the case where 
at least one person “imagines that they have the… one and only true 
paradigm.” She gives a specific example of a conversation she had 
with another member earlier that day: “The debate was, though, that 
his maps were the truth and… He is very respectful in listening to 
other people. However, he still believes that their paradigm is the 
truth… I said ‘Yes, I think possibly your arguments do hold for, for the 
natural sciences up to a point. But even the natural sciences have 
evolved through debate and, and paradigm shifts. So you’ve always 
got to be open to testing out ideas.’”
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Critical-emancipatory
“Okay. Wonderful!” I say,  “Can we switch to critical systems thinking 
or emancipatory, it might be called? …” 
Her response was about the traditional emphasis we in the ISSS have 
of diffusing power plays (as they are inevitable): “I think that a lot of 
the… participants at ISSS are very good at working with power.” How? 
“Whenever people are taking themselves too seriously there will be 
humour and there will be ways of addressing it… If people are critical 
and systemic there isn’t much chance for a total power approach to 
prevail at the time.”
Postmodernist
“I get fed up with postmodernism taken to extremes,” she said. “Uh 
hmm…. I don’t buy postmodernism,” she repeated. “I would say, first 
and foremost that I am not a postmodernist. However, I do think that 
some of the postmodernist ideas have been very enriching. We, in 
fact, if we buy into the notion of multiple truths and perhaps on no 
possibility of finding the truth; we remove the hope of social envi-
ronmental justice. So I, you can’t really function that way, at all. Be-
sides which I don’t actually buy it. Because I believe that the more 
you engage in dialogue and testing out ideas, the better the match or 
response to a particular situation.”
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“I accept the fact that you can have expanded forms of testing so 
that, instead of just the experts making the decisions, you have the 
people who are going to be affected by the process. That’s a falsifica-
tion process. That’s a testing process. And you can build in principles 
of subsidiarity. You can build in sort of Ashby’s rule… It certainly helps 
if you take into account the people who are going to be affected and 
if you said what Béla Bánáthy suggested, ‘think of future generations’, 
then the probability is that you are going to come up with much bet-
ter decisions. I avoid the notion of truth. Instead, I stick with ‘better’, 
‘more just’, ‘more appropriate’ decisions and then I don’t have to get 
into that territory.”
Experiment’s value
“Yes,” she said when asked the question as to whether or not this ex-
periment was of any value to her. “Encouraging people to look at an 
area of concern even thinking about how to frame that area of con-
cern by using critical thinking tools is great. And many students have 
said that it’s changed their way of seeing the world, that it’s made 
them much better at research, it made them better policymakers.”
Then she reminds me that my thesis assumes the systemist is not 
one of those “mean spirited” people who would rather not learn, 
would rather not change; someone who would say, “I have an ex-
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tremely good life and everybody else may be suffering— I think I’ll 
just continue doing what I am doing because why should I change?” 
She reminds me that change happens very slowly.
Another good point she makes is that “critical systems thinking is 
only as good as the practice. So I like thinking of praxis.” That 
prompts me to ask how she feels about pragmatism (operating with-
out a theoretical approach). She says that there is ‘narrow pragma-
tism’ and ‘expanded pragmatism’ from West Churchman’s “Design of 
Inquiring Systems”. When I point out if that is a theory about how 
pragmatism should be done, then what is practiced is not pragmatic 
(as in pragmatism), she responds, “Uh hmm. But you think about the 
consequences instead of just in narratives for others and for the envi-
ronment and the next generation—that form of, of pragmatism of 
thinking about the consequences is actually— If you take it and think 
of it in those expanded terms then um, it isn’t uh, necessarily prob-
lematic. So, idealism matters how you see it, idealism can be prob-
lematic if in fact you are not prepared when you set what ought to be 
doing the following, but if your lenses of what ought to be the case 
are very limited, then you will make very poor decisions. Whereas 
with EXPANDED pragmatism based on a design of inquiring systems 
that asks questions, ‘Well, what will be the implications for myself, for 
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others, for the environment,’ and you use those sorts of questioning 
tools you can make much better um, decisions.”
8.3.4. Interview with ‘Participant 4’
“If this Society is going to last in the long term and be ef-
fective we need to address this whole issue of how can 
we help the access to society to make systems thinking 
mainstream. Because, at the moment, systems thinking 
is seen by a lot of people as some sort of a cult or a 
movement of a few people in the world who try to tell 
everyone this is a new discipline, there’s a new way of 
thinking… So I started to realise that we will have to be-
come much more conspicuous in practice.” —Participant 
4.
This interview was a disaster on my part, but there were remarkable 
results, nevertheless. Because of the difficulty I had here, in subse-
quent interviews I abandoned the original hypothetical scenario, the 
ISSS’ viability, and asked the interviewee to choose an intervention of 
their own—something they had done in the past. Had this been the 
case here, Participant 4 would certainly have been more engaged and 
more capable of connecting his real experiences with theory. He does 
manage to get his own story in, anyway, but I do not manage that 
well and the interview is overlong.
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Participant 4’s natural approach is for the most part positivist-
functionalist and he focuses on natural environmental and socio-
cultural issues involving problems of sustainability. He wants to es-
tablish a network of education centres where teaching and learning 
take place together in ‘learning laboratories’.
The problems with the ISSS are owing to the disconnection between 
ourselves and the wider world, he explains. It is too cerebral and in-
active, disengaged from problem solving activities.
Participant 4 contributes three great stories about how he introduces 
people to systems thinking—the red spots story, the monkey story 
and the housecleaning story—all stories with practical problems that 
everyone can relate to, and all are resolved with systemic thinking.
Participant 4 is an expert on a modeling tool called Bayesian belief 
networks. He has just discovered that another modeling tool, causal 
loop diagrams, illuminates a different and highly valuable understand-
ing of the same system. He plans on blending these methodologies in 
future practice. Another colleague has FAM software that helps deal 
with political and legal issues. Using all three together this way, Par-
ticipant 4’s practice will then be a true mixed-multimethodology. 
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Introduction and his ‘natural’ paradigm
Participant 4 presses for a shift in emphasis from our “inward focus” 
towards an orientation on action and results. The viability of the ISSS 
depends on becoming known in the world, mainstream, and become 
more conspicuous through systems practice, “Infiltrating society with 
systems thinking and systems education, problem-based research.” 
He is involved in planning to form “a network of systems education 
for systems education.” From this, training would take place in learn-
ing laboratories for sustainability; practice and research together. 
Because we need to teach everybody, from the Ph.D. to the taxi 
driver, talking about systems concepts in simple terms is necessary, 
he said. For example, ‘leverage points’. He would draw a lever and 
fulcrum and say, “if you press that little thing, the whole thing, you 
can lift a big weight.” It makes it easier for them to understand par-
ticipatory analysis, systems analysis and systems thinking. Then in 
the learning laboratories they see that it works. 
The red spot story is a humorous allegory. Basically, a person with 
red spots all over his body seeks help. The first recommendation is to 
get makeup to cover them up. Then they shower and the makeup 
comes off, the spots are still there. To be effective, he needs to know 
why they are there. A medical doctor tells him his liver is sick and 
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
367
gives him tablets. That’s a systemic intervention, to stimulate the 
liver. But talk to all the stakeholders. For example, a taxi driver says, 
“No, the reason his liver is sick is because he drinks a tremendous 
amount of alcohol.” Another man says that he knows the he is a 
stressed out person, and when he gets stressed out he gets spots. 
The problem is stress. Looking further we find the guy has marital 
problems that cause the stress. The stress causes the drinking which 
effects the liver and causes the spots. He needs marriage counseling, 
after all. When this kind of simple model or simple examples are 
used, he said; they understand very, very quickly. 
The monkey story comes next. As he tells it, the Germans gave $3M 
to protect the habitat for monkeys in Vietnam by promoting tourism. 
Tourism boomed, but the monkey population did not rebound as ex-
pected. It turns out that the new prosperity had bypassed the local 
population, the true stakeholders. As business scooped in the reve-
nues from tourism, they remained poor. It was discovered that locals 
were forced to hunt and fish illegally to feed themselves and their 
families. Here we have another example of a systemic intervention 
gone wrong due to the failure to find and intervene at the true root of 
the phenomenon.
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Participant 4’s ‘natural’ paradigm was identified as positivist-
functionalist and pragmatist. See results table, Table 4, §9.2.
Positivism-Functionalism
I try to seek his buy-in on the idea of paradigms. I’m aware that he is 
skeptical of theory, but at this point I do not know how alien my ideas 
are to him. I rush through the briefest of introductions and I throw 
my instructions out at him as if this was a quick review of something 
he is already very familiar with.
He begins haltingly. “I th-, hm. I think, I understan—, I’m not sure I 
understand you correctly but… I think that, we have all… We have 
members that are like that. They only think in those terms, right?”
“Yes,” I replied. “You, you would, then kind of be like them and look 
at this picture and tell me what you see out of it that way.”
He says that the ISSS doesn’t do anything, they just talk about doing 
things. He wants to see intervention in action, case studies, propos-
als. He states, reflexively (in the sense of reflexivity) that he needs to 
understand how theorists and practitioners “feed off each other,” be-
cause, he says, “I tend to lose interest in… in that person if they con-
tinually tried to explain everything that we do with theory but never 
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gets to the point where this person actually takes action with us in 
practice. They will remain theorists.”
Interpretivism
The interview had gone on too long already. In the interests of time I 
decided to skip interpretivism. This is yet another flaw in my ap-
proach to data collection. Unfortunately, the decision to omit this sec-
tion was a bad one. As there will always be an unknown area here, it 
weakens support for my general observations and conclusions.
Critical-emancipatory
He says that maybe the ISSS should think about changing its format. 
“I should go there,” he says, “and give a paper then say, this is what 
we’re doing—, this is what I’m doing—, these are the findings—. This 
is the new theory that we developed off these findings—. And this is 
how we apply it now—.” He wonders if we waste time talking about 
theory.
“When we go away from here, I’m still going to use Bayesian belief 
networks, [redacted] is still going to use… and [redacted] is still going 
to use FAM.” Then he had an idea. Maybe “we can talk to each other 
about these things and see how the one can build on the other… How 
1 + 1 could become 4. And how we can take good bits out of Bayes-
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ian logic and good bits out of causal loops and, and so on, and 
maybe… these things converge… then new and innovative things 
emerge.” Later, in his answer to the question of value, he gets deeper 
into this idea and it becomes something very special.
Postmodernist
We work with uncertainty, he said, and we will never have all that we 
need to know, but our process has to be one of continuous improve-
ment and continuous learning.
Experiment’s value
He reports a particular problem with learning theory in the traditional 
sense. For him, the “show me” approach, rather than the “tell me” 
approach works. I would classify him as an expert pragmatist. He 
admitted that he would be sticking to the one method that he knows 
works—Bayesian belief networks—but by the time we got to this sec-
tion (on what, if any, benefit the exercise had for him), he was al-
ready designing a new, mixed method:
“What will really happen with causal loops and Bayesian is 
those two things have converged and what’s emerging 
out of that is new things that, that we, that was not pos-
sible before when you ONLY look at Bayesian or ONLY 
looked at causal. Very simple things like if you ONLY look 
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at Bayesian you don’t really understand the interconnect-
edness. So you can drill down into this thing and you can 
understand all of the parts of the car needs to be work-
ing. And they need to be cleaned. And they need to be… 
But if you don’t know exactly how they all fit together you 
will never get that car to run. So that… these two actually 
help us to do things that we previously couldn’t do easily 
with just causal loop modeling. You know? And, and the 
Bayesian belief networks help with that.
“And then [redacted] came in and he said, we have the 
Popeive[?] computer. And I still don’t know how it works 
but he says that also helps you identify leverage points. 
So maybe there’s 3 methods that we could throw to-
gether. And uh. And uh, yeah.”
I believe the experiment helped him recognise his isolationist ap-
proach which seems also to have stimulated a synthesis of different 
methods. He now be less hesitant to “look behind the curtain” of 
these methods to check into their theoretical underpinnings. As he 
said, “It’s easier to identify what tools or what theory to use and 
match to the particular tools or one of the other things if you actually 
understand the theory.” 
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8.3.5. Interview with ‘Participant 5’
“I’ve been wondering how do we get fresh blood? Which I 
think is very important… So I think new blood is very im-
portant. And two new-blood things that I have noticed… 
It’s one way of getting, experimenting with bringing in 
new blood of a certain calibre… One way of bringing a 
younger blood in and a newer blood… The average age 
is… old.” —Participant 5
Introduction and her ‘natural’ paradigm
When she was new to the ISSS, Participant 5 said, she was over-
whelmed. She criticised an apparent lack of relationship between the 
papers given at the conference. A common complaint from newcom-
ers is that their first conference was not what they expected. “It is 
difficult to take it all in.” She spoke of the need for fresh blood. The 
ISSS may be stale. There are too many old people and too few young 
people; again something that was a mismatch with her expectations. 
She does acknowledge that this is not the place for an intellectual 
who is “too young” and she does talk about the wisdom and intellec-
tual excellence of the Society. There is a lot here yet to be learned.
Participant 5’s ‘natural’ paradigm was identified as critical-
emancipatory. See results table, Table 4, §9.2.
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Positivism-Functionalism
I mistakenly assumed that she knew about the paradigms of critical 
systems thinking. I rushed through my description of the first para-
digm and the instructions. 
“If I was talking from a functionalist perspective, what would I, how 
would I say it differently, what I have said now?” she asked. 
If I were a positivist-functionalist, she said, “I would then be talking 
about how do we quantify the quality of the conversations.” 
Interpretivism
She said, “When I hear people talk, at least conceptually I say to my-
self, sometimes they are reinforcing my meta-level understanding of 
something. And that’s really good. But sometimes they break it. Ei-
ther by introducing something that I’ve never really thought about, or 
something that is contrary to my meta-level understanding. And 
that’s when I say I get a chance to re-look at my meta-model, what-
ever that happens to be, or my meta-understanding across the spec-
trum to say, “Okay. How do I now change?” Do I accept it and do I 
stay with my uh, and change you know that new stuff or that change 
stuff, and change my meta-level of it, or do I say, ‘No! Even though 
that might be right for you, in my experience I still hold where I am’. 
And it’s against that that I tend to, to rate it.”
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Critical-emancipatory
“I think what is really useful is that when a person can utilise their 
power in a fashion that enables those who want to be reflective to re-
flect.” 
Postmodernist
One of her concerns is the topic of values and ethics, something that 
various members of the ISSS are concerned with and make important 
but that she feels do not translate well to interventions. If we don’t 
take the time to have the ethics and values conversations with our 
clients, she said, we can “fall into that trap of posturing as if we 
know, conclusively or exhaustively.” 
This then leads her into associations with philosophy and idealism, 
greed and capitalism, and the tradeoff that occurs in the design of 
systems: we cannot design systems that can withstand every disas-
ter, so where do you draw the line on robustness? And how do you 
admit to doing that and justify your decisions? She doesn’t stop 
there. Concern after concern is mentioned, one after another and 
they are overwhelming. 
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
375
Experiment’s value
She seemed genuinely very pleased that she had discovered and 
learned valuable things, but it was not clear what they were. 
8.3.6. Interview with ‘Participant 6’
“The thing that I’m most interested in is the creation of 
democratic institutions and the dispersal of power.” —
Participant 6.
Introduction and his ‘natural’ paradigm
The previous five interviews had been done three months earlier. By 
this time I was ready to try letting the interviewee pick his or her own 
intervention: “We start by having you pick your system and just tell-
ing me your natural approach. How you see… What you see in your 
system as things that are issues and concerns and then how you 
think maybe you think you might approach uh, some resolution.”
His case study is with a cooperatively owned community market to 
help them implement an “ethical merchandizing code.” This co-op is 
25 years old and has 8,000 members. It was originally founded by a 
group of Society of Friends, or ‘Quakers’, who held a few strong val-
ues: “a marginal belief in God, a belief in peace, a belief that they 
wanted to provide themselves with healthy, organic food.” Today’s 
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members are diverse and simply like shopping at this particular shop 
“because it has good quality merchandise; locally sourced, sustain-
able, organic (to the most part) food.” To keep to those values the 
management had developed a detailed code of merchandizing that 
was some four pages long. There were problems. “It wasn’t being 
implemented, [and] wasn’t being used at all by the staff.” Participant 
6 was asked to intervene and see that it was successfully imple-
mented.
In “intimate” interviews with small groups of managers, he found that 
there was “a disconnect” between what the Board of Directors had 
established and what was actually happening on the ground. The four 
page merchandizing code was “very complex, very qualitatively 
based, very value based.” The Board did not want the co-op to buy 
from vendors who did not have “a good track record” of human 
rights, union rights, or animal rights. After many attempts to work 
out how to implement the policy, it became apparent that the infor-
mation required to vet every product supplier and to keep up to date 
on possible violations of the purchasing criteria by any of them was 
an immense task—they would have to form an entirely new depart-
ment to do this—and it was seen as a commitment and responsibility 
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that nobody wanted to assume. It was decided that implementation 
of the policy as it was currently conceived was unworkable.
At this point there was an expectation that Participant 6 was an ex-
pert, and as such, he should know what ought to be done. In any 
case, they waited for him to impose a solution. This, he said—avoid-
ing a coercive situation—was the most difficult part of the interven-
tion for everyone. He insisted that he was not an expert; he had no 
magic solution; and that the future was up to them; theirs to decide. 
His hope was for individuals to engage and take power for them-
selves; to liberate themselves from what would otherwise be im-
posed.
Then one of the group members said that in his department they kept 
a notebook of documentation on each product for the employees to 
record whatever information, good or bad, they knew or heard about, 
including customer comments. At some point it had become a refer-
ence. The thinking was that if a customer wanted to know about a 
particular product or supplier they could read this material and make 
up their own mind whether or not to purchase the product. 
The decision to take this concept companywide was suggested and 
approved. It would be transferred to the web, customers could search 
through it and would be invited to contribute, as well. A self-selected 
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group of employees would control for malicious comments and oth-
erwise allow whatever seems reasonable to be posted. The great ad-
vantage of this, says Participant 6, is that it takes the co-op out of 
the vetting and policing business. The point of power and responsibil-
ity then rests in the consumer. They may take the power for them-
selves. They decide which products to support, and which products 
not to support. It then becomes evident which products should be 
removed from the shelves—those not being purchased. 
Participant 6’s ‘natural’ paradigm was identified as critical-
emancipatory. See results table, Table 4, §9.2.
Positivism-Functionalism
Participant 6 was able to act out what a functionalist might do. If 
there was a dip in revenue, for example, he said he would look at 
trend data to see if it was a periodic cycle; for example, a seasonal 
thing. Next, he might look at whether the customer demographics 
had changed and look at the local economy, etc.; ruling out the most 
likely causes like a doctor might diagnose a patient. He would look at 
whether the dip was owing to any particular department or product. 
Then he might look for structural changes in the company itself, pol-
icy, for example, or a change of management. He would search for 
root causes, he said.
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Could he find positivist-functionalist aspects in his own intervention 
scenario? There was a nine second pause while he thought. I imagine 
he was consciously disengaging from his intervention as a critical-
emancipatory systemist and trying to re-envision the problem as a 
positivist-functionalist. Was he then able to do that exploration? That 
this took so many seconds suggests the high level of complexi-
ty—when this sort of thing is being done for the first time. 
“What I would see would be the inability of the General Manager to 
find creative solutions to a problem,” he said at last. In that situation 
it looked like the failure of the General Manager to implement the 
Board’s directive. He added that he would probably try coaching him 
to develop his skills. 
Interpretivism
He would start by getting clarification from the Board and from the 
group members what is meant by ‘human rights’ and ‘animal rights’. 
For example, what about whether or not a company provided ‘decent 
living conditions’? He would seek to further ‘quantify’ those ideas and 
seek consensus on something measurable. Then he would seek to get 
‘buy in’ from the stakeholders, “So that we all know what page we’re 
on and what our expectation and what our responsibilities are.”
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He said, “What we’re really saying is that we don’t want to sell prod-
ucts from companies that do not have a good track record of human 
rights, and what that really means is we don’t want our customers to 
buy [them], which really means we want our customers to know who 
the bad guys are and who the good guys are… It gets political. It’s 
completely value based.” If the consumer wants a Coca-cola they will 
buy it, anyway. “But if enough people don’t want to buy it, it will go 
away.” This is also a form of negotiation, he said, but it’s “negotiating 
with their wallet.” 
At about this time I said, “Stop! Now you’re getting into values.”
Critical-emancipatory
Considering how this is Participant 6’s “natural paradigm”—he even 
identified it as such—I skipped over the critical-emancipatory para-
digm. I now consider this decision to have been a mistake; some new 
thoughts or insights might have surfaced.
Postmodernist
“My purpose here on Earth,” he argued, “is to leave the world a little 
bit better than I left it and to build the family of humanity… So, I’m 
not so much interested in theory. I’m interested in praxis. I’m inter-
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ested in what theory does for humans. My goal is human flourishing… 
I can’t work with that paradigm in that system,” he said, reluctantly.
I said, “Uh huh,” and sat back, giving him a moment to think. It was 
a new technique for me.
Presently, he said, “It’s impossible. It would be… It would… I can’t 
work with that paradigm in that system, But to the extent that I 
could, I think that the the the um, the solution… the process that was 
developed in this particular intervention was as close to it as I could 
come. Because what it does is allows the ultimate consumer, the 
member, to say…” and then he switched his point of view from the 
systemist to the consumer and said, “You don’t want me to buy Coca 
Cola because you have given me a whole stack of information that 
says that it’s an evil company… I’m going to buy it anyway. I am in 
power. I am not accepting your value. You are… If you tried to impose 
your value upon me it would be a… patronizing me and demeaning 
me as agent.” 
Then he switched back to his own point of view to sum it all up. “They 
achieved their goals by basically saying, ‘Well we believe that every-
body… That nobody in their right mind would buy this product be-
cause it’s such an evil company.’ But in point of fact, the point of de-
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cision, the point of power rests in the adult person, the agent, who 
has the the right to do that, if they want.”  
(There is an optimism in the idea that the company will trust the con-
sumer to do the right thing for themselves. This is liberation from be-
ing the liberator.)
It had become such an exciting experience, I think for both of us, 
that the interview protocol broke down. I jumped in and it became a 
lively, quick exchange of creative insights. I said, “Yes! And you know 
what too, postmodernists have to understand… that our values are 
transitory. I might care today—”
“Absolutely!” he shouted.
“I might care today and I might not care tomorrow. In the heat, you 
know, give me a Coke!… And I might change my mind with new in-
formation. It’s all in flux. And I’m allowed to change my mind!”
“You are because you’re an agent,” he said. “And in point of fact, you 
cannot, you know… The truth, the truth is a chimera! It does not ex-
ist.”
“Yes! Excellent!”
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Language and ‘truth’ are fundamentally mismatched. He said, “You 
can’t even talk about it linguistically. What you can talk about linguis-
tically is justification.”
Experiment’s value
“Oh, you know,” he said, in response to my question as to the ex-
periment’s value, “only in the last. You know, when you asked me the 
question about the postmodern thought. And uh—”
“Well, that was the hardest one to get out of you,” I interjected.
“Yeah. But I’m so… the answer was there. And I’m so fascinated in 
conditions of power uh, that uh… Power and value go hand in hand. 
8.3.7. Interview with ‘Participant 7’
“I would love to add to your last words [about whether or 
not systemists can switch paradigms], um— ‘Can they do 
that?’ They can and they have to… It is good for your 
training to focus on one… theory you learn in depth. You 
really read the books. You really know the methodologies. 
You really know the background. And that gives you pos-
sibility to stand firm, to hold your ground. And at the 
same time it allows you the flexibility to approach any 
other kind of method and include that into your toolbox 
because you know how to relate to that. See, whenever 
you study one specific method or methodology or theory 
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to its end, you come to the end where a strong theory 
softens because it faces its boundaries, where it can’t ex-
plain any more. Where you have the paradox… the end of 
the paradigm.” —Participant 7.
Participant 7 spoke of “the NLP folks”. I had first assumed that NLP 
was the name of the company where the intervention took place, but 
it seems the most likely reference is to ‘neuro-linguistic programming’ 
which is 
…an approach to communication, personal development, 
and psychotherapy created in the 1970s. The title refers 
to a stated connection between the neurological proc-
esses ("neuro"), language ("linguistic") and behavioral 
patterns that have been learned through experience 
("programming") and can be organized to achieve specific 
goals in life (Tosey and Mathison, 2006).
His approach sees reality as a pluralism of individuals’ viewpoints 
(ontological), efforts for coming to a consensus and establishing nor-
mative expectations, in the sense that participants must collectively 
agree to measurements and milestones (epistemological), which they 
then agree to act on and achieve together (methodological). Onto-
logically, it is subjective. Epistemologically, it is interpretive. By defi-
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nition, therefore, Participant 7 first takes an interpretive approach to 
systemic problem solving. But NLP is a positivist/structural-
functionalist theory and he relies upon it to fashion and shape a con-
sensus and then to fashion and shape a project of change manage-
ment agreed to and with commitments from the participants. His ap-
proach is therefore a blend of interpretivist and positivist/structural-
functionalist practices.
Introduction and his ‘natural’ paradigm
He begins by describing his methodology in general terms. There are 
always three steps, he says—inquiry, mapping and hypothesis-
ing—and the more stakeholders involved in this the better the quality. 
Inquiry is “exploring the situation with all the systemic and non-
systemic tools which are available” (the difference being how a tool is 
used). This data may be “insights you produce or stories you come to 
hear about… or whatever.” Mapping is making a picture of the “foci of 
attention” or issues raised from the inquiry data, by paraphrasing and 
“entering the ‘loops of understanding’ and all these kinds of things”. 
Next is a deeper analysis which asks, “What are the semantics behind 
that? What are the leading distinctions which create these subject 
matters… What are the practices behind it?” And finally, “Out of that 
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comes the hypotheses.” It was important, he said, to be solution ori-
ented, rather that problem oriented. 
I asked him to talk about a specific situation. 
The intervention was a for change management with a manufacturer 
who had recently experienced rapid growth. The concern was over 
“quality issues”. His company, he said, uses systemic inquiry for ex-
ploring social systems, organisations, institutions, NGO’s, etc. In this 
case he interviewed the department head (the primary stakeholder) 
and later two interviewers also did so. (He did not mention what was 
said in or agreed at those meetings.) Their intervention was a two 
day workshop held with the department manager’s 25 direct re-
ports—supervisors, I assume—and this is where the three stages he 
mentioned above occurred: exploring, mapping, hypothesising, “and 
testing them out on the people to see if we had, so to speak, the 
Leggo bricks out of which we were able to build up a change process 
for those.” It involves “exploring what kind of change, what kind of 
activities they are coined to.” Then, “we have to sort that out and 
bring them in a meaningful order,” so they are “moving towards the 
next practice, rather than the best practice”. 
His role is not to provide a mastermind solution, but to “facilitate” 
dialogue and decision making. Otherwise, “people won’t identify.” 
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They could do this themselves, he said, if they create the same prac-
tice of “holding the space to facilitate their communication.”
Lastly, he mentions that these projects require him to accept respon-
sibility for the whole process. And, as the facilitator, this includes his 
guarantee to protect the primary stakeholder (department manager) 
from attack. “People can get very mad” in these workshops, he said. 
Taking full responsibility and providing protection assures the primary 
stakeholder and lowers the perceived risk.
Participant 7’s ‘natural’ paradigm was identified as positivist-
functionalist. See results table, Table 4, §9.2.
Positivism-Functionalism
In Participant 7’s terms, we have an “ecology of paradigms.” And of 
the positivist-functionalist paradigm: “Yes! Yes! Yes! We need it des-
perately. They need it desperately.” He pointed out again the funda-
mental importance of the map (the central metaphor) that is created 
from everybody’s ideas in the intervention. He said, “They need to 
know where they are and how they get where they want to go,” and 
“We need to lay out the landscape.” “With the map you can say, ‘here 
you are.’ The map can tell you how far you have come and how far 
you still have to go.” The map then links to resources. He reminds us 
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that many change management projects fail because they do not 
properly account for the need and the usage of resources. Resources 
need to be measured and monitored as well as milestones, he said.
“So after the first set of sessions they were able to engage in the 
whole endeavor. So that they knew what they had signed up for… We 
won them over and their energy.” 
Volunteers were called for to form a task force and steering commit-
tee. They were asked to meet three times over the summer “to keep 
the whole thing going and to do further preparation and refinement”.
Interpretivism
What is most interesting in his reexamination of his story with the in-
terpretivist perspective relates to the high value that interpretivism 
generally places on consensus and normative power. (Contrast this 
with positivist/structural-functionalism which is not concerned, with 
critical-emancipatory which is suspects coercion and repression, and 
postmodernism which values individualism.)
“It’s not… so much to get the truth out of people… That can change. 
Overnight or even from one moment to the next one. … They come 
out of the head and into the social realm of the group and so the 
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end… it is not something rock solid. It is something that can be em-
braced and taken on a journey. So.”
“A lot of the process is negotiation in terms of how do I see the world, 
how do you see the world, and how can we agree on something that 
enables us to jointly march in one direction. … We’re back to the 
map. What is the kind of map that we are looking at? Is that the map 
which will enable us to uh, to venture the journey?” 
I think this is about persuasion—a skill that can be studied and devel-
oped; here we see it is especially useful for the methods of interpre-
tivism.
“The NLP [Neuro-Linguistic Programming] people are pretty advanced 
in that. The pacing and leading thing.” [Pacing and leading are facili-
tation techniques to manipulate the flow of conversation. Pacing is 
establishing rapport to make persuasive communication easier. Lead-
ing is steering your prospect toward your point of view. (Mortensen, 
n.d.).]
Critical-emancipatory
He wants to separate the critical and emancipatory aspects and be-
gins with the emancipatory: He said, “You wouldn’t be surprised if I 
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tell you that… we are engaging… in the stuff that we do, starting with 
the emancipatory side.” 
“The problem (as opposed to solution) focus would be, ‘Oh, that is in-
justice and we have a problem with power’ and all this. Get away 
from all of that. Solution would be ‘what is the best balance for inclu-
sion and participation in the process?’” 
“Open up the room for everybody. Get everybody involved… Really 
engage them in the process by listening. First of all, listening. Um, 
nothing is more powerful than listening if you want to win over some-
body” (followed later by getting them to accept responsibility for what 
needs done).
“… But not to the price that you hit the leader with a club over the 
head.” (Later, we find out there were meetings beforehand in which 
he and the leader, or boss, have made an agreement about what was 
to happen during this meeting.)
Then he moves on to the critical aspect of the critical-emancipatory 
paradigm. In this phase he traces the origin of his technique back to 
its roots in group dynamics which then the idea was to “fuel up the 
conflict in the group and then let them work it out… And whatever 
comes is okay.” Not very successful, he says. Next were systemic 
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consulting and systemic therapy methodologies working with teams 
and resources. Now the idea is looking for the possible ‘next practice’ 
to change towards a more desirable state. With this there has to be a 
determination as to whether the change will be ‘enough’. It also in-
volves discourse analysis. 
It is up to the critical-emancipatory paradigm to point out the poten-
tial abuse of power. The critical and emancipatory aspects work to-
gether. The critical looks at boundaries and reflexively questions it-
self. The emancipatory looks for power and control issues with the in-
tent to liberate where it finds unfairness. The critical will help with the 
idea of what is ‘unfair’ here. 
Postmodernist
Participant 7 corrects and adds important ideas to my description of 
postmodernism. He says that the reasoning of decisions, being trans-
parent and open for critique belongs in the critical paradigm. He con-
siders postmodern to be “engaging with the practice, not with the 
map;” that is, not with the model. It considers resilience and viability. 
It is, he says, about mastering the craft of your methodology so that 
it can be done effortlessly. He brings up the idea of aesthetics and 
design. Ranulph, for example, he says, is “brilliant, by the way. 
Where systemic design meets systemic practice. Design as such is a 
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very postmodern practice in this respect. And so we can learn a lot 
from designers in the way… how they go about approaching a prob-
lem, approaching a task. They, they don’t even approach problems. 
They don’t have problems. They want to bring something to the world 
and then they go. And if they see what they started isn’t getting 
them anywhere, they start over again. And they wouldn’t call that a 
problem.”
Experiment’s value
I prefaced the wrap-up question with a bit about my thesis: “I wanted 
to know,” I said, “Can systems thinkers do it? Can they rotate 
through different paradigms, pull out anything useful, or will their 
brains break? Or will they refuse? Or will they not understand or they 
will not engage with this ideas of shifting paradigmatic views.” Then I 
went on about how important it is to employ some kind of multipara-
digmatic perspective.
“I would love to add to your last words” he said. “Um, ‘can they do 
that?’ They can and they have to. To extend their practice wherever 
they go.”  He said it is like the Japanese martial arts tradition of mas-
tery of the sword where the ultimate goal is winning without fighting. 
It is a brilliant story. 
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It is good for your own training to focus on one of those— 
to have one theory you learn in depth. You really read the 
books. You really know the methodologies. You really 
know the background. And that gives you possibility to 
stand firm, to hold your ground. And at the same time it 
allows you the flexibility to approach any other kind of 
method and include that into your toolbox because you 
know how to relate to that. 
See, whenever you study one specific method or method-
ology or theory to its end, you come to the end where a 
strong theory softens because it faces its boundaries, 
where it can’t explain any more. Where you have the 
paradox at. Where you see that you can’t really find the 
question. So to speak, the end of paradigm. And you 
have to reach that and or… I’ll put it the other way 
around, if you reach the end of paradigm then you’re 
again in a position where you can reflect on the whole 
method or the methodology, the whole theory and put it 
into a postmodern contingency of methods. And say, 
‘Okay, this is one method. It has its strengths, it has its 
limitations.’ It’s a method… er, it’s a theory. It’s a 
weapon. It’s a tool. And there are other tools which do 
other things. But my mastery, as a systems practitioner is 
to elegantly [use] this theory or to elegantly handle this 
method. And not to be intrigued by the strength of the 
method and saying, ‘Okay, I have a sword. And whenever 
somebody comes along I chop his head off.’”
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Then I asked the question, “when you went through this exercise with 
me, did you find anything of value out of that for you? Did you come 
up with any thoughts that you hadn’t had before… or seen?” And I 
got another beautiful story.
A lot of the tools, methods, methodologies that we use 
are fairly trivial in the end and in their application. So you 
can more or less easily mimicry the whole thing. And go 
out and about and sell your services as consulting or even 
as systemic consulting. But then you are out in front of 
the theory, not behind. Blaise Pascale said it so nicely. 
“All development goes from the trivial through the com-
plicated to the simple. And there is a difference between 
simple and trivial. And the middle bit makes a difference.” 
And that’s why a proper practitioner needs uh the educa-
tion and qualification and the exposure to the theory and 
the methodology and has to go through the whole thing 
to its very end. Then you can take it from there.
It seems that what Participant 7 learned from our interview is what it 
was he felt he needed to tell me that I did not know. It enriched me.
8.3.8. Interview with ‘Participant 8’
“A being… of course we have preferences. But the prefer-
ences arise out of a moment. As long as we maintain a 
manner of relating with others that takes into account 
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their legitimacy of beings and takes care some thought 
about the consequences of our actions far beyond our-
selves, whether it’s just for the one closest to us like you 
right now, or the biosphere as a whole. And wisdom has 
to do with that balance of operating with care, under-
standing and expansion of perspective which we men-
tioned before, and a willingness to flow with the times 
and not… be a… a non-attachment. To be always willing… 
to redesigning constantly, if we talk in Ranulph’s terms 
which are quite new to me, by the way. I had never 
thought of using design as something I would want to do, 
until he explained his view of it.” —Participant 8.
Introduction and her ‘natural’ paradigm
She tells a story of a lecture she gave and what happened after-
wards. When it came time for audience questions and answers, the 
first few people to queue up behind the microphone were male. After 
several questions she said she would just take one more question. At 
that point, one of those in the room objected, saying that it should be 
a woman’s turn to ask a question. The expectation, she said, was that 
she should ask the man at the front of the queue if he would step 
aside to let the woman behind him ask the last question. Instead, 
though, Participant 8 suggested that this was not a conversation 
about sexism, and told a story about her Estonian culture where 
there is not even a word which means “he” or “she”. As she intended, 
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the group then seems to have realised that they had imposed the 
idea of sexism onto a sex-neutral situation. 
Hers was the only interview I had where the interviewee’s ‘natural’ 
paradigm seems to be postmodernist-poststructuralist. 
Participant 8’s ‘natural’ paradigm was identified as postmodern. See 
results table, Table 4, §9.2.
Positivism-Functionalism
Her story involving gender assumptions does not translate well to the 
positivist-functionalist paradigm. It seems well understood within the 
postmodernist-poststructuralist paradigm where there is a richness of 
meaning that is lost when the same situation is explored from the 
positivist-functionalist worldview. Perhaps that is why participant 8 
and I had great difficulty coming to an understanding of what it was 
that I expected her to do. 
“…Can you look at your same situation as a functionalist only? So 
imagine you’re someone else.”
“Oh,” she said, “imagine I’m someone else. Okay. …[pause] It’s a 
mystery there. … From that perspective [does] such a happening 
have to be either a mystery in the sense that something else must 
have happened. ? … Or, or I don’t under… I don’t see what actually 
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happened. It’s yet to be revealed. … Okay … There must be an expla-
nation but the explanation would be looked for within a conventional 
paradigm?”
I did not understand her questions. I resorted to trying to put it in 
terms I had heard her use in her presentation. “Uh, in your terms, 
you would cut the world in such a way that you see things as the sci-
entific mind does.”
“… … If I was that person.”
“Uh huh.” Now she realises that I do not understand her concept the 
same way as she, we assume different positionalities. Hers is in the 
minds eye of the observer; mine is external, observing the observer. 
She explains, “Not only that but it’s the training. It’s not tha— usually 
people aren’t actually cutting the world when they’re in this mode. It 
is how they’ve been raised in their education system.”
“Well,” I say, “my theory is that people have a ‘natural’ way, and I 
want them to go through the different paradigmatic views [specifi-
cally].”
“Aah!” she realises.
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“To to stretch their uh normal way of thinking about things. So I want 
to see if you can do this for me. … Find something in that narrower 
viewpoint of functionalism that might bring something of value out.”
Again, I realise that my preparation was not up to par. She says, 
“Okay. In the functionalist way, that particular incident could have 
been explained by… that is, ‘She told a joke.’” This I take to mean 
that another way of looking at what happened was that there was a 
situation of tension which was resolved when she made light of it. 
She seems to have reinterpreted what happened by projecting how 
someone who lacks her postmodern way of understanding would see 
it. At the time none of this made sense to me so I thought it best to 
just move along. 
Interpretivism
“Oh, subjectivist,” she says. “And we agree to disagree,” she replies. 
‘That’s okay. You can think your way.’ And that could have been also 
the explanation for it. I gave forgiveness to the questioner and the 
people and the next man in line and the woman. So we agree that 
you all have these different perspectives and that’s okay. We’ll live in 
a multiplicity.” 
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Critical-emancipatory
Like Participant 7, she asks and I agree to take critical and emancipa-
tory separately. First, emancipatory.
“Um, the person who claimed sexism in the first place was obviously 
in that view, or he would not have had that concern that there was a 
power play of the institution against the weak. And whether… and the 
weak may not have been a victim, but he… and it was a man, so I 
can say ‘he’… he claimed that this woman was an unwitting victim of 
the circumstances. And I, in my more powerful position [chuckle] yet, 
of being the conference moderator did an extra power play on top of 
him. So it removed his power which was, actually, a power play, too. 
And gave the power back to the questioners by creating a larger 
space for the… for the whole question period.” 
“And you didn’t invalidate his opinion,” I said.
“I played with his power play,” she proudly stated.
Emancipatory:
“So we have to broaden our time and space horizons,” she added. 
“Yeah. Okay. And that… this is one of the first steps I like to have 
people make in coming to… I don’t know what I call my world [para-
digm]—it’s none of them yet [laugh]—which is being able to think 
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further in the consequences, in time and space. So my responsibility 
as the conference coordinator was to be concerned for the feelings of 
all the people in the audience, and what would happen next, what 
was happening with the presenter—whether they were being put on 
the spot as well—and for the questioner. So broaden out and bring a 
wider view to bear on the situation.”
“This was also happening… but none of them [the paradigms so far] 
describe what I felt I did.”
Postmodernist
Her response to my ideas about the postmodernist-poststructuralist 
paradigm was interesting and informative. “I do differ from that. … 
And that is I do not like the notion of values for starters. … Because 
values are already distinctions that you have made in the… as if they 
were something permanent, as if they were to be upheld as some rei-
fications of uh ideas. They have very much the same influence as a 
moral code has as a set of rules who derive from ethical behavior un-
der most circumstances. So in a, being… of course we have prefer-
ences. But the preferences arise out of a moment. As long as we 
maintain a manner of relating with others that takes into account 
their legitimacy of beings and takes care some thought about the 
consequences of our actions far beyond ourselves, whether it’s just 
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for the one closest to us like you right now, or the biosphere as a 
whole. And wisdom has to do with that balance of operating with 
care, understanding and expansion of perspective which we men-
tioned before, and a willingness to flow with the times and not… be 
a… a non-attachment. To be always willing… to redesigning con-
stantly, if we talk in Ranulph’s terms which are quite new to me, by 
the way. I had never thought of using design as something I would 
want to do, until he explained his view of it [in his plenary talk at the 
conference] (cf. Glanville, 1980, 1996; Glanville, 1999, n.d.). 
Experiment’s value
I forgot to ask her thoughts on the value of what we had just done. 
8.3.9. Interview with ‘Participant 9’
“I was going to explain to her why it [her methodology, 
the 30-30 roundtable] was so good. And my partner… 
said, ‘No, no, no, no. Don’t say that when you go in— af-
terwards… Just ask her, “Do you have any questions?”’ 
and I said, ‘Oh, you’re so right on!’ So after she’d experi-
enced this whole 30 minute roundtable I said, ‘Do you 
have any questions?’ And she said, ‘Yes. Wouldn’t it be 
better if the students could answer each other?’ And I 
thought, ‘Oh, my god. Where do I draw [the line]?’” —
Participant 9.
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Introduction and her ‘natural’ paradigm
Participant 9 has developed her own methodology called the Round-
table and spoke exclusively about it, focusing on a specific case study 
where it was applied. She spoke about its application as being appro-
priate wherever there are groups having meetings, and especially in 
schools. “Teachers need new methods” she says, that are “very easy 
to use”. And not just in the classroom. Explaining its suitability to a 
superintendent of schools, she said, “We could put it in your faculty 
meeting. We could also put it in your PTA meeting”. Her years of ex-
perience have taught her that administrators and teachers are over-
worked. She stresses that it is tiny and takes only 30 minutes a 
week. Overworked, stressed-out people do not want a lot of informa-
tion about theory, she says. 
I believe she sees the stakeholders and participants as pragma-
tists—uninterested in theory. She wants to introduce them to what 
she does by showing them what it does instead of explaining. So the 
stakeholders are pragmatic, the implementation of the method is 
pragmatic. Her view is that it is critical-emancipatory theory, and the 
methodology itself is emancipatory.
The roundtable method looks like this: The leader decides upon a 
topic and distributes a reading to each of any five people to be read 
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aloud. This succinctly describes what is to happen; that is, the format 
of the meeting and the rules. The topic (whatever might be appropri-
ate at that time) is introduced. Everyone in turn ‘shares’ (speaks) 
once, for a set period of time which is strictly enforced, on the topic, 
extemporaneously relating their own thoughts whilst the others only 
listen. The group ends each person’s share only with “Thank you”. 
The method ends when everyone has had the opportunity to share or 
time runs out.
Participant 9’s ‘natural’ paradigm was identified as critical-
emancipatory and pragmatist. See results table, Table 4, §9.2.
Positivism-Functionalism
I made an egregious mistake. I used the terms “functionalism” and 
“positivism” without defining them. I just assumed she knew what I 
meant when I used those terms. I now clearly understand that the 
degree to which I should expect anyone to engage with my method-
ology must principally depend upon the degree to which they under-
stand its terminology. She spoke about being positive versus being 
negative. It is functionalist because it only takes 30 minutes, by the 
2nd week the teacher has learned to do it herself, and by the 3rd week 
the students can lead it, themselves. It is scripted; it teaches leader-
ship, listening, speaking, leading. After 5–10 sessions there is a re-
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view for revision meeting where changes to the leader’s script can be 
decided upon, which gives them design experience, a sense of control 
and stewardship. 
Interpretivism
She says that she doesn’t pretend to be objective or neutral. She 
shows enthusiasm and tries to promote its wider acceptance. It is de-
signed so that everyone’s unique way of understanding the topic is 
shared with everyone else.
Critical-emancipatory
“One of the risks of emancipatory practice,” she says, “is that when 
you point out power imbalances, polarities can increase. In this 
methodology you don’t point out the power imbalances, you redis-
tribute the power. … Which is true democracy,” she says.
Postmodernist
She does not have a negative pre-disposition and seems eager to explore 
her system as a postmodernist. “We don’t know what we know. We don’t 
know anything. Generally, systemists want to change everything—systemi-
cally. But that’s too big. So I’m changing 30 minutes. She learned from Béla 
Bánáthy that people in a system can act in four ways: reactive and resis-
tant, inactive, proactive, and interactive. Her methodology “understands 
and accepts those attitudes”:
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“For the reactive person who says, ‘I don’t want to do 
anything new, except what I want to do,’ the Roundtable 
says, ‘Oh! It’s just a novel new way of spending 30 min-
utes. We have to spend 3 hours in faculty meetings any-
way. Are you willing to do 30 minutes?’ And this is how it 
responds to inactive people—they can pass if they want. 
They don’t have to do anything. Proactive people, it says 
in the guidelines all you can say is “Thank you,” and 
we’re looking for diverse opinions. And for interactive, we 
don’t need to worry about the interactive person, they al-
ready know what to do.”
Experiment’s value
Her first reaction to the question was no, “It was just fun.” Then she 
changed her mind. “I learned specific new ways to look at my sys-
tem. That’s what I learned. And I learned a little bit more about in-
terpretivism and postmodernism. The other two…” I remind her are 
critical-emancipatory and functionalist, “I think so.”
That Participant 9 took the pragmatic approach in introducing the 
methodology in the case study particularly interests me as relates to 
one of the central assumptions of this research. In general, to move 
forward, I ask whether we should deal with lacunae in the theory 
concerning multiparadigm multimethodology, which means that we 
have got to navigate the train wreck that is paradigm incommensur-
ability; or not, which then defaults into forms of pragmatism in prac-
406
tice. I argue for the former, and say of the latter that ‘anything goes’ 
may be fine within a limited domain of low-risk, simpler problems, 
but the trade off is that we lose so much of the richness, knowledge 
and diversity that embodies systemic theory and jettison all its guid-
ance, rationale,  rigour, etc. that has been developed, tested, im-
proved and matured before us and currently available to us. Without 
the theory its just ethnography—stories of what has happened—but 
not why. 
In Participant 9’s story, the pupils’ teacher asked, “Wouldn’t it be bet-
ter if the students could answer each other?” Participant 9 had inten-
tionally chosen to wait for enquiries before giving any explanations, 
and answered—still without any reference to theory—with three rea-
sons:  1)“You’ve got to hear all 30 students in 30 minutes”;  2) “If 
the student only hears ‘Thank you’, [then they each] get absolute 
equal time”; and  3) “If the student hears neither… approval…[nor] 
disapproval… then the students are going to listen more deeply to 
themselves”. This worked in the sense that it sufficed for the mo-
ment. And by answering just the question asked, Participant 9 did not 
overwhelm the teacher with deeper matters and protected herself 
from being seen as pedantic. No further questioning from the instruc-
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tor is mentioned, neither does Participant 9 mention that she ever did 
explain the methodology’s emancipatory raison d'être.
If that is so, I believe there is a danger, even the likelihood that the 
teacher might run roundtables herself, knowing how to do it but not 
why. Without knowing anything of the emancipatory epistemological 
underpinnings and how that informs and motivates the methodology… 
without that guidance, the practice would almost certainly drift, sof-
ten, or change in other ways (such as having the students answer 
back) which would corrupt its fundamental emancipatory purposes 
and aims. It seems to me that to be effective on its own, pragmatic 
instruction must be accompanied by a strict obedience to a discipline 
which ensures that the practice is never changed.
In this case, for this teacher, the approach to learning from the bot-
tom up was well received. It was quick, non-threatening, and simplis-
tic; almost effortless. The pragmatic approach works as an introduc-
tion to the methodology. But for sustainability the purposes and ra-
tionale—why it exists in the first place—must also be communicated 
and understood. In this case it is about holding open the social space 
artificially for 30 minutes to provide an artificially silent, neutral, 
value-free zone and there inviting each participant to speak in turn 
for an equal period of time and say whatever they wish to say. The 
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participant might then express what had been repressed or sup-
pressed. It can result in feelings of increased self-worth, self empow-
erment, self respect, of being listened to, released from or unbur-
dened—what we lump together and call emancipatory. It is this fun-
damental concept of holding open a neutral, non-threatening space 
that is the key. Only then would a practitioner understand why the 
other students must not be allowed to answer each other during this 
time. To comment or critique would corrupt and politicise the value-
free space. Once understood, it is likely that the methodology will be 
used with the proper intent and achieve positive results. “One little 
boy said, ‘Teacher? It teaches courage’.” Emancipatory practices have 
a great potential for changing lives in the most genuine form—one 
changes oneself.
8.3.10.Interview with ‘Participant 10’
“I really see the need… to take those really soft system 
ideas and make them hard in the model” –Participant 10.
Introduction and his ‘natural’ paradigm
Participant 10 had attended my talk earlier in the day where I was in-
vited to give a presentation on my paper “Towards an Ontology for 
Critical Systems Thinking and Practice”, so he is familiar with my 
ideas but not with the experiment. In this interview he describes his 
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PhD dissertation research project which aims to study ‘land use 
change’ using the methodology of agent-based modeling. 
Participant 10’s ‘natural’ paradigm was identified as positivist-
functionalist. See results table, Table 4, §9.2.
Positivism-Functionalism
Because he had already told his story in positivist-functionalist terms, 
Participant 10 did not uncover anything significantly new when he 
was asked to reexamine his system as a positivist-functionalist. 
Interpretivism
He speaks of the model as though it is reality, its components are ob-
jectified (abstractions given real existence) and anthropomorphised 
(abstractions are humanised) and the overextended expectations of 
this type of model are largely derived from this way of thinking about 
it. This leads to a gross overestimation of the model’s ability to ‘simu-
late’ real situations, and therefore overconfidence in its validity and 
predictive powers. The stated design purpose of the model is to simu-
late the outcome of different policy decisions.
Critical-emancipatory
His critical-emancipatory reexamination of his study of land use 
change and his modeling method was very illuminating. In this 
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thought experiment, he uncovers implicit assumptions and questions 
his value systems. He critiques the model for things he now notices it 
does not take into account and explores ideas for repurposing it. He 
discusses the phenomena of land use change as a social and envi-
ronmental concern, talks about the negative impacts to the land, dis-
placed and excluded people and to society. He sees it driven by the 
power of money and willful social stratification which has negative 
impacts on the less well to do. He projects a bleak future. He reveals 
his concerns and admits they have motivated his design and ap-
proach to the project.
Finally, he repeats his confidence in the model’s ability to simulate 
what is intended and its predictive validity. 
Postmodernist
Participant 10 does his best for me, however poor my description of 
postmodernism, and identifies his judgement that there is a problem 
called urban sprawl, in spite of the fact that those who benefit from 
the situation “love it”. He calls the problem “unsustainable”. And he 
demonstrates reflexive thinking about his model, saying “There is 
something very dubious about trying to model how people make de-
cisions.” This is a new insight and a new appreciation that such real-
life complexity cannot be simulated in this type of model. He says a 
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
411
bit later, “trying to model the system accurately… is a pipe dream”. 
That is no reason to abandon the effort, though, because in creating 
this sort of model “you learn so much. You learn how the system 
works by trying to put it… trying to take it out of the air in this very 
soft, sort of mushy, complex interactions and trying to put it in silico 
in something as hard as code.” 
That statement, so awkwardly worded, tells me that language, too, is 
not up to the task of conveying this deep complexity. And if language 
fails here, so will an effort to write the computer code. No wonder we 
find it so simplifying to objectify and anthropomorphise. Postmodern-
ism is sometimes called the “linguistic turn” because it focuses on our 
use of language to think. The postmodernist understands that lan-
guage is the brick and mortar of the constructed consciousness. 
Experiment’s value
He said, “I really see the need for… engaging the stakeholders” in the 
design, which he had not done, deciding himself what the model 
needed (and what it did not). He said of the decision making code 
that he had put himself in their place. Now he sees that if stakehold-
ers were involved in the design and testing they would understand it, 
appreciate what it was doing and learn so much it would be “off the 
charts”. 
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Participant 10 says that the experiment was worthwhile for him. It 
has given him ideas which he will take back and use to improve his 
research project. He mentions improving the model’s representation 
of landscape and “working on the perception piece—the agents’ per-
ception models and expectation formation.” He stated again that he 
assumed that agents would make the choices that he would make 
when given the particular circumstances and that he now realises this 
is “not completely valid” but still an improvement over other agent-
based models he has seen.
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Chapter
9. Findings concerning the experiment
9.1. Qualitative results
I had finished the interviews and typed up the transcriptions. In ana-
lysing the first interview, my conversation with Participant 1, it was 
difficult to decide which systems paradigm matched best with his 
‘natural’ story about the ISSS. He described various aspects of the 
problem situation that I confidently labelled ‘positivist-functionalist’. 
For example, he, like the rest of us, used language that indicates our 
understanding of the ISSS as having a real existence—a thing unto 
itself. He described how different ISSS members saw things differ-
ently and spoke about their unsuccessful attempts to come to agree-
ment on various issues; ideas I tagged ‘interpretivist’. He spoke about 
the Society’s members regularly questioning its reason for being. 
They wondered whether their organisation’s internal structures and 
processes were those that could best serve those goals and ideals, 
and whether it should be more or less inclusive. I recognised this as 
reflexivity and tagged it ‘critical-emancipatory’. Similarly, I tagged 
parts of his story as ‘postmodern’, as when he concludes that perhaps 
the Society ought to remain unconstrained and allowed to become 
something no one can foresee; although he realises this would mean 
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
415
that the outside world will continue to criticise the Society for lacking 
a strong organisational culture and lacking rigourous standards. 
In his re-examination of the ISSS with the postmodern perspective, 
Participant 1 brings out the incommensurable nature of the complex 
problem. He cares very much about the Society and this long-running 
problem has frustrated us all. There are positivist-functionalist issues 
such as the need for funds, new members and conference volunteers. 
There are interpretivist issues as the Society is founded on principles 
of inclusion, accommodation and acceptance of non-mainstream 
ideas. There are emancipatory issues like democracy and tolerance 
and refuge for non-mainstream ideas. There are critical dimensions, 
such as the need to reassess what is and is not being done to change 
course and remain viable. Postmodern issues center on the multidi-
mensional complexity of the problem and the apparent paradox of 
having to manage a system that is essentially self-organised and vol-
untary.
In his ‘natural’ story he was able to explore the ISSS in all four para-
digms as evidenced by the fact that he was given at least one tag for 
each one. 
By the same definition, Participant 2 was also able to do all four 
paradigmatic explorations. I had assumed that she was an interpre-
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tivist, but the data does not support that. I was quite surprised when 
she said, “our language [systems thinking] should be simplified and 
more normalised in order for us to understand each other and be un-
derstood by others as well.” It may be that she has forgotten the 
epistemological differences between positivism-functionalism and in-
terpretivism and the reason for the first epistemological break in sys-
tems thinking has to do with the ability interpretivism has to deal 
with this type of information, something that overwhelmed the 
positivist-functionalists.
Participant 3 has had conversations with other members that I would 
say centre on the issue of paradigm incommensurability. She has de-
bated other members (who are positivist-functionalists) who profess 
to have worked out a better understanding of the one, true world-
view. She has tried and failed to convince them that their worldview 
may be valid and consistent and perhaps ‘better’ than others—but not 
‘best’. “Yes, I think possibly your arguments do hold for, for the natu-
ral sciences up to a point. But even the natural sciences have evolved 
through debate and, and paradigm shifts. So you’ve always got to be 
open to testing out ideas,” she says. She explored all four paradigms 
and brought forth new ideas in each one, as well.
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My fourth interviewee, Participant 4, most met my expectations. He 
seemed, however, to be a pragmatist; repeatedly things like “Doing is 
the most important thing” and that “theorists are boring”. His way of 
learning is ‘show me’. His way of teaching is storytelling. No doubt 
the interview would have gone better had I stuck to a prepared script 
which included better descriptions of the paradigms. Looking back, it 
was a mistake to assume that all my interviewees would be some-
what familiar with the central concepts I used, in part because I as-
sumed they would be familiar with the history and development of 
systems thinking and the split when we adopted interpretivism. In fu-
ture interviews, rather than taking a predetermined “one size fits all” 
starting stance, I should begin by establishing a level of intersubjec-
tivity. I need to be prepared yet remain flexible with how I describe 
the paradigms, either from the top down as I consistently did in this 
project, or bottom up with stories or concrete examples first. It 
should all be written down to be referred to as needed. I should ask 
more questions like, “Do you follow me?” to regularly check whether 
or not they have processed what I have said before moving on. I 
should ask them to interrupt me whenever I say something they 
don’t follow.
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Somewhere along the way I learned that the interviewee would ac-
cept the idea of being in a particular paradigm more readily if I told 
them that their own ‘natural’ approach was very wide—too wide—and 
that what I wanted them to do was to close down their perspective 
until all they could see were aspects of this one paradigm I had just 
explained. This “linguistic turn,” a principle of the postmodern para-
digm, appears to shift their attention toward what I have implied is 
already there that they need to find for me, and away from what was 
perhaps lacking in their old world view and the needed to be created 
so that it would appear in the new one. All they needed to do was to 
block out all the other stuff and when they looked again they would 
see it. I suppose I would say that the idea I had for doing that was 
the result of a creative process in the postmodern paradigm. I am in-
trigued with this sort of reframing with language used intentionally 
for problem solving. 
It is interesting, too, that this also matches the ontological philosophy 
of the theory I propose. ‘Everything’ is already there in the P–S on-
tology, and is potentially there (it is there when we ‘observe’ it) in the 
conventional ontologies. Remember, it is through the critical moment 
of becoming (‘observing’) that we make the particulars of the world 
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real, solid, defined, bounded in the particular ways—in the ways that 
the brain operates. 
As I have said, at the time the interviews were done the methodology 
had not yet been well developed and that I originally approached the 
challenge of testing my basic ideas from the viewpoint shared in the 
scholarly literature—that switching paradigmatic point of view was no 
simple matter for the entrenched systemist. Various writers have said 
for example that we are so habituated to our own particular way of 
engaging with the world that we are recalcitrant and defend our 
learned and idiosyncratic ways instinctively. We cannot simply hop 
from it to another and another… and we won’t, they say. We do not 
believe in other world views. Basically, we disagree that any other 
world view could be be valid or valuable, or we are simply ignorant 
and believe that seeing the world so differently is impossible. 
I reasoned, therefore, that my approach would have to be non-
threatening, maybe even fun. “Pretend,” I would ask them in a light-
hearted way, “to imagine seeing the world through different ‘lenses’.” 
In my opinion this approach was completely successful, notwithstand-
ing the naive, amateur bungling—which may have actually helped by 
eliciting some sympathy. Empathy on my part lead to a more compli-
ant approach to the paradigm shifting process. Describing it as ‘shut-
420
ting down’ their natural ‘wide angle lens’ to focus in on just the issues 
appropriate to the worldview of the other paradigm yielded immedi-
ate results. This approach seems to work like putting blinders on a 
horse. 
I believe now more than ever before that our ‘natural’ paradigm is so 
rich we cannot help but that it would otherwise intrude on the 
serially-paradigmatic investigative process.
I learned that I do need to establish a solid level of intersubjectivity. 
For that I must clarify my definitions of the paradigms, mention a few 
applicable methods, repeatedly ask the interviewee if he or she is 
clear in their understanding of what has been said so far, and offer to 
keep explaining until they feel that we are ‘on the same page’. 
I should expect that this is a skill that will benefit from practice, like 
any other, both for me and for the interviewee. Repeat performances, 
even on very different problems of concern, would be easier and bet-
ter. I learned that people like being asked what they think when they 
believe you sincerely want to know, and that they enjoy talking about 
their experiences when they know you are truly interested.
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9.2. Quantitative results
Ten systemists participated in individual, semistructured interviews. 
Data analysis took two tracks, qualitative and quantitative: Discourse  
analysis was chosen to produce qualitative, contextual rich descrip-
tions and summaries of each interview. (See the preceding sections 
and summaries.) Critical hermeneutic analysis was chosen to support 
the assignment and placement of paradigm tags throughout each 
conversation; and afterwards the tags were simply counted and 
placed in the table below, one column per interviewee. As described 
in the following text, the contents of the table should not be con-
strued as factual in any objective sense; each number simply indi-
cates that I placed a particular tag so many times in the transcribed 
text. 
The quantitative results of the critical hermeneutic analysis are pre-
sented in the table below. The three divisions of the table are: (top) 
the systemist’s storytelling in their ‘natural’–paradigmatic worldview; 
(middle) the systemist’s re-examination through each paradigm; and 
(bottom) the systemist’s report of what was of value in doing the ex-
ercise. 
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systemist ➛ Parti-
cipant
 1
Parti-
cipant
 2
Parti-
cipant
 3
Parti-
cipant
 4
Parti-
cipant
 5
Parti-
cipant
 6
Parti-
cipant
 7
Parti-
cipant
 8
Parti-
cipant
 9
Parti-
cipant
 10
‘natural’ paradigm
positivist-functionalist
interpretivist
critical-emancipatory
postmodern
pragmatist
positivist-functionalist
positivist-functionalist
interpretivist
interpretivist
critical-emancipatory
critical-emancipatory
postmodernist
postmodern
experiment’s value
positivist-functionalist
interpretivist
critical-emancipatory
postmodern
pragmatist
total non-‘natural’ tags
4 12 9 18 3 0 14 0 1 14
3 2 5 0 4 3 2 0 0 3
7 10 17 1 7 24 1 5 5 6
1 8 8 0 0 10 0 9 3 3
0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 6 0
4 3 3 0 2 11 5 1 1 2
10 0 4 — 2 9 4 2 6 1
8 9 8 7 9 4 6 9 8 12
6 10 2 1 9 10 3 8 7 3
0 0 2 4 2 0 0 — 2 —
0 2 0 2 2 0 0 — 0 —
5 3 5 4 0 0 7 — 2 —
0 1 2 0 2 4 0 — 2 —
0 0 0 3 0 0 0 — 0 —
0 6 4 9 6 4 7 — 4 —
Table 4. Tags by paradigmatic alignment per interviewee. Top: ‘natural’ 
paradigm story. Middle: directed paradigmatic re-investigation. Bottom: the 
perceived value of the exercise. Maximum score in top section (the ‘natural’ 
paradigm) is highlighted in each section.
As indicated in the top section, the ‘natural’ paradigm, Participant 1 
told his story (a hypothetical intervention with the ISSS) in mostly 
critical-emancipatory terms as judged by the number of critical-
emancipatory tags (7) relative to the others. For that, Participant 1 is 
categorised in this experiment as having a basically critical-
emancipatory approach. Participant 3, Participant 5, and Participant 6 
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are also considered to be basically critical-emancipatory systems 
thinkers in this exercise for the same reason. Participant 6 identified 
himself by saying as much straight away, “My paradigm is an emanci-
patory paradigm.” Likewise, Participant 2, Participant 4, Participant 7, 
and Participant 10 are considered to be basically positivist-
functionalists here. Participant 8 is here and generally identifies her-
self as a postmodernist researcher (following on from the work of 
Humberto Maturana). Participant 9 is both a critical-emancipatory 
systems thinker (5 tags) and a pragmatist practitioner (6 tags). Par-
ticipant 4 received 5 pragmatist tags as well. 
The classification of ‘natural’ paradigm serves from here as the base 
from which to consider whether or not the individual systemist was 
able to make the ‘shift’ into the various other paradigms. It is impor-
tant that they do report findings from other paradigms to lend validity 
to the premises of this research. The middle section of the table re-
ports those results. 
When asked to re-examine their own systems as as if they were 
positivist-functionalists, all but one of the non-positivist-functionalists 
were able to report positivist-functionalist issues, suggesting they 
were able to switch to this paradigmatic worldview, at least to some 
degree. The number of positivist-functionalist tags ranged from 0 to 
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11. Participant 6 breezed through it, rattling off 11 issues in telling 
his positivist-functionalist approach to diagnosing and problem solv-
ing. As I reflect, this was the response I had expected from all of the 
interviewees. On the other extreme end is Participant 4. He is a 
‘natural’ positivist-functionalist, and in our interview I rushed through 
the description of positivism-functionalism. As a consequence of that 
and the fact that he was not familiar with the ideas or the terminol-
ogy of paradigms and positivism-functionalism, he did not understand 
what I was after. Instead he reflexively questioned his distaste for 
theory and made no observations that I could tag as positivist-
functionalist. I realise now that I should not expect even some sys-
temists to have encountered these ideas before. Neither should I ex-
pect a helpful response if my intent and instructions are not well un-
derstood. 
Pragmatism which appears here (Participant 4 and Participant 9) and 
in the bottom section is discussed separately in the next section.
In the next phase, re-explorations by the interviewees of their sys-
tems as interpretivists indicate numerically that they were able to 
shift into (their own understanding of) the way in which an interpre-
tivist sees the world. The tag count ranged from 0 to 10. Again, it is 
especially important that those who are not ‘naturally’ interpretivists 
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were able to report relevant findings. Most of the systemists were 
able to produce new interpretivist observations from my description 
of it. Participant 4 was not asked to do so because I felt that the in-
terview, at over 5,500 words, was already overlong. The most inter-
esting outcomes of this phase were from Participant 2 and Participant 
10, who I believe got it wrong.
Participant 2 chose to describe interpretivism and place it in context 
within the history of the ISSS—in positivist-functionalist and critical-
emancipatory terms. And similarly (but with liberal use of anthropo-
morphisms) Participant 10 did not shift from the positivist-
functionalist into the interpretivist paradigm, either, but described in-
terpretivist features of his positivist-functionalist, agent-based com-
puter model—agents that in his words “see the world differently” (one 
from another) have “different preferences,” and “make decisions” dif-
ferently. 
This type of misunderstanding, or error, was unexpected and for that 
reason alone it is important to this research. It is also important be-
cause it is what I consider to be a kind of misapplication of the con-
cept of multiple paradigms. What Participant 2 and Participant 10 did 
are classic examples of how positivist-functionalists make sense of 
interpretivism from within the positivist-functionalist paradigm. They 
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are real demonstrations of paradigm incommensurability. For, just as 
positivism-functionalism (owing to its dependence on realist ontology 
and positivist epistemology) takes place only within the positivist-
functionalist paradigm (which is a worldview having a realist ontology 
and positivist epistemology), interpretivism (owing to its nominalist 
ontology and anti-positivist epistemology) can only take place within 
the interpretive paradigm (which is a worldview having a nominalist 
ontology and anti-positivist epistemology). There are other kinds of 
misapplication as well. As an example, let us say that systems practi-
tioner Foo is an efficiency expert and makes process flow diagrams 
and mathematical models of every system she studies. And let us say 
that Foo attends her first systems conference. She may be eager to 
engage with other positivist-functionalists, but be put off when the 
talk turns, say, to labour unions or ecology or aesthetic design.
I find that when someone is negative towards the idea of paradigm 
shifting it is only because they cannot see the validity or value of an-
other paradigm besides their own ‘natural’ paradigm. When someone 
is negative about matters relevant within what (to them) is a non-
‘natural’ paradigm, those negative concerns are invariably expressed 
from the point of view of another paradigm, usually their own ‘natu-
ral’ paradigm. For example, Foo may think that the others are wast-
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ing time talking about matters that are irrelevant or that mean noth-
ing to her. 
Participant 10 received only one interpretivist tag. On the high end, 
Participant 1 received 10 tags and Participant 6 got 9—both are ap-
parently well used to this paradigm and with thinking as interpretiv-
ists. 
The critical-emancipatory re-explorations elicited 88 memes tagged 
as such. Participant 6, who had already explained his system in ‘natu-
rally’ critical-emancipatory terms had the fewest tags—four. In this 
phase he had little else to say. Especially significant in this phase was 
that Participant 10’s re-examination not only produced the greatest 
number of critical-emancipatory tags, his re-examination transformed 
his conceptualisation by making a more appropriate dis-connection 
between the real, living system and his agent-based modelling ap-
proach. To be fair, I was not passive. I raised some of my own con-
cerns and asked several questions to guide him deeper into the prob-
lem, prompting him to take a more critical perspective on various bits 
of it. I was delighted to engage with him and watch as he decon-
structed the problem and reflexively questioned his approach and 
presuppositions. His new conceptualisation is deeper; his model is 
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more circumspect and appropriately described. He will not abandon 
the model, but he has adjusted the way he understands it.
Many people approach the postmodern paradigm with a negative atti-
tude. Why postmodernism has such a bad image is a question I keep 
asking myself. What they seem to know is that it is fatalistic, radical 
and even destructive in practical terms. It invalidates our beliefs and 
what we know to be true. This seems reactionary. Surprisingly 
though, when I took the interviewees through the paradigm in my 
terms—in which part of what I say is that we have to throw away 
what in postmodernism is useless to the systemist—everyone came 
out with interesting postmodern thoughts about their system. 
Just as Participant 10 (a positivist-functionalist) came to a transfor-
mational understanding of his own system through interpretivist and 
critical-emancipatory thinking, Participant 6 also came to to a trans-
formational understanding of his critical-emancipatory sys-
tem—through postmodernism. In my conversation with Participant 6 
we explored different ways in which the critical-emancipatory and 
postmodern paradigms see the purpose and use of values and 
choices differently. As I understand it, the critical-emancipatory 
thinker believes that he or she can decide what is good or bad, right 
or wrong, the degree to which pressure becomes coercion and where 
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what is acceptable becomes unacceptable.  Therefore and thereby the 
critical-emancipatory thinker believes he or she can ultimately act 
righteously in everyone’s best interest. Postmodernism sees that and 
reminds us that we cannot ‘know’ with certainty and that to act is to 
ignore or dismiss that cold fact. To the postmodernist, to act should 
be viewed by the actor as an informed pragmatic decision (not to be 
confused with pragmatism)—not what is ‘right’ or ‘best’ or ‘good’ in 
any ultimate sense—a pragmatic decision that is inescapably biased. 
That is, to me, the great contribution of postmodernism—knowing 
and (humbly) admitting the certainty of uncertainty. And one of its 
important dividends is that such beliefs flatten social hierarchies. The 
intention is not to stop me, the systemist, from acting for fear that I 
will err, it is that I am displaced from being God. “Oops!” I say to my-
self, “I had better be sure.” I return then to the critical-emanciptory 
paradigm and ask “Am I doing the right thing? Have I missed some-
thing? What is it that I don’t know that I may need to know to make 
a better decision?”
In the interview, Participant 6 decided that, without these ideas from 
postmodernism, the critical-emancipatory approach can become a 
form of modern day colonialism—harkening back to a time where the 
erudite and ‘proper’ British ethnographer deigned to live amongst the 
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savages ‘as one of them’ and ‘objectively’ reported back to ‘civilisa-
tion’ the shocking and titillating details of a different cultures’ ‘bar-
baric’ practices—a history which Participant 6 says he (as a privileged 
and educated white male) himself, is ashamed of. I likened it to old 
movies and plays where white men and women would portray Afri-
cans in black face. The thought is how dare we put forth that which 
we understand about others as though it were objectively true, or as-
suming that such views really are the way they see themselves? How 
dare we make decisions that affect others, believing they are the 
right decisions, without bothering to check our assumptions regarding 
those others? 
Without postmodernist influences we can be unthinkingly disrespect-
ful, demeaning and coercive. Whenever it is possible and in effect 
workable to do so, the postmodernist systemist would like to design a 
system whereby an individual takes his or her own decisions on per-
sonal matters. It is best to have these kinds of systems self-
organised, open and transparent. Of course it is not as simple as that 
when the decisions one makes for oneself affect others, but it is a 
postmodern ideal. In these trickle-up systems, an individual’s choices 
do have compounding, co-creative and emergent social and environ-
mental effects. 
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Participant 1’s postmodernist re-investigation brought about several 
ideas for the ISSS. He talks about how distinctly different individuals 
are, how they have different motives and values and goals; how they 
are connected to various extended networks and other organisations; 
and how the ISSS, being like a bazaar of ideas, attracts a rare quality 
of people who come together to interact. He makes it sound almost 
magical. Participant 2 talks about continual change and extraordinary 
complexity and how we struggle along with language as a way to 
make sense of things. Despite her statement “I don’t buy postmod-
ernism,” Participant 3 contradicted herself more than once, adding 
some valuable thoughts. “With postmodernism,” she said negatively, 
there are “multiple truths” and “no possibility of finding the truth,” 
which removes “the hope of social environmental justice.” But in the 
next breath she said “I believe that the more you engage in dialogue 
and testing out ideas, the better the match or response to a particu-
lar situation.” And that is exactly what postmodernism ultimately calls 
for. It seems that despite her disagreement with postmodernism she 
is in complete agreement with it! Participant 4 said he agrees with 
postmodernism in at least one respect, that we work with uncer-
tainty. He said we need to realise that we can never know enough 
and there may always be unintended consequences to any interven-
tion. Despite that, though, he says, what we should do is to do our 
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best at finding out how we think the system works and enhancing our 
understanding. I could not disagree.
As to the bottom section and the question of value, two of the inter-
viewees were not asked whether or not they thought that doing this 
exercise was of any value to them, an oversight for which I am to 
blame; and Participant 1 responded only in terms of his ‘natural’, 
critical-emancipatory paradigm, the other seven reported from be-
tween  four and nine things tagged from their non-‘natural’ para-
digms. 
The following table shows aggregate statistics across the population 
(n=10) of interviews.
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systemist ➛ min max mean stdev
‘natural’ paradigm
positivist-functionalist
interpretivist
critical-emancipatory
postmodern
pragmatist
positivist-functionalist
positivist-functionalist
interpretivist
interpretivist
critical-emancipatory
critical-emancipatory
postmodernist
postmodern
experiment’s value
positivist-functionalist
interpretivist
critical-emancipatory
postmodern
pragmatist
total non-‘natural’ tags
0 18 7.5 6.4
0 5 2.2 1.7
1 24 8.3 6.8
0 10 4.2 3.9
0 6 1.1 2.2
0 11 3.2 3.0
0 10 4.2 3.3
4 12 8.0 2.0
1 10 5.9 3.2
0 4 1.3 1.4
0 2 0.8 1.0
0 7 3.3 2.3
0 4 1.4 1.3
0 3 0.4 1.0
0 9 5.0 2.5
Table 5.  Statistics (n=10) from Table 4, above.
9.3. Combining the results
In this section I look at the two sets of results which were derived 
from the experimental dataset. The aim is to see relationships be-
tween the two sets of results and make critical evaluations about 
what that may mean in specific instances (micro) and what might 
then be summarised about the overall picture (macro). 
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These two sets of results information come from the same source of 
data—transcripts of the ten interviews which have been analysed and 
tagged (coded) using the subjective principles of critical hermeneutics 
(described above). It is important to remember that this is not the 
same as working with two independent sets of results, so there is no 
true triangulation. The quantitative result set is just used to provide 
another way of looking at the dataset. Tabular representation is an 
analytical tool that is simple and easily understandable. It is particu-
larly useful to look at this data numerically because the two tables 
are so condensed they can be used to spot outliers (data that falls 
outside the typical range) and its location in the table points to the 
section of the qualitative data where the actual information can be 
found. 
In systemic terms we could say that it is particularly useful with large 
qualitative datasets to condense two aspects of that data (inter-
viewee and paradigm) quantitatively and by presenting those results 
in tabular form each cell represents a location in the original qualita-
tive dataset. This helps us to manage a large qualitative dataset and 
it is only by taking a different paradigmatic approach that this is pos-
sible. Participant 4 has found a similar synergy by using both Bayes-
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ian belief networks (interpretivist) and causal maps (positivist-
functionalist).
Again, the purpose of the experiment was to check two basic philo-
sophical arguments of the proposed framework for complex systems 
design and intervention:  
• that practicing systemists can actually re-engage with the 
problem situation from different paradigmatic perspectives 
as they understand them, and  
• that the systemist will judge the practice to have practical 
value. 
As the table shows, Participant 6 (whose ‘natural’ paradigm is gener-
ally critical-empancipatory) was able to report 11 observations as a 
positivist-functionalist. He is apparently well educated in the para-
digms of critical systems thinking and firmly believes that his system 
is far better understood in a critical-emancipatory context. That 
eleven is a large number in this situation is misleading, however. I 
cannot conclude that Participant 6 has found a new positivist-
functionalist understanding of his system; the number simply means 
he was able to enumerate several positivist-functionalist aspects 
within it. So in this case, the quantitative data does not triangulate 
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with the qualitative understanding. It does not support an assumption 
that this experience was of practical value, but it does support the 
first assumption being tested—that it can be done. More generally, it 
suggests that if, prior to deploying this method, a systemist familiar 
with a particular paradigm has already been through a critical evalua-
tion of the system of concern with respect to that paradigm, then the 
memes raised in the corresponding operation of this method will in-
clude those which were already discovered. In such a case they will 
have been critically evaluated as well, and this operation might seem 
to be merely a process of recall. But the systemist knows that critical 
systems thinking is a recursive and iterative process and should 
therefore take the opportunity to critically re-evaluate and reflexively 
ask again, “What more is there to learn here?” To the critical systems 
thinker, this is not time wasted nor is the re-evaluation through that 
paradigm perfunctory or unnecessary. In this case it seems that Par-
ticipant 6 did see something new, “the inability of the general man-
ager to find creative solutions” and “to deal with unanticipated prob-
lems,” and he made a recommendation that the manager should be 
mentored.
Pragmatism, whilst not actually a paradigm, is singled out here for 
discussion because it is anomalous and was completely unexpected. 
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As I have explained I am biased against pragmatism and planned not 
to include it to any great extent in this project. But I was quite sur-
prised in the text analysis process to be confronted with straightfor-
ward evidence of pragmatism, first in the interview with Participant 4 
and again in the interview with Participant 9. 
As I reviewed Participant 4’s transcript it became obviously necessary 
to consider it. He observes an egregious imbalance and calls for the 
ISSS to de-emphasise its dependence on theory and focus instead on 
the production of practical results by acting. To him it was our “in-
ward focus” that was largely to blame for the Society’s problems. 
“Theory is boring,” he repeated; we need to “just get on with it.” I 
had been dead set against pragmatism; but Participant 4 went on to 
show me that starting with a practical demonstration or a story may 
be the best approach to introduce people to systems thinking. After-
wards, explaining why the demonstration worked or the story was re-
solved then presents a more accessible route to theory. Rather than 
push the theory, the need to understand why the example worked re-
quires the theory and so the person who wants to learn then pulls it 
in. It is about learning, from the point of view of the learner, rather 
than teaching, from the point of view of the practitioner. I was thus 
forced to create a new, pragmatist tag and label five chunks of his 
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‘natural’ story as pragmatist. Owing to the strength of his convictions 
I am obliged to categorise him as both a positivist-functionalist and a 
pragmatist. 
Participant 4’s pragmatism may stem from an instinctive dislike of 
theory, but Participant 9 was also tagged six times with the pragma-
tist label but for a very different reason. Hers is an intentional, con-
scious strategy (within an otherwise theoretically-based, critical-
emancipatory approach to intervention) which employs pragmatism 
as the method of its implementation and delivery. Participant 9’s 
method is to simply demonstrate the Roundtable in action. She pur-
posefully avoids giving any explanation or rationale beforehand and 
simply runs a session; saying only that it is simple, takes very little 
time, and that it just works. The pragmatic approach is best, she 
says, because the stakeholders and participants are already over-
loaded and stressed out. She believes they do not necessarily want to 
know any theory or sit through an explanation of it; and even if she 
did, she doubts that they would understand or that they would agree 
with its critical-emancipatory assumptions. To bypass any pre-
judgement she simply asks them to watch or participate in a session. 
From Participant 9’s story, I can now see the possible benefit of tak-
ing a pragmatic approach to the implementation of a systemic meth-
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
439
odology, but I do have additional concerns. The first has to do with 
sustainability. The Roundtable is hygienic and sessions are supposed 
to be conducted on a regular basis. Participant 9 does not share my 
conviction that sustainability depends upon the stakeholder under-
standing the theoretical rationale behind the method. For example, if 
the participants do not understand why a person who is sharing must 
not be interrupted or criticised and that they be guaranteed their full 
share of equal time, then they will not understand the effort it takes 
to hold open and protect the emancipatory safe space and why it is 
absolutely vital to do so. Further, Participant 9 does not mention the 
need for it, but I believe that transparency and full disclosure is a 
moral duty to those who are affected by what we do, whether or not 
it is invited. So not only should they know, we owe it to them to tell 
them. 
So “pragmatist” appears in the ‘natural’ paradigm section of the table 
and in the totals, but not in the middle. I do not see how I could ask 
my interviewees to re-examine their system as would a pragmatist. 
In the middle section, Participant 1 seems to have been most prolific 
in the interpretive paradigm, reporting more than twice as many is-
sues as he did in his ‘natural’ paradigm story. This may not be a sur-
prise considering it is considered to be his general approach as well. 
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It is also interesting that he is flagged six times for postmodernist 
ideas when he re-examined his system explicitly in postmodern 
terms. 
Importantly, this result (Participant 10) supports both test concerns. 
The method has broadened and transformed the systemist’s appre-
ciation of the problem situation and informed his approach strategy.
As to the question of value, Participant 1 reported nothing of value 
outside his ‘natural’ paradigm and approached the question—which 
calls for critical reflection on what just happened—from a critical-
emancipatory standpoint, which is also his ‘natural’ paradigm. He is 
already familiar with the paradigms and he stated that he does not 
“find it foreign at all to look at things through a lot of different per-
spectives and paradigms.” In reporting the value to himself of doing 
this exercise, Participant 1 reverts to his ‘natural’ paradigm. If that is 
true, what zero means in this case is that he has no need for a new 
methodology such as this one because he already does a similar thing 
‘naturally’. For a systemist like Participant 1 it produces no new in-
formation.
Participant 4, alone, received tags for pragmatism in this section, but 
these he earned by simply reiterating his distaste for theory. Perfectly 
understandable coming from him, pragmatism is one of his ‘natural’ 
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paradigms (along with positivist-functionalist). Therefore, I would not 
claim that this amounts to any new insight nor represents any added 
value.
9.4. Summary
A brilliant person is likely to explain the most complex situations us-
ing concepts from all four paradigms of systems thinking; but not in-
tentionally bracketed formally as I have done in this experiment. Us-
ing unstructured interviews with a diverse group of ten systemists I 
undertook an experiment to test:  1) whether or not and to what ex-
tent it was possible for the systemist to shift into each of the four 
paradigms and re-examine the same problem of concern, and  2) 
whether or not and to what extent doing so would elicit new aspects 
of understanding and prove to be of some value. The results were 
mixed and the method was flawed. Nothing is proven in the positivis-
tic sense of the word. But the evidence suggests neither of the two 
tests failed. 
Not everyone agreed that the interview yielded new insights for 
them, but every one taught me more. Not only did I get a more and 
more rich picture from what each interviewee said, I remained ac-
tively engaged with the idea of crafting my eventual methodology. 
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With such a loose approach to the interview process I remained free 
to reflexively re-consider that approach while it was happening and to 
remain flexible in order to learn more and to improve the process. 
The more important aims were to feed back to my design of this new 
theory which was my larger goal, and to gain practical experience so 
that I could improve my methodology. 
My assumptions going into these interviews reflected the ‘common 
wisdom’. That is, we (systemists in particular) each have one habit-
ual, automatic way of understanding the world from which we judge 
other ways of looking at the world as nonsensical, invalid or ill-
informed. I expected to find them, in my terms, positivist-
functionalists for the most part; fewer would likely be interpretivists; 
fewer still would be critical-emancipatory in terms of worldview, and I 
expected no postmodernists. I never expected to find pragmatists. I 
did expect that each systemist would resist to some extent and de-
fend their own ‘natural paradigm’. I expected it would be somewhat 
difficult, very difficult or impossible for them to switch from their 
‘natural’ paradigm into another. I did not expect to find pluralists. 
My assumptions going in that each systemist would have one habitual 
paradigm was not necessarily true: Half of them did seem to over-
whelmingly favour one paradigm (Participant 10, Participant 7 and 
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Participant 4: positivist-functionalist; Participant 6 and Participant 3: 
critical-emancipatory); but in telling their ‘natural’ stories, four of 
them (Participant 1, Participant 2, Participant 3, Participant 10) men-
tioned subjects from all four paradigms, according to my tags. 
The proportion I expected to find was not met: four positivist-
functionalists, no interpretivists, five critical-emancipatory thinkers, 
one postmodern. 
Very surprisingly, two systemists very clearly expressed definite rea-
sons for being pragmatists: Participant 4 insists that theory crowds 
out action; Participant 9 has developed a very well grounded critical-
emancipatory methodology, but insists that its method of implemen-
tation be pragmatist. They are quite successful doing what they do, 
so I am convinced I need to rethink my strong stance against prag-
matism. 
To the extent that I expected resistance or defense, the negatives 
expressed had only to do with a prejudice against postmodernism 
(Participant 3, Participant 1), and a vague fear that perhaps addi-
tional perspectives or more voices would complicate the situation 
rather than clarify it (as I believe) and possibly lead to decision-
making paralysis.
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The extent that anyone found it difficult to switch paradigms as I 
asked them to do in this experiment has to be for the most part due 
to my poor descriptions. (Refer to the transcriptions where I am quite 
critical of myself in specific situations.) Otherwise, I found that if the 
participant did not report anything I could tag as being from that 
paradigm, it was because they chose to describe the paradigm itself 
rather than ‘assume’ the paradigmatic stance and report specific ob-
servations as I had asked. I cannot say that they could not do so, 
only that they did not do so.
The findings were surprising. Yes, this sample size is too small to 
support any general claims of reliability or generalisability. It is a 
highly selected group of systems researchers and practitioners. They 
are the motivated ones, the active practitioners, those who come to 
conferences for systems research in order to share and to learn and 
to network with other systems people. 
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Chapter
10.Conclusions 
10.1. Introduction
The thesis asks, “Is it possible to create a new theoretical framework 
for systems thinking and practice which resolves the long standing 
problem of paradigm incommensurability and enables a coherently 
informed multiparadigm multimethodological approach to systemic 
research design and intervention?”  The research project identified 
four objectives, five aims, and five contributions to knowledge that 
would be the focus of the plan to investigate the question. These foci 
are discussed in the following sections of this chapter. The chapter 
starts first with a reflective account of the experience of undertaking 
this research project and dissertation, how it was originally con-
ceived, how that changed over time with circumstance and an in-
creasing knowledge base, mistakes and blind alleys and how some 
unexpected findings transformed the way the problem itself is now 
understood. Limitations are reflectively related and some thoughts 
about the implications of this project are recorded as well.
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10.2. Primary reflections, how the research project evolved
The impetus for starting this Ph.D. dissertation with this topic was 
that I believed that I understood the way that we commonly take a 
multiparadigmatic perspective of the world around us (in an easy and 
comfortable way) that current systems theory does not explain. With 
respect to the concept of ‘paradigm’ as we know it and use it, it is my 
opinion that we are stuck with theoretically incommensurable para-
digms. I felt that the resolution of this mismatch must lie at a more 
basic level than other approaches with which I was familiar have fo-
cused. I understood that my approach would necessarily have to 
stem from a new ontological base. 
The research project as originally proposed said only that a new on-
tology would be produced and that it would show how the incommen-
surability issue could be resolved by a subsequent theory based upon 
that ontology. As the research project proceeded the ontology be-
came more thoroughly developed. A philosophy developed about the 
nature of the organisation of nature as asymptotically undefinable 
and around the definition of ontic elements whereby there is such a 
property. A great deal of effort went into explaining the ontological 
elements themselves with their unusual qualities, why there were 
these and not others, how and why such an ontology (assuming it 
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were the case) was possibly sufficient and necessary to support the 
world as we know it (if we did know it). I eventually realized that I 
was creating its epistemology. Further, I found that for the systemist 
to put these ideas into practice a general methodology would be nec-
essary. What was originally an ambitious but manageable research 
project to create and justify a new ontology expanded quite naturally 
to include an epistemology and then a methodology and became a 
project that undertook to create a new entire theoretical framework.
Nor, as it was originally conceived, did the research project did in-
clude the idea of testing the new ontology in the real world. However, 
once it became a project for the design of an entire framework, it was 
decided that an experiment was called for to test it. I was invited to 
the Conversation of the IFSR in Pernegg, Austria in April 2010, and 
then in July I presented an early paper on my ideas at the six-day 
annual conference of the International Society of the Systems Sci-
ences in Waterloo, Canada (where I was presented with Sir Geoffrey 
Vickers Award). At these events I managed to interview ten system-
ists.
This project hopes to make a contribution to knowledge by improving 
the theoretical foundation for the paradigm of critical systems think-
ing with the addition of new theory specifically targeting the ground-
Towards a Framework for Multiparadigm Multimethodologies
449
ing of multiparadigm multimethodologies with respect to the long-
standing problem of paradigm incommensurability. I also hope that 
with its explication that a-paradigmatic reality appears to us only 
paradigmatically and its specific call for a critical approach which di-
rects the systemist’s employment of all four paradigms it will contrib-
ute to our understanding of and success with pluralistic engagements. 
10.3. Assessment on the objectives of the research project
In this section, the research question and the aims and objectives of 
this thesis are restated with the intention of answering each of these 
points with regard to how they have been addressed in the thesis. 
10.3.1. Regarding the research question
Is it possible to create a new theoretical framework for 
systems thinking and practice which resolves the long 
standing problem of paradigm incommensurability and 
enables a coherently informed multiparadigm multimeth-
odological approach to systemic research design and in-
tervention?
The research has completed the aims and objectives which were 
planned to answer to this question by implementing the research plan 
450
consisting of four objectives, five aims, and five contributions to 
knowledge. These are detailed as follows:
10.3.2. Regarding the research objectives
The objectives of this research are to:
• Conduct research to develop a historical perspective into 
theories which address multiparadigmatic and multimethod-
ological approaches to systems thinking and practice, and to 
create a map which indicates their theoretical relationships 
and supporting philosophies.
A tremendous amount of work has gone into the design of this pro-
ject, into its actual research, and in the production of the disserta-
tion. The table “Development of Multiparadigm Systemic Theory” (Ta-
ble 2) includes 12 new entries compared with the last such survey 
(Mingers, 2003) and should prove to be a valuable resource for future 
systems theorists and researchers. Figures 10–13, a taxonomy of 
multiparadigm systems theories in four views, is (I believe) the first 
time such a tree of theoretical provenance has been produced. It in-
dicates intellectual heritage and philosophical support which had not 
yet been done.
• Explain the problem of paradigm incommensurability and 
how it relates to theoretical support of any cross-paradigm 
multimethodological approach.
Research found that no literature reports a credible successful solu-
tion to the problem of paradigm incommensurability. It would seem 
that those who have done so have erred, and are typically considered 
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‘relativist’. Others ignore the problem or change the criteria with 
which they categorise theories so that there are no paradigms to be 
incommensurable with. I believe that the theory here does have 
merit. In the least, I hope it stimulates some lively, creative discus-
sions and keeps the issue alive. 
• Propose a new ontology that reconciles the problem of para-
digm incommensurability and an epistemology and method-
ology to make it a functional as a theoretical framework for 
systemic research, design and practice.
The results are the subject of Chapter 5. The P–S ontology is a dual 
duality of structure/process and is isomorphic between real and ab-
stract ontic types. It works with a mechanism called the critical mo-
ment through which the systemist pulls onto-epistemologically (para-
digmatically) formed constructs.
• Test the new theory in order to demonstrate whether or not 
its basic assumptions are satisfied: that systemists can and 
will take a serially multiparadigmatic look at a highly com-
plex system of concern and, if so, report that it was valuable 
to do so.
Tests were performed with ten systemists. Refer to Chapter 7 for the 
tests and detailed analyses, and to Chapter 8 for general results and 
findings.
10.3.3. Regarding the research aims
The aims of this research to reach those objectives are to:
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• Explore the development and divergence of systems think-
ing’s methodologies in terms of their grounding philosophies 
and chart a paradigmatic taxonomy.
• Focus this research on the multiparadigm, multimethodologi-
cal branch of critical systems thinking and the philosophical 
attempts within it to resolve the central problem of paradigm 
incommensurability. Discuss why these multi- meta-, bridg-
ing and pragmatic paradigmatic theories have all failed to 
produce satisfactory bases for multiparadigm multimethod-
ologies.
• Building on the leading edge of critical systems theories, ex-
plore and develop new ideas for the concept of an a-
paradigmatic reality; and, with the specialised needs of the 
systems community in mind, propose a simple, inclusive on-
tology which intrinsically supports it. Posit how such an a-
paradigmatic reality might translate by the mind–brain from 
a seemingly multiparadigmatic ‘potential’ into a specific, 
paradigmatically-constructed experience.
• Produce a new epistemology and methodology to make a 
model for a new systemic approach based on the process– 
structure ontology which specifically supports cross-
paradigm multimethodologies and their engagement in sys-
temic practice. Show how, for the systems practitioner, such 
a framework facilitates a rich understanding and theoreti-
cally legitimises a multiparadigmatic, pluralistic approach to 
methodology, method making and practice.
• Design an experiment to test the theory’s basic assumptions 
and as a critique and validation exercise. Conduct interviews 
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of ten systemists by walking the interviewee as a systems 
practitioner through an exploration of a problem situation 
using the model and multiple paradigms. Analyse and report 
results.
The plan for this research project was well constructed except that 
the scope of the subject matter and the amount of knowledge re-
quired to fulfill the research objectives were both underestimated. 
However, the products of this research can stand on their own and at-
test to the fulfillment of the aims and objectives of the project. That 
more could be done indicates there is some value to this work and 
that it would be worthwhile to continue this line of thinking. More, 
then, is hopefully to come.
10.4. Regarding contributions to knowledge
Contributions the dissertation makes to knowledge include:
• The map of systemic theories re: multiparadigms or mul-
timethodologies and their supporting philosophies.
Refer to Figures 10–13 which include 20 theories, 12 more than ei-
ther Midgley’s (1997b) original research or Mingers’ (2003) followup. 
This is also the first map to show the historical provenance of multi-
paradigmatic theory in systems thinking, as you can see by the par-
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ticular branching structure in all three graphics. By following the 
philosophical underpinnings shown in Figure 12 you can see how 
these have been taken up, as well. This work is distinct, too, because 
it may serve as a quick reference from which to locate the original 
works (Figure 11) of these important theories.
• The P–S ontological theory as a resolution to the problem of 
paradigm incommensurability with respect to the systemist. 
The ontology is developed in Chapters 6, and the theoretical frame-
work, including the epistemology and a methodology in Chapter 7. 
Refer to the graphical illustration of the components of thought in-
volved in this theoretical approach, Figure 15.
• A usable understanding of the mind-brain's production of 
paradigmatic observations pulled as emergent properties of 
an a-paradigmatic reality we cannot know.
The P–S ontology works through a mechanism I call the critical mo-
ment of becoming. Refer to Chapter 5. 
Testing was done and results were mixed. The testing process was 
not rigorous and mistakes were made, however the qualitative data 
suggests that systemists can shift paradigms (it does not show that 
they cannot) and that doing so may have value. See Chapters 8 
(tests) and 9 (results). A quantitative summary is shown in Table 5.
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The theoretical components of the new framework were described 
just above, development and testing have also been described. The 
systemist may find it useful to refer to Figures 10–13 (development 
of MP-MM theory in systems thinking, evolution of pluralism with ref-
erences to the original publications, evolution of pluralism with sup-
porting theories, evolution of pluralism with additional, philosophical 
information) and to Figures 2 (structural components of a new critical 
systemic pluralism) and 15 (a multiparadigm multimethodology proc-
ess diagram).
• The need to increase systemists' awareness of the para-
digms of systemic practice and of multiparadigm multimeth-
odological approaches.
The test design assumed that practicing systemists would be at least 
somewhat aware of the concepts of the critical systems paradigms, 
but they were the minority. The majority of current systemist partici-
pants were not familiar with the terminology: positivism-
functionalism, interpretivism, critical-emancipatory and postmodern-
ism. This would seem to indicate that few systemists are academi-
cally current and it reflects the divergence of systems and a focus on 
specialisation. The theory prescribes a serially multiparadigmatic ap-
proach. To do so, the systemist will most likely need to be educated. 
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To find this theory of value, though, may stimulate us to want to 
know more.
The examination of the interview data from Participant 1 forced me to 
create a new ‘pluralist’ label (defined as “one who typically takes 
fluid, multiparadigmatic perspectives”) for the ‘natural’ paradigm of 
the systemist. This lead to a cycle of learning and involves a recon-
sideration of my idea of ‘systemist’ which is a central concept of this 
dissertation. Unfortunately, time does not permit me the opportunity 
to take the framework through a complete cycle of change to incorpo-
rate that learning. For that, I call for further research. 
Similarly, a related issue which had come up more than once (i.e. 
Participant 7, Participant 9, Participant 8, Participant 3) is the idea of 
mastery and how a master comes to know the limits of their para-
digm and then gains the wisdom to transcend it and switch to an-
other in such cases. That seemed to me to be what Participant 1 was 
doing in a fluid, easy manner. In order to tell me about the various 
aspects of the problem situation, he (as a pluralist) would switch into 
the paradigm which was most appropriate for those thoughts. From 
this new understanding of pluralist practice I developed a flow of con-
sciousness perspective of what happens in terms which should also 
be incorporated into a future version of the framework. 
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Such a pluralist practice, like the theory I have put forth, is not a per-
spective itself. Like the new theory, it is incomplete without the par-
ticular paradigms’ perspectives. Its purpose is to call upon whichever 
paradigm is appropriate in the moment. The pluralist perspective is 
just a pivot about the moment of becoming.
How is that different from pragmatism? To the pragmatist there are 
no contradictions and no paradoxes. Decisions are made to settle a 
contradiction (one way or the other) when it arises, and paradoxes 
are intentionally ignored, so in effect they do not exist. But Partici-
pant 1 understands the complex situation with the ISSS cannot be 
solved. That is, he understands that it cannot be solved. There will 
always be a plurality of members’ points of view and beliefs. There 
will always be paradigm incommensurability—something the pragma-
tist cannot understand. No one way exists, for example, which can 
order and organise the Society in such a way that would satisfice for 
the scientific stereotypes without sacrificing the Society’s very iden-
tity. The pragmatist would decide that the Society must change its 
identity. And members have done this and will probably continue to 
do this. They simply cannot abide the paradox and leave incommen-
surability to be what it is—incommensurable. This takes us back full 
circle, to the reason why this theory was created in the first place.
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10.5. Limitations
The primary limitation of this research project was that of time. In 
terms of practical implications this means that the framework needs 
more development. I have no doubts as to the quality of the research 
that I have completed and the amount of knowledge I have acquired 
throughout the span of this project, yet the project feels incomplete. 
I did not manage to switch off research mode completely until time 
had almost expired. Reflexively, knowing that time was expiring I 
should have made a plan to manage this cutoff. There is then the 
need to improve the framework and its theory by incorporating the 
findings of the experiment and their derivative implications. A huge 
amount of research from the literature awaits its incorporation into 
the thesis; much of it ready but not yet to the point that it made the 
inevitable cutoff deadline. And there is so much more yet to learn! 
The time constraint has left many important but non-essential topics 
out of this thesis and still others have been described in little depth.  
I have learned that the time constraint should have been taken far 
more seriously when this research project was conceived and 
planned. Now I believe I more completely understand that this is the 
nature of research—
The more I know, the more I know I do not know. (TB)
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10.6. Practical implications
It occurred to me to question my own ‘natural’ paradigm. Not surpris-
ingly, it turns out that I am a pluralist as well. In conducting the in-
terviews, I generally took an interpretivist approach and occasionally 
slipped into one of the other paradigms which would best support the 
intent and the expression of my idea of the moment. (In dialogue, I 
consider my point of view to be very important and think of the inten-
tional use of the point of view as a matter of technique. For example, 
I find that I am likely to be understood and can establish a certain 
level of intersubjectivity when I slip into the paradigm I am trying to 
explain and speak from it in the first person.) Had I realised or even 
noticed that I was a pluralist before I had to admit that some of my 
interviewees were ‘naturally’ pluralists, I may have been able to build 
this into my theory. But since I did not, this has to be put forward as 
one of the issues that will make it into the next round of the learning 
and improving cycle. 
How valid is the experimental data? The interview method was flawed 
and applied inconsistently. I now know better, but at the time it 
seemed more important to learn from each interview experience and 
adapt my approach to the next one than it was to be consistent. The 
findings revealed two critical issues that had not been considered in 
460
the philosophy and design of the new theory: pragmatism and plural-
ism. Both make it necessary for the theory to be re-evaluated in the 
next iterative cycle of experiential learning in the manner of Kolb 
(1973a, b, 1976, 1984) and critical systems thinking; and that should 
also be followed by another round of testing which will also have im-
proved.
The theory it defines an ontology which is without form, (that form is 
only assigned by the human through the critical moment), but the 
design of the ontology itself is done with languaged concepts. We are 
unable to imagine a “formless” world without giving it a form that is 
“formless”. I wonder whether or not this and other concepts may be 
too difficult for the systemists (for whom it is designed). It cannot 
hurt, though, that it reminds us that by seeing the world paradig-
matically, we are necessarily imbuing our world with our own biases 
and simplifications. Questioning ourselves, we can ask “what is it that 
is seen which was not there” and “what is there that has been 
blocked out?” When we question simplification we can ask “what is it 
that is deemed ‘important’ and what is it that has been filtered out?” 
It is true that when we shift paradigms we free ourselves from one 
framework with biases and simplifications only to be trapped in an-
other with different ones. I insist, though, that it is not an act of futil-
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ity but is actually liberating when compared to having only a single 
paradigmatic perspective. The world is complex. We should improve 
the variety of means we use to come to understand it and the variety 
of tools we use to affect change responsibly.
10.7. Summary
The dissertation answers “Yes” to the research question: 
Is it possible to create a new theoretical framework for 
systems thinking and practice which resolves the long 
standing problem of paradigm incommensurability and 
enables a coherently informed multiparadigm multimeth-
odological approach to systemic research design and in-
tervention?
This project has been a greatly rewarding and enriching life experi-
ence. I have stood on the shoulders of giants. This research will 
hopefully add something to the discussion amongst the theorists, 
academics, designers and practitioners in the systems community 
about our present trajectory and what it means for the future if we 
continue to specialise. It is possible that we could change course and 
begin to come together instead by educating ourselves and others to 
become theoretical and methodological pluralists and by working to-
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gether in teams of other pluralists and specialists. I hope to be af-
forded the opportunity to continue developing this line of thinking. 
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